THE VINDICATION,

BY THE

REV. GEORGE JUNKIN, D.D.

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The vindication, containing
a history of the trial of

THE

VINDICATION,

CONTAINING

A HISTORY

OF THE

TRIAL OF THE REV. ALBERT BARNES,

BY THE SECOND PRESBYTERY,

AND

BY THE SYNOD OF PHILADELPHIA.

TO WHICH ARE APPENDED,

NEW SCHOOLISM IN THE SEVENTEENTH COMPARED WITH NEW SCHOOLISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

BY REV. GEORGE JUNKIN, D.D.

PHILADELPHIA:
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INTRODUCTION.

THE HISTORY PREPARATORY TO THE ACTUAL COMMENCEMENT OF THE TRIAL.

In February, 1835, I was in Philadelphia on business, and whilst there, had my attention called to the new work of Rev. Albert Barnes, on the Epistle to the Romans. This arrest of attention was by an unknown correspondent of the Presbyterian, over the signature of Veritas, who presented a number of extracts from the work, accompanied by very judicious and forcible remarks; pointing out the errors of the Notes, and their opposition to the Standards of the Presbyterian Church. The new book, as from these notices might well be expected, was a subject of frequent conversation: and among other places, at the table of my friend and host, Rev. John Chambers, who stepped up to his study, and brought the book itself. I read a few pages in it, and was induced to procure a copy to examine at my leisure. This examination resulted in the conviction, right or wrong, that, as no other person appeared disposed to do it, it would be proper for me to comply with the order of the General Assembly, and endeavour to procure an ultimate decision on these controverted subjects. After this determination, the next question was as to the manner: and here, too, it appeared to me the Assembly was correct; the only proper way was to bring charges against the author. Before I could arrive at this conclusion, it was early in March; and it appeared exceedingly desirable to have the whole matter embraced within as short a space of time as practicable: so as to give occasion to the least possible amount of agitation, with its evils. Hence the plan proposed in my letter below, of making the case what, in civil matters, is called an amicable suit. Ignorant of it, I dropped a line to brother Steel, requesting him to let me know when the Second Presbytery of Philadelphia, of which brother Barnes is a member, held its stated meeting, and whether it would be practicable to accomplish the object as proposed. He informed me by letter, dated the 12th March, that the stated meeting in question was to have been late in April, but that a special meeting was about to be called, viz. on Friday, the 20th, for the purpose of changing the time of holding the stated meeting: and advised to prepare and send forward to him my paper, and promised to have it presented, &c. Or, if Mr. Barnes refused the request to waive his right of ten days, or if the said stated meeting should be fixed too far on in April, to receive the charges, and allow the ten days for preparation, which our Book guarantees to prosecuted persons, and to finish the trial before the Assembly, then he would endea-

vour to procure a *pro re nata* meeting to receive the charges, so that they might come up at the stated meeting. Agreeably to this arrangement, I wrote to Mr. Barnes as follows:

LAFAYETTE COLLEGE, March 16th, 1835.

Rev. and Dear Sir.—In your Notes on the Epistle to the Romans, there are doctrines set forth, which, in my humble opinion, are contrary to the Standards of the Presbyterian Church and to the word of God.

It also appears to me, and has long so appeared, that these, and certain affiliated doctrines, have been the chief causes of the unhappy distraction over which we all mourn.

A third opinion, operating to the production of this communication, is, that peace and union in evangelical effort cannot take place, so long as these important doctrinal points remain unsettled; and that, therefore, all the friends of such union and peace ought to desire their final adjustment by the proper judicatories of the Church. It is certainly true that many have wished to see them brought up, fairly and legally, before the proper tribunals, unconnected with mere questions of ecclesiastical policy, and without any admixture of personal or congregational feelings. Regret has often been expressed by many, and by myself among others, that the Presbytery of Philadelphia, had not, at the outset, instituted process against yourself, instead of the course they pursued. I am sure, however, they did what they thought for the best. It is much easier to find fault after a measure has been put into operation, than to foresee its defects and prevent them.

Now, dear Brother, your recent publication has re-opened the door, and, unworthy as I am, and incompetent to the solemn duty, yet duty I feel it to be to enter it; and by an open, fair, candid, and Christian prosecution of the case, to bring out a formal and legal decision of your Presbytery on the points alluded to. I therefore intend, *Deo volente*, to prefer charges against you, founded solely upon your Notes on Romans, and referring to no other evidence for their support, than what shall be deduced from that book.

In prosecuting these charges, I hope I shall be enabled to act with gravity, solemnity, brotherly affection, and all the respect due to a court of Jesus Christ. The object is peace through union in the TRUTH; and I hope the God of Truth and Peace will direct us to a happy issue. Most conscientiously do I believe that you have fallen into dangerous error. I feel that *your* doctrine shakes the foundation of my personal hopes for eternity. If *it* be true, then I cannot "read my title clear, to mansions in the skies." Around the discussion of a subject so solemn, I cannot doubt, the Son of God will throw a hallowed influence, which will call up feelings very different from those that too often agitate ecclesiastical bodies, where principles of minor consequence acquire exciting power from adventitious circumstances.

May I now ask of you the favour to transmit to Mr. Henry McKeen's, No. 142 Market street, a note with responses to the following queries, viz:—1. Will you admit the Notes on Romans, bearing your name, to be your own production, and save me the trouble of proving it? 2. Will you waive the constitutional right of ten days, &c., [Book pp. 396–402,] and so let the case come up and pass through the Presbytery with as little delay as possible; provided I furnish you with a copy of the charges at least that number of days beforehand?

To these postulates I can see no reasonable objection on your part, and presume there will be none.

A friend of mine will receive your reply and dispose of it agreeably to arrangements already made; and will also inform me of the time and place of the Presbytery's meeting. Your brother in the Lord, GEO. JUNKIN.

To this letter was returned the following answer:

PHILADELPHIA, March 18th, 1835.

Rev. Sir:—Your letter of the 16th inst. came to hand to-day. In regard to the "postulates" which you have submitted to my attention in your letter, I remark that the Notes on the Romans *are* my production, and that I trust I shall never so far forget myself as to put any one to the "trouble of proving it." On those Notes I have bestowed many an anxious, a prayerful, and a pleasant hour. They are the result of much deliberate attention; and of all the research which my circumstances, and my time permitted. I commenced, and continued them with the humble hope of extending my usefulness beyond the immediate sphere of my labours in the pulpit; nor have I any reason to doubt that, in this, I was under the governance and direction of that sacred Teacher, by whom the Scriptures were inspired. If others *would* make a better book on the important epistle in question, I should heartily rejoice in their doing it. I have never been so vain as to think that in the exposition of a book like the Epistle to the Romans—so intrinsically difficult—so profound—so often the subject of commentary and controversy, *my* work was infallible; or that there might not be room for much honest difference of opinion and exposition. Nor am I conscious of any such stubborn attachment to my own views there expressed, as to be unwilling to be convinced of their error if they are incorrect, or to retract them if I am *convinced* of their error. Whether the act of *charging* a minister with heresy; of *arraigning* him for a high *crime*, without a friendly note, without a Christian interview, without any attempt to *convince* of erroneous interpretation, be the Scripture mode, or most likely to secure the desired end, belongs to others, not to me, to determine. I would just say, that I have not so learned Matthew xviii. 15—17. I have no reason to *dread* a trial or its result. I mourn only that *your* time and mine, and that perhaps of some hundreds of others, should be taken from the direct work of saving

men, and wasted in irritating strifes and contentions. On others, however, not on myself, will be the responsibility.

In regard to the "postulate" in your letter, that I "would waive the constitutional right of ten days," &c., I have only to say, that if any man feel it his duty to arraign me before my Presbytery, I presume it would be best in the end, and most satisfactory to all parties concerned, that the principles and rules of the book of discipline be formally adhered to, and that it is not my purpose to make any further concessions.

As I have no acquaintance with the gentleman whom you refer to in Market street; as he has given me no occasion to address a letter to him; and as it is evidently not necessary that *our* correspondence on the subject should be conducted, like that of duellists, through the intervention of "*a friend*," I thought it best not to address him, unless he shall make it proper, but to answer yourself without delay. I am yours, &c.

REV. G. JUNKIN, D. D. ALBERT BARNES.

On the 18th I forwarded, through Mr. Steel, a letter, as follows:

To the Rev. Moderator and Second Presbytery of Philadelphia.

BRETHREN.—To you belongs the solemn and responsible duty "of condemning erroneous opinions which injure the purity and peace of the Church—of removing and judging ministers—of watching over the personal and professional conduct of all your members."

Now one of your members has, as appears to me, published in a recent work, certain erroneous opinions, of a dangerous tendency to the peace and purity of the Church, and to the souls of its members. In that publication he has observed, "he who holds an opinion on the subject of religion, will not be ashamed to avow it." As, therefore, he appears willing to let his opinions be known, and to abide their consequences, and as to me they appear dangerous, (in the absence of a more suitable advocate of the opposite truths) I ask of your Reverend body the privilege of preferring CHARGES against the Rev. Albert Barnes.

As I have stated in a letter to that brother, "the object is peace, through UNION in the TRUTH; and I hope the God of truth and peace will direct us to a happy issue. Most conscientiously do I believe that you have fallen into dangerous error, I *feel* that *your* doctrine shakes the foundation of my hope for eternity. If *it* be true, then I cannot 'read my title clear, to mansions in the skies.'

Around the discussion of a subject so solemn, I cannot doubt, the Son of God will throw a hallowed influence, which will call up feelings very different from those that too often agitate ecclesiastical bodies, when principles of minor consequence acquire exciting power from adventitious circumstances."

I have also stated in that letter, the opinion "that peace and union in evangelical efforts cannot take place so long as these important doctrinal points remain unsettled." Hence this measure. It is designed to produce a legal decision, and put an end to the distractions

consequent upon present fluctuations. I do therefore pray and beseech the Presbytery to take order in the premises, and to facilitate the issue with the least possible delay. I have no witnesses to cite but brother Barnes himself, and shall be confined to his testimony contained in his Notes on Romans. These are referred to in part in connexion with the charges, and other portions will be read on the trial for further proof and illustration. Your brother in the Lord, GEORGE JUNKIN.

This letter brother Steel was requested not to hand over to the Presbytery, provided brother Barnes would accede to my proposition of an amicable suit, by waiving his right of ten days after the tabling of charges, giving him, however, that much time *before* trial; and in case he would so agree, to hand the charges therein specified to him; but if he, Mr. Barnes, would not so agree, then to lay the letter and charges before the Presbytery.

Here it is proper to remark, that my letter to Mr. Barnes was written and mailed on Monday, the 16th. He received it, and wrote his answer on the 18th; the answer, however, was not mailed until Saturday, the 21st: meanwhile, the Presbytery met, (on Friday): brother Steel called at Mr. McKeen's, where brother Barnes had been requested to leave his answer to me, and not finding any, attended the special meeting of Presbytery. They resolved to hold their stated meeting—when alone any and every business can come up—on Monday, the 23d: so that it was perfectly impossible I could know of the meeting and be there. Let me here ask, Why did Mr. Barnes hold his answer to me from Wednesday until Saturday, so that it could not reach me until Monday? And why did he not drop it at Mr. McKeen's, 142 Market street? Did he wish to keep me ignorant of his decision as to the "postulates," until it would be too late for me to meet the Presbytery? Did he suspect that if he should leave his answer where I requested, it might enable brother Steel, or some one else, to meet the Presbytery, and present the charges? Why did the Presbytery, on Friday, change their stated meeting until Monday? Did they wish to throw out the charges, of which brother Barnes had intimation? These queries are important, as they direct the reader's mind to the evidence of a disposition to shun a trial. "Charity thinketh no evil:" she, however, "rejoiceth in the truth."

Let us proceed with the narrative. On Monday, 23d, the Second Presbytery met, and Mr. Steel presented my letter above with the charges, of which Mr. Barnes *then* obtained a copy. This letter produced some sensation, and drew forth some unkind remarks and insinuations. There was secret collusion—there had been a caucus, and the proposed prosecutor was but the *tool* of that caucus—preconcert there surely must have been—Dr. Junkin could not prosecute, for he had signed the Act and Testimony, and could not acknowledge the legality of this court—why was he not present

in person? &c. &c. They were assured that the suspicion of a conspiracy was as groundless as it was unkind—that Dr. Junkin had not read the "Notes" when last in the city—that the only preconcert was the arrangement, by which an opportunity was secured of presenting these charges—that the reason why he was not here is obvious; you have fixed the time so that he could not *possibly* know of your meeting; but let a time be appointed for the trial, and he will attend, &c. &c.

The result was the adoption of the following minute, of which official notice was communicated thus:

"To the Rev. George Junkin, D. D.

"Extract from the minutes of the Second Presbytery of Philadelphia.

"In Presbytery, March 23d, 1835. A letter was received from the Rev. Robert Steel, purporting to have been addressed by the Rev. George Junkin, D. D., of Easton, Penn., to this Presbytery, which was read.

"After recess the Presbytery resumed the consideration of Dr. Junkin's letter; whereupon it was

"Resolved, That this Presbytery cannot regard any *letter* from an absent person, as sufficient to constitute the commencement of a process against a gospel minister.

"Resolved, That the said letter be preserved on the files of this judicatory.

"Ordered, That the Stated Clerk send the Rev. Dr. Junkin an attested copy of the minutes in the case of his letter.

"Attest. THOMAS EUSTACE,
"*Stated Clerk of the Second Presbytery of Philadelphia.*"

Appended to this was a private note, which I here record with great pleasure.

"Brother Junkin will perceive that official duty has made the accompanying communication necessary on my part. I deeply regret that your sense of duty has made you think this step necessary, but would desire to cherish the best feelings toward you personally, and have those feelings reciprocated. Praying that all may be overruled for the good of the church purchased with blood, and with the best wishes for you and yours,

I remain yours truly.
THOMAS EUSTACE."

Here again, let it be remembered, is evidence of reluctance—strong reluctance to entering upon the trial. The Presbytery, as such, and Mr. Barnes and many others individually did manifest no little disinclination, and display no little ingenuity to avoid a trial. There is moreover some inaccuracy in their minute. The letter addressed to them did not *purport* to be from me. *It was from me*, and had my name appended to it in the ordinary manner. It was not a letter *from* Mr. Steel, but only *through* his hands.

The Presbytery did not, as Mr. Steel on my behalf requested them to do, fix a day for meeting on the business, but adjourned to meet at *the call of the Moderator.* Thus it was made practicable to come together from time to time, on short notice privately given by the Moderator, and to transact their necessary and ordinary business, without its being possible for me to know.

Believing then, as I do to this hour, that the design was to thwart my purpose, to evade a trial, and prevent a decision of the doctrinal questions, I determined to prevent its accomplishment, by taking a complaint, which "brings the whole proceedings" up to the superior judicatory: and for aught we can yet see, it might have been as well, had it gone up thus to the General Assembly.

The following paper was therefore addressed to the Moderator.

"To the Rev. Moderator of the Second Presbytery of Philadelphia:

"Rev. Sir,

"I hereby give constitutional notice, that I intend to *complain* to the next General Assembly against the proceedings of the Second Presbytery of Philadelphia, in relation to the charges which I preferred against the Rev. Albert Barnes—for the following reasons: viz.

"1. Because the reason alleged for not regarding my charges as sufficient to constitute the commencement of process against a gospel minister; viz. that they [the charges] were contained in a letter and presented in my absence—has no foundation in the constitution of the Church. There is nothing in the Book of Discipline from which such a reason can fairly be inferred, but the contrary. The Book says, "they must be reduced to writing." p. 401.

"2. Because the Presbytery have given me no notice when they will again meet, that I may appear before them; but although they were respectfully asked to appoint a day, they adjourned to meet at the call of the Moderator, thus precluding the possibility of my being present.

"3. Because, although they retained and filed the charges, they have virtually and substantially refused to permit Mr. Barnes to be tried on them.

"4. Because such virtual refusal is a violation of the constitution, which makes it the duty of the Presbytery "to condemn erroneous opinions," p. 359; and which implies, p. 401, that when "some person or persons—undertake to make out the charges"—and "to reduce them to writing," the duty of the Presbytery is to afford a fair, open and candid trial.

"5. Because such virtual refusal is directly in opposition to the repeated injunction of the last General Assembly, which has said, Minutes p. 26, "and should any already in office, be known to be fundamentally erroneous in doctrine, it is not only the privilege, but the duty of Presbyteries, constitutionally to arraign, condemn and depose them." And again, "Our excellent constitution makes ample provision for redressing all such grievances; and this As-

sembly enjoins, in all cases, a faithful compliance, in meekness and brotherly love, with its requisitions." Again, "the fair and unquestionable mode of procedure, is, if the author [of a book deemed heretical,] be alive, and known to be of our communion, to institute process against him; and give him a fair and constitutional trial."

"6. Because, according to Book, chap. V. 8, the Presbytery was bound forthwith to cite the parties, (viz. Mr. Barnes and myself) to appear [which seems to imply their absence] and be heard at the next meeting, which meeting shall not be sooner than ten days after such citation."

Yours, very respectfully.

GEO. JUNKIN.

Easton, March 28, 1835.

Appended to this was a kind of semi-official note to the Moderator, thus: "Brother Grant may perhaps have seen the complaint on the enclosed half sheet before. Since writing that copy [it was addressed to brother Eustace, I not knowing, when it was written, who was Moderator,] I have learned that you are Moderator of the Second Presbytery, and looking at the copy hastily taken, I am apprehensive I neglected to date the one sent to brother Eustace. To obviate all doubt and make the thing constitutionally safe, I address you directly.

May I not hope that the Presbytery will throw no obstacle in the way? Brother Barnes says "I have no reason to *dread* a trial or its result. I mourn only that *your* time and mine, and that perhaps of some hundreds of others should be taken from the direct work of saving men."

Now, my dear brother, will not the true time-saving expedient here be, to come right up to the point? Will not putting off and standing upon doubtful points of order, be the very way to make a protracted and a perplexing business of it? My deliberate opinion is, that with the right spirit, the whole matter may pass through in a single day. Assuredly all I mean to read and say on the trial, if permitted to take my course, will not exceed three hours.* Should you call a meeting about the 7th April, I will have all the charges written out, and the testimony adduced in their support transcribed from the book, and lay a copy on your table, so that your clerk will have no trouble writing it, and you no delay. Brother Barnes surely needs no time almost to prepare. The whole testimony is already in his mind. He says, "On these Notes I have bestowed many an anxious, a prayerful, and a pleasant hour." He assuredly has not to labour, as I have, in arriving

* *Now*, after having spent fourteen hours speaking in Presbytery and six in Synod, I am of the same opinion. Had the case been met at first and promptly, I still think a single day would have finished in Presbytery; so marvellously does delay and discussion extend a matter.

at their meaning, as a preparation to its discussion. He has not his opinions to form. He has counted the cost. He believes the doctrines he has taught to be truth. If he and the Presbytery, after the proposed examination, shall still be of that opinion, I am sure they will say so. I may misunderstand his language. Let its true meaning appear. Can the brethren of the Presbytery give a good reason why the trial should not go on forthwith, according to the book? Of course, your humble servant thinks not. Should a meeting be appointed for the trial, as above requested, you will let me know. Or should it be thought necessary to have me present before the charges will be admitted to lie, let me know. Only remember, our public examinations, &c. &c., are on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday of next week. For my presence, I must confess, I see no colour of reason; if obliged to go I shall *feel* that I am put to trouble and expense, without necessity and without law; yet I will go any time after Thursday next.

"Now may I not hope Mr. Grant's influence will go to gratify my wishes and meet my sense of duty? Allow me to add, when I began this note, it was designed to be private. It may be viewed as almost semi-official. Its substance seems so to require.

Very respectfully, your brother in the Lord,
GEORGE JUNKIN."

This complaint was not carried to the Assembly, because the ground of it was removed by the Presbytery's opening the door for trial. In my note accompanying it, as first sent to brother Eustace, on the 26th, I had observed "should the spirit of my letters to brother Barnes and to the Presbytery be fairly met, then you will call a meeting to try the case—say between the second and tenth of April."

On the 30th March I received the following:

"*Philadelphia, March* 28, 1835.

"To the Rev. George Junkin, D. D.

"Dear Brother,

"I have been desired officially to inform you that the Second Presbytery of Philadelphia will meet by adjournment at the call of the Moderator on Thursday the second day of April, 1835, at nine o'clock, A. M. in the Lecture Room of the First Presbyterian Church on Washington Square: this being an adjourned meeting, Presbytery is competent to the transaction of any business that may come before them.

"Attest. THOMAS EUSTACE,
Stated Clerk."

On the opposite page was the following private note:

"Dear Brother,

"You will see by the above, that your wish has been promptly complied with. I believe there is no desire to shrink from an investigation on the part of Mr. Barnes or the Presbytery.

"Yours truly, THOMAS EUSTACE."

Thus, although I had written "between the 2d and 10th April," and stated to the Moderator, "Only remember our public examinations, &c. &c., are on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday of next week," and "any time *after Thursday*, I could attend; the meeting was appointed on the 2d, (Thursday) at 9 o'clock, A. M. so rendering it imperative on me to travel great part of the night or to afford opportunity to fail in procuring a trial.

The reader will please to look at these *facts*, and ask himself how far the apprehension of a complaint operated in procuring this prompt meeting of my wishes. Would a hearing have been afforded, if it could have been avoided?

Let us follow the thread of history. After finishing my labours in the examinations, on Wednesday the 1st April I set out, and by travelling in the night was enabled to be in Philadelphia about 9 o'clock on the morning of the 2d, and about fifteen minutes after 9, entered the Lecture Room. At that moment the clerk was reading the complaint above, although the minutes had not yet been read. After the reading was over, I and some others were kindly invited to seats as corresponding members. The Presbytery attended to various business, at every hiatus in which I looked for an introduction of my own. But finally, about five o'clock P. M. seeing no disposition in the house to take it up, I invited the Presbytery's attention to it myself—stated, that as I had tabled charges and had received official notice that the Presbytery were to meet to day, and as the ten days stay were up, I had reason to suppose the trial would now proceed. Dr. Ely said there was no authoritative notice issued—if the clerk had sent such a paper, it was from not knowing his duty. I then read the letter of the clerk; but was assured it was not designed as a citation, as the Presbytery had no charges before them—was asked whether I had now any charges to table. I replied in the negative—I had not *now* any charges to table—they were already tabled, and more than this, they were taken possession of by the court, and ordered by a formal, recorded resolution "to be preserved on the files of this judicatory," and therefore it appeared strange indeed, to ask me *now*, for a paper which you yourselves put on file ten days ago. Had this Presbytery *returned* the paper to me by the hands of the original bearer or any other, it would be reasonable to ask me whether I would now present charges. But being a document of the court, I presume the next step is to proceed in the use of it according to its obvious intent and meaning.

It was then *resolved*, to ask me whether I now preferred these charges and designed to sustain them.

My answer was, that some ten days since I had presented them, and had now come prepared to prove their truth and relevancy.

Objection was here made to the charges, because the term heresy was omitted. This was introduced, I think, by brother Duffield, then sitting as a corresponding member. Others seemed pleased with it. But Dr. Ely made some judicious remarks which

appeared to satisfy the court that the charges were sufficiently specific. The prosecutor alleged his reasons for the omission, which are embodied in the introduction to the argument.(8). There the reader will find them, and it will be necessary to correct a remark in relation to them. It seems expressed, that the objection was not thought of at all until the trial was about actually to commence. This impression from reading the remark there is incorrect. The objection was raised—it was answered by myself and by Dr. Ely, and appeared then to have been satisfactorily refuted.

A resolution was then passed, to admonish me of the consequences of failure to prove charges brought against a gospel minister. Whereupon I stood up, and the Moderator, in all due form, administered the admonition.

A resolution was next passed, to put a copy of the charges into Mr. Barnes' hands. He stated that he had, by permission of the clerk, taken a copy, when the paper was first presented, [March 23d.] He was then asked whether he was ready for trial. He made a short address, in which he presented some difficulties. 1. The rule, Matt. xviii. 15, 16, "If thy brother," &c. has not been complied with. 2. Dr. Junkin's name I find affixed to a document which I hold in my hand, called the Act and Testimony, and I cannot see how he can consistently prosecute before a court whose constitutional organization he calls in question, &c. 3. The case, he said, was one of most fearful solemnity, and ought not to be gone through hastily. Great deliberation was necessary. 4. His health had been in such a state as to compel him to omit some of his ordinary duties—he could not, without unjustifiably pressing himself, be prepared in less than ten days, nor even then. 5. At the end of the ten days, Dr. Ely would be absent. Brother Grant and brother Patterson would be absent. Brother Dashiel was now absent. Without any unkind insinuations against other members, he felt unwilling that so weighty a business should be determined in the absence of these four influential members; and he felt assured the other brethren would not like to take the responsibility. 6. Another reason was that, orderly, the appeal, for he had no thought the business would end in Presbytery, should go to the Synod of Delaware. If it did not, the Assembly would probably send it back. He could not account for the haste with which this thing was pressed. He declined immediate action, and claimed positively the ten days, and hoped the trial would be postponed until June.

In reply to these remarks, the prosecutor said, the rule Matt. xviii. has no reference to such a case as this—it relates to private, personal injuries only. Now, there is no private or personal offence between us—no wounded feelings—no fault—it is a *public* concern that *cannot possibly* be hushed up by private explanation. 2. That his signature of the Act and Testimony had nothing to do with this case. He was willing to prosecute before this

court—that was a sufficient recognition of its jurisdiction, but said nothing about its organization. A foreigner who prosecutes before a court of the United States, only acknowledges its jurisdiction in the case; he expresses no opinion as to the constitutionality or correctness of its original organization. 3. The importance of the matter was a reason why there should be no unnecessary delay. The object was *peace through union in the truth*, and delay would only keep the community the longer in agitation—had he not hoped the case would be brought to an issue before the Assembly, he would probably not have brought the matter up at all; certainly not at this time. He deprecated a whole year of paper war, which must follow, if the case is not now tried.

Mr. Bradford argued strongly in favour of immediate action—but in vain. After some desultory conversation the trial was postponed until the 30th of June, at 9 o'clock.

In the course of his remarks, Mr. Barnes had read from the Assembly's minutes of 1824, p. 219, and had intimated his design to avail himself of an incidental observation about the definiteness of charges—alleging it to be a constitutional rule. Lest he might do so, I transmitted by mail a full series of references to the pages of his book that would be quoted, and of the parts of the constitution violated by them. Thus the indictment was made to contain not only the offences charged, but also the proof and the law; yet it appeared to me that he and some of the court thought it ought to contain the *argument* also. This letter was dated April 11.

Thus we have the history of this case to the period when the day of trial was appointed; by which it appears that Mr. Barnes had a copy of the charges and the chief references to proof, three months and eight days before trial; and that the errors alleged against him were pointed out. the law laid down, and the proof presented eighty days before trial. What more could have been done to favour a defence?

Thus we have traced the history to the period when the trial should commence. A short time previously to this, I ascertained that it was highly probable no trial would take place—that (it was believed,) there was a great anxiety, especially since the doings of the last Assembly, and the triumph of Act and Testimony principles, to avoid a decision altogether—that to this end there would be a resurrection of the objection against the charges for the omission of the word *heresy;* and an effort to dismiss the cause on the ground of informality—that thus, Mr. Barnes would stand professedly ready for trial, and eager to defend himself; the Presbytery would present the aspect of a court, open, free, and ready to proceed; but because of informality utterly hindered—that this informality, being in the charges themselves as drawn up by me, the fault and failure would lie upon myself—the wonder was with some industry circulated, that a man of Dr. Junkin's acuteness of mind, should have committed so great a blunder, and it was charitably imputed to inadvertence.

Now of all this I was apprised before the Presbytery met, and was not at all surprised when the *facts* revealed the accuracy of the information received and of the inferences deduced from it. The historic detail it is not necessary to state. Suffice it to say, the objection was renewed, Mr. Barnes uniting in such renewal, and repeating in strong language his reasons. Great complaints were made against the charges for want of precision—no crime was charged, &c. &c. Especially brother Patterson felt it extremely hard to try a man for nothing—no specific charges were made, &c. &c. But if brother Barnes was willing to go on at such a *great disadvantage*, he would throw no obstacle in the way. This remark threw Mr. Barnes into a great strait. It was manifest Mr. Patterson had not seen the drift of it. Mr. Barnes, however, felt it, and experienced no little difficulty in extricating himself from the awkward position it placed him in. He was thus obliged openly to say, whether or not he was willing to go on to meet the charges as they had been drawn up, presented, and accepted. His reply was, that this was a question for the brethren of the Presbytery; he threw himself upon them; if they thought it was fair and just for him to be tried without any specific charge of *crime* or *heresy*—the only two things, he contended, for which a minister could be tried, he was ready. These remarks were understood, and a motion was made by Mr. Patterson to permit the prosecutor to take back his charges and amend them, or otherwise the Presbytery would not go on to the trial; this motion was carried; and upon being requested to comply, I declined, knowing that then it would be a new bill, and Mr. Barnes would be entitled to his ten days again; and stating at the same time my objections against the term; and that, in my view of its meaning, the things charged amounted to heresy; yet, doubtless, others would think differently. Thus the case was about to be arrested, agreeably to my previous information. The Presbytery were proceeding to other business, and the intended prosecutor rolled up his papers to take leave of the court. Before going out, however, he thought he would propose a query, and wrote it on a slip of paper, viz. After charges are received, admitted to lie, and a day appointed for trial, is it competent for the court to compel the prosecutor to change his bill of charges, and to dismiss the case if he refuse? He handed this to Dr. Ely. He wrote "I think not," and handed it back. It was handed to Mr. Boardman—he nodded assent;—to Mr. Bradford—he did the same, and in a few minutes arose and invited the attention of the Presbytery to the position they had placed themselves and brother Barnes in, by the resolution just passed. Dr. Junkin, some three months since, tabled charges—the churches know it—the world knows it. He has come to attend to the prosecution and proof of them—he is just about to depart without a trial—has he shrunk from them?—No, he desires to go on—yet there is no trial. Why? On whom rests the blame of failure? This question will be asked. It must

be answered. Who prevented the trial? Not Dr. Junkin. He stands ready to prove, as he says, the charges *he* made. The public will think either the Presbytery, or brother Barnes, or both, arrested the trial. Did Mr. Barnes, it will be asked, demand a trial, and the Presbytery refuse? What position does this place the Presbytery in? Or, why did not Mr. Barnes insist on a trial? Ought any man to consent to lie under the imputations of these charges? If I were in Mr. Barnes' place, I would demand a trial; if there should be none, I should dread the impressions upon the public mind, &c. Dr. Ely presented the same views, and the result was a resolution to reconsider, and a farther resolution to go on with the trial.

Thus, after spending the chief part of a day in attempts, as I then thought, and still think, to evade a trial, and the *odium of its evasion*, the court found itself on Friday, at 3 o'clock, P. M. just where it started, and the case was then opened.

After the arguments of the parties had been heard at length, and the court had, upon a call of the roll, individually expressed their opinions, so that the result was known, a committee was appointed to prepare a minute containing their judgment, the Presbytery had a recess until 3 o'clock, when other business was expected to come up. A few minutes before that hour, I met the Moderator on his way to the church, at the North West corner of Walnut and Sixth streets, and observed to him that I wanted to be certain to which Synod I should appeal—or, in other words, whether the Synod of Delaware would ever meet. He said it never would, because the time to which it stood adjourned was later than that to which the Synod of Philadelphia stood adjourned; of this he was satisfied—for father Patterson had a memorandum of it in his pocket-book. I also proposed the query, whether it would not be better, on all accounts, for me to carry the appeal direct to the Assembly? In the affirmative of this he promptly acquiesced with me. I said, no doubt, if the parties and the Presbytery agree harmoniously in carrying it direct to the Assembly, they will not remit it to the Synod. In this we perfectly agreed, and he promised to further this course in Presbytery.

After having attended to some business I went up to the house, and upon an opportunity presenting, proposed to take the appeal direct to the Assembly, stating the reasons as in the conversation with the Moderator. Whereupon, immediately Mr. Barnes arose and objected—he had said from the beginning, and he now repeated, he wished this business to take the regular constitutional course—if it went to the Assembly in any other way, they would probably remand it to the Synod. I then asked to be informed whether the appeal could go to the Synod of Delaware—would that body ever meet again? To this inquiry a number of voices responded—No, it can't meet—its time of meeting is after the time to which the Synod of Philadelphia stands adjourned, and of course it cannot meet. Then said I, the appeal must be to the

Synod of Philadelphia, and to this there was not an official, formally expressed assent—but a real, well understood and fully expressed and general assent. In this part of the narrative I am minute, because subsequent events require it. Brother Barnes and some others have not a distinct recollection. My memory here is transparent—its conceptions are vivid—it directs me to the very spot where Mr. Barnes sat, when I made the proposition to appeal to the Assembly and the inquiry about the Synod of Delaware, viz. on the second seat to the right of the Moderator, and a little farther off than the middle of the seat. Accordingly a few days after I prepared my appeal to the Synod of Philadelphia. Confident I am, neither brother Barnes, nor any other brother will deny the accuracy of the above statement. They may say "I have no distinct recollection," which doubtless is the fact of the case, but which is no proof. Brother Grant, however, will not say even this: his recollection of the above circumstances must be secured by their associations.

Decision of the Second Presbytery of Philadelphia, in the case of the Rev. Albert Barnes, done in Presbytery, July 10, A. D. 1835.

Extract from the Minutes.

The Presbytery having heard the prosecutor at great length, in support of his charges, and the accused in defence of himself, and having duly considered the testimony submitted in the case, judge the Rev. Albert Barnes not to be guilty of teaching or holding any heresy or erroneous doctrine, contrary to the word of God and our Standards.

1st. Because it has not been proved, that Mr. Barnes has taught that all sin consists in voluntary action. He has taught, in the passages cited, that men are not compelled by any physical necessity, or fatal necessity of nature, but affirmed, agreeably to the Confession of Faith, chap. ix. sec. 1., that they are voluntary agents in the commission of sin.

2. Because Mr. Barnes has not denied, that Adam was acquainted with his existing moral relations, but has taught that there is no reason from the Mosaic History of the creation and of the life of Adam, to believe, either that he possessed all the scientific knowledge attributed to him by the Rabbins, or that he was as well acquainted with the consequences of sin before, as he was after the fall.

3. Because the passages cited from Mr. Barnes' Notes on the Romans, teach nothing one way or the other on the subject of man's ability or inability; nor is there any evidence whatever, direct or implied, that he has affirmed or taught, that the unregenerate man can convert himself to God. He has indeed taught, in accordance with the Bible and Standards, that the sinner acts most voluntarily, when he turns to God, that he is regenerated by the Spirit of God, and that his turning is his own act. But he has not denied, that in so turning, he is acted on and efficiently determined by God, the Spirit; the contrary he has taught.

4. Because Mr. Barnes has in exact accordance with our Standards, and the Bible, taught that saving faith is in every case, an influential act of the mind. In denying that it is a *principle*, he does not mean that a Christian is not a man of principle, nor his religion that of principle, nor that the mind of the sinner, who accredits the testimony of God, is brought into a state in which it readily perceives the force of evidence furnished in that testimony, and thus may be said to be a habit of mind; but simply, that saving faith is not any thing independent of the actings of the mind, nor any created or conceivable essence of the soul, back of the act of believing. This exercise of mind and heart, the Apostle says, was imputed to Abraham for righteousness. Mr. Barnes has affirmed the same, but has not taught, in so doing, that faith is regarded as a justifying righteousness. He has, on the contrary, explicitly affirmed, that the righteousness of Christ is the only ground of the justification of the sinner before God.

5. Because, while Mr. Barnes has preferred not to use certain theological technicalities, such as Covenant of Works, Federal Headship, Representation, &c., and for reasons which he has assigned, he has not denied the facts in the case, as made known to our faith in the sacred Scriptures. The Confession of Faith speaks of the Covenant of Works, as a commandment, or the law of God given to man, of obedience to which, abstinence from the fruit of the tree of knowledge, was the test and evidence. It does not intimate, that independent of and subsequent to the enactment of the moral law, God entered into a special compact with man, about his obedience, but that He was pleased to promise eternal life, not only for himself, but for his posterity, on condition of Adam's obedience to that law, to be proved by his observance of the prohibition from the fruit of the tree of knowledge. To illustrate the great, prime, elementary transaction of God with our race, as its moral governor, upon strict principles of commercial law, Mr. Barnes has objected, as being inconsistent with the dignity of the Divine Being, and the nature of moral relations. According to the strict idea of a covenant, he conceives that the parties, previously to its being made, are at liberty to decline the agreement, and because our first parents were not at such liberty to object against or decline that constitution which God ordained with them, as the Head and Representative of our race, he thinks that the Confession of Faith, by using the words law and commandment as synonymous with covenant, did not mean to teach, that the parallel is complete between the moral law, as originally given by God to our first parents, and a covenant in the strict meaning of the word, but has left it optional, whether to explain it by the one phrase or the other. Mr. Barnes has preferred explaining it as a law or commandment; but he has denied that our first parents were tried for themselves and for the race, see page 122. He has denied that in the strict legal sense of the term, Adam was the representative of the race, because he conceives

the idea of consent or appointment by those represented, as always implied in such representation. Yet has he not denied, that in a more vague and general sense, our first parents were the representatives of their race; but he has objected to attempts to explain the nature and character of the Divine transactions with Adam, which are not made in the Bible or in the Confession of Faith, but found only in human treatises on systematic Theology, as mere philosophical theories, suggested by the forms and usages of commercial law among men, for the purpose of explaining those facts in the moral government of God, which God himself has left unexplained. In so doing, Mr. Barnes has not denied, that such a connexion was established by God between Adam and his race, that, in consequence of his sin, they are subjected to the same train of ills, as if they had themselves personally been the transgressors.

6. Because while Mr. Barnes has denied that the sin of our first parents is reckoned or accounted in the sight of God, as the crime of their descendants, either by virtue of any alleged personal identity between them, agreeably to the views of some old Calvinists, or by virtue of such a legal connexion between them, that, on the principles of commercial law, that is reckoned to them, which is not truly and properly theirs, and for which they are personally blame-worthy, and ill-deserving, agreeably to the views of some at the present day, he has not taught that we have no more to do with the sin of Adam, than with the sins of any other parents, nor that our relation to him is not very peculiar, nor that the consequences or results of his sin, deeply and seriously affect us.

7. Because Mr. Barnes has not denied that we suffer many and direful ills, in consequence of the sin of Adam, that those ills are certain and universal, growing out of the connexion between Adam and his race, and are appointed by God, as a wise, just and holy moral governor, as an expression of the evil nature and tendency of apostacy. He has only objected to the use of the words guilt and punishment, according to certain theological definitions, which by not implying personal criminality, conflict with the sense in which they are used in common language—Guilt, according to Mr. Barnes, implying obnoxiousness to punishment because of personal blame worthiness of crime; and punishment, any pain or suffering inflicted on a person for this crime or offence.

8. Because the prosecutor did not attempt to show in what the proper penalty of the law consisted, nor whether spiritual and eternal death constituted a part of it, nor whether the Standards of our Church teach that Christ endured the identical penalty of the law, which according to some old Calvinistical writers, consisted in temporal, spiritual, and eternal death; or only an equivalent amount of suffering. Mr. Barnes has not denied that Christ is the "vicarious substitute" of his people, nor that He has "purchased pardon," but has explicitly affirmed and taught these

things. In denying that Christ did endure the penalty of the law, he has explained himself to mean, that Remorse, Despair, Corruption, and other things, which he supposed to be implied in the idea of spiritual death, as well as eternal sufferings, all of which he understands to be a part of the proper penalty of the law, were not inflicted on Christ, and not to deny that his sufferings and death, were substituted as a sacrifice, to satisfy divine justice, fully equivalent with the penalty denounced against transgression.

9. Because Mr. Barnes has taught nothing in regard to the active obedience of Christ, as distinguished from his passive; so far from having taught, that justification is simply pardon—he has taught the very reverse, maintaining that God regards and treats the sinner who believes in Christ, as if he were righteous, and that solely on the ground of the merits of Christ, irrespective of any good deeds or desert of the sinner whatever.

10 Because the evidence submitted on the part of the prosecution, in respect to the charges of erroneous doctrine, was that of inferences drawn from Mr. Barnes' language, which in the judgment of the Presbytery, were not legitimate, but which even if they were, ought not, and cannot, agreeably to the decision of the General Assembly of 1824, be used to convict of heresy or dangerous error, affecting the foundation of a sinner's hope, or the Christian's title to eternal life.

The Presbytery therefore judge, that the charges have not been maintained, and ought to be dismissed, and do acquit Mr. Barnes of having taught in his Notes on the Romans, any dangerous errors or heresies, contrary to the word of God and our Standards. And they do moreover judge, that the Christian spirit manifested by the prosecutor, during the progress of the trial, renders it inexpedient to inflict any censure on him, and the Presbytery would express the hope that the result of all will be to promote the peace of the Church, and further the Gospel of Christ.

Attest, THOMAS EUSTACE,
Stated Clerk of Second Presbytery of Phiadelphia.

DR. JUNKIN'S APPEAL.

Lafayette College, July 16th, 1835.

To Rev. John L. Grant, Moderator, and to the Rev. Second Presbytery of Philadelphia.

Rev. and Dear Brethren,—You are hereby officially informed that I intend to appeal to the Synod of Philadelphia at its next meeting to be held in the borough of York, on the last Wednesday of October next, against your recent decision in the case of the Rev. Albert Barnes. This appeal is from the "definitive sentence." Its general ground is "a manifestation of prejudice in the case, and mistake" and consequent "injustice in the decision."

Allow me, before proceeding to specify the reasons which shut me up to the belief that the Court was prejudiced, and did err in judgment, to say that I impeach no motives—I charge no *corrupt*

prejudice; no *intentional* mistake or error upon any man. Men do often err under the purest motives, and are often powerfully prejudiced, whilst perfectly unconscious of it. With this single remark, I proceed to detail the reasons why I appeal on the above named grounds, viz.

1. Because the Presbytery, nearly three months after the charges had been received, and the day fixed for trial, attempted to constrain the prosecutor to change them, by prefixing the general charge of *heresy;* and did actually pass a resolution refusing to hear the parties, merely because this term was absent; and upon the prosecutor saying, in answer to a question put to him, *that in his opinion*, the errors charged amounted to heresy, the Presbytery made a record which amounted virtually to a change of the indictment to a general charge of heresy. The prosecutor, now appellant, had stated his objections to the use of this term. *First*, It is a vague term, not defined, in our books; no two, perhaps of the Presbytery themselves, would agree in what constitutes heresy. Its use therefore could only create confusion and throw a character of indefiniteness around charges of error, which he had laboured to make definite and precise. *Secondly*, This term is a bugbear, and is often used to excite popular commotion of an unpleasant character, and may therefore greatly prejudice the mind against the one who accuses another of error, and in favour of the accused.

Thus the Presbytery manifested favour toward Mr. Barnes, in giving him and his friends the opportunity of exciting odium against the accuser, by allusions and references to persecution, and to "the inquisitorial toils" of the prosecutor. Accordingly this last phraseology was actually used by one of the judges, (Rev. John Smith) and not without effect.

Thus also the Presbytery changed substantially the ground and nature of the prosecution, and led themselves into error. In their final verdict, they assumed *heresy* as the general charge. And in giving their opinions, some members had their eye constantly on that fearful term, the meaning of which the court did not define. So the Rev. Mr. Barbour opened his remarks—"I never can give my verdict," said he, "that brother Barnes has been guilty of *heresy*." And again, "The Confession was not made for a trap to catch *heretics*."—And more of the same kind. So the Rev. John Smith, and the Rev. N. S. Smith, rung the changes on the word *heresy*, and evidently were engrossed with that undefined idea. So Elder Hinckle said, "the prosecutor has failed in establishing the charge of *heresy* against the defendant." So Elder Darrach, "I would not say Mr. Barnes was guilty of *heresy*." And thus the court was carried off the ground of the charges, and decided on a case not before them. Heresy with many is some horrible thing for which a man must be burnt. Thus lost in a term undefined and undefinable, the court, as appears to me, erred in judgment. They shuddered at the idea of burning Mr. Barnes.

2. Because the accused was not called upon by the court to put

in a plea to each charge specifically. Dis. V. 10. "The charges shall be read to him, and he shall be called upon to say whether he is guilty or not." Now cases may occur, wherein an accused person may plead guilty to one and not to another of the charges, and unless the question be distinctly put, "do you admit the truth of this first charge, or not?" and so of the rest, it cannot be known what the plea is; and if no special plea be put to each count of the indictment, the prosecutor and the court are put to unnecessary trouble, and kept in ignorance of what they are called upon to do; whether to prove the truth, or only the relevancy of the charge. This violation of rule is the more censurable, because a Presbytery is a court of conscience, and every person arraigned ought to have it put to his conscience to say whether the things charged are true or not. But the 12th section settles this question. "If the minister, when he appears, will not confess, but denies the facts alleged against him," &c. Clearly this contemplates an explicit acknowledgment or denial of the things charged. Now Mr. Barnes, in the plea he put in, admitted some of the charges, and denied others; but the Presbytery did not require him to specify which he admitted, and which he denied; so that the plea amounted to nothing. He says, "I neither have taught, nor do I teach any thing, according to my best judgment, contrary to the word of God; nor do I deny any truths taught in the word of God, as is alleged that I do in the indictment now before the Presbytery," Can any candid man read this plea against charges of holding doctrines contrary to the word of God, and Confession of Faith, without feeling that the accused admits teaching doctrines contrary to the Confession of Faith? And is this plea any thing more than any errorist in every age has put in? Who does not know that all errorists that have troubled the Church, and do trouble her, always profess to found their doctrines on the Bible? In reference to the Confession of Faith there is absolutely no plea at all. The prosecutor has always been of opinion, and by the admissions of Mr. Barnes, now more than ever, that had he been put to a special plea, he would have acknowledged the truth of at least a majority of the charges, as he has done of the principal ones, so far as the Standards are concerned; and would have justified himself on the ground of Scripture. Thus, it is believed, prejudice was manifested in favour of the accused. For by this course he was left to all the benefit of a denial, where he could do it with a clear conscience; whilst he had all the advantage of silence, where he could not have denied. By this, too, the trial was greatly protracted.

Thus, also, the appellant and the court are left still in doubt whether Mr. Barnes admits or denies certain points. Dr. Ely in his paper said Mr. Barnes included Christ's active obedience in the matter of the believer's justification, and did not teach that justification is simply pardon. On the contrary, Rev. Mr. Patterson said he believed Mr. Barnes held the common doctrine of the New

England divines, and the doctrine of Dr. Dwight; which is, that justification is simply and only pardon. Thus justice in this state of the case could not be expected. This incipient error led on to others.

3. Another reason for thinking that there was some little bias in the court, is the high estimate in which, deservedly, some at least of the members held Mr. Barnes as to talents, and his congregation as to respectability and influence. It will be remembered that the Presbytery held its meetings in the lecture room where the accused had usually met his people, and many of them were present during the trial. It is hardly conceivable that the good brethren should not be insensibly influenced. Accordingly, one in closing his remarks said, "Never let me be found condemning a man to whom God has given such mighty powers of mind, and a congregation so dignified and influential."

4. My fourth reason for appealing on the ground of prejudice leading to error, is, that the Presbytery have in their decision endorsed some of Mr. Barnes' alleged errors, and having made them their own, could not be presumed altogether impartial in their judgment. Ex. gr. "This exercise of mind and heart," (Abraham's) say they, "the Apostle says was imputed to Abraham for righteousness." See 4th reason. And again, under 5th reason, "It (the Confession of Faith) does not intimate that independent of and subsequent to the enactment of the moral law, God entered into a special compact with man about his obedience; but that he was pleased to promise eternal life, not only for himself, but for his posterity, on condition of Adam's obedience to that law, to be proved by his observance of the prohibition from the fruit of the tree of knowledge."

Now, on the contrary, the very doctrine of the Confession and Catechism is, that man was created having "the law of God written in his heart," and "when God had created man he entered into a covenant of life with him." The covenant was subsequent to the enactment of the law. Thus the Presbytery sanctions the error charged, and therefore may well be supposed favourable to the accused.

5. Because on the 5th, 6th, and 7th charges, it is very difficult to say whether the Presbytery admit, as Mr. Barnes did, that he denied the doctrine of the Standards. It is painfully difficult to know what their decision is under these heads; and particularly on the 7th, they certainly do not tell us whether Mr. Barnes denied or acknowledged the doctrine that Adam's posterity are guilty, i. e. liable to punishment on account of Adam's sin. Why did not the Presbytery give an unequivocal sentence here? On these three charges, where every attentive hearer of his defence must know that Mr. Barnes admitted his denial and rejection of the doctrine of our Standards, and where he set up his defence on the ground of Scripture and his own metaphysics, in opposition to them, I am constrained to think, the main efforts of the Presbytery

have been expended in throwing darkness and obscurity around the subject, and "so they wrap it up."

This reason I may extend to each one of the charges, and the Presbytery's action on them.

Three questions naturally arose on each. 1. Is the thing charged proved by the testimony? 2. Is it contrary to the Standards? 3. Is it contrary to the Bible? Now the prosecutor humbly conceives he had a right to a decision on each of them. This he respectfully requested in a letter addressed to the Presbytery, but was refused.

6. Because an inaccurate statement in the 8th reason of the decision, was, perhaps, partly the ground of said decision, viz: "Because the prosecutor did not attempt to show in what the proper penalty of the law consisted." Now the prosecutor did show, from the Confession and the Bible, that the proper penalty of the law consisted in death. "Thou shalt surely die"—that it consisted in the curse—the wrath of God—which things include sorrows, anguish, and woes unutterable, inflicted upon the Saviour by the righteous judgment of God the Father, because his own Son bare the sins of the people (by legal imputation) in his own body on the tree.

7. Because of a similar inaccuracy in the 10th reason, viz: that "the evidence submitted on the part of the prosecution, was that of inferences drawn from Mr. Barnes' language." Now the appellant humbly conceives that he submitted the language itself of Mr. Barnes, as the testimony and the evidence in the case. He submitted all the passages read, and their adjoining contexts respectively. These were the evidence, and it is believed they contain *proof.*

8. Because one member of the court, at least, distinctly rejected the Standards of the Church, as a rule of judgment in the case. He said the Confession had been twisted into a wrong place. It was not a trap to catch heretics. He had as good a right to bring charges against a man for holding doctrines contrary to Ridgley's Body of Divinity, and the Bible, or contrary to the Christian Almanac, and the Bible, as the present prosecutor had to charge Mr. Barnes with holding doctrines contrary to the Confession of Faith and the Bible. It is true, he next day apologised, by saying he did not mean to disparage the Confession of Faith. But then his speech was at least partly written. It was deliberately and strongly expressed; whereas the apology was obviously a lame effort, for popular effect. Now, how many more of the judges were of this sentiment, I cannot say. I believe, however, there be some even *newer* Presbyterians, than this anti-confession brother. But one thing is obvious, viz. that such doctrine effectually precludes a fair and impartial trial.

9. Because the Presbytery took Mr. Barnes' present declarations as expository of the meaning of his language adduced in proof. I think this will be evident upon a simple reading of the

passages of his book quoted as testimony, and the decision of the court. During the whole trial, it appeared plain to me, that he was by the court viewed as the legitimate, and the only legitimate expounder of his own printed words; and in support of this it was alleged, that he knew best what was his own meaning.

Now the appellant believes that the court itself was the only authorised expositor. They had no right to take the *present views* of the party at the bar; nor his *present gloss* upon his own words, formerly uttered, as their correct meaning. They were bound simply to weigh the words according to their obvious meaning in their connexion, and according to the usages of the language. The question before them was not (or ought not to have been) What does Mr. Barnes *now teach* or deny? Not, what does he *now* say he taught *then?* But simply, what has he taught here in this book?

Every candid mind must perceive, that if a man shall be permitted to give his own explanation to his own words, no man can ever be convicted of holding error, unless he be so stupid as to be unable to distinguish between truth and error, and to fetter down and explain away his own terms. A very small portion of talent for mystification can gloss over the most obnoxious terms. For example: An action of slander is brought against me, for uttering the words—'I saw O. P. Q. in a state of intoxication, at a public dinner on the 4th of July.' It is proved that I pronounced these words, and that I am not on friendly terms with O. P. Q. I put in a plea of justification, and claim the privilege of explaining. I show both from my habits of speaking and writing, that I have used the term intoxication, in application to high mental excitement. The man was intoxicated with joy. This is all I meant. It was a compliment. I was simply representing the strong patriotic feeling of O. P. Q.; he was intoxicated with joy upon a reminiscence of the glorious transactions this day commemorates. Or, I show that I have been in the habit of abusing Pennsylvania as a drunken state—the whiskey insurrection state —the state of intoxication. I meant nothing more than that I saw O. P. Q. in Pennsylvania that day. Will the court and jury take my explanation, and find me a verdict? or will they judge for themselves what my language means? Will they receive as authority, my present testimony, in my own favour; or will they ascertain by other scales, the weight of the words proved?

This, I take it, is the grand error of the Presbytery, as to the ground of their decision. They made Mr. Barnes both witness and judge in his own case, by a gratuitous assumption of his present views, and his present exposition of his language formerly uttered, and now adduced in proof, as being undoubtedly the true and proper sense of that language; and of his doctrines there published. Accordingly, notwithstanding he had said in his defence, "the doctrine of all sinning in Adam, and falling with him, I mean to reject," the Presbytery acquitted him on the ground of

his oft-repeated declaration, that he agreed with his accuser in the substantial facts of the case.

All these considerations, and some others, conspire to sustain me in the conviction, that my tenth and last, and principal reason of appeal is just and true, viz.:

10. Because the decision of the Presbytery is not in accordance with the facts of the case, as exhibited in the charges, and the Testimony and the law. It is not a righteous decision.

All which is respectfully submitted, by

Your unworthy brother in the Lord,

GEO. JUNKIN.

Decision of the Synod of Philadelphia on the above Appeal.

Resolved, 1. That in view of the proof presented to Synod, and of the whole case, the decision of the (Assembly's) 2d Presbytery of Philadelphia, in the case of the charges of the said Geo. Junkin against the said Albert Barnes, be and the same hereby is *reversed*, as contrary to truth and righteousness, and the Appeal declared to be sustained.

2. That some of the errors alleged in the charges to be held by the said Albert Barnes are fundamental; and all of them contrary to the standards of the Presbyterian Church in the United States; and that they do contravene the system of truth therein taught, and set forth in the word of God.

3. That the said Albert Barnes be, and he hereby is suspended from the exercise of all the functions proper to the gospel ministry, until he shall retract the errors hereby condemned, and give satisfactory evidence of repentance."

On the general resolution to sustain the appeal and reverse the decision of the Presbytery, the vote stood—*Ayes*, 73 Ministers, 69 Elders. *Noes*, 14 Ministers, 2 Elders. Non liquets—17. Excused—1. On the final vote adopting the minute closing with the above three resolutions, the vote stood—*Ayes*, 58 Ministers, 58 Elders—116. *Nays*, 29 Ministers, 2 Elders. Non liquets and excused, 8.

Thus, for sustaining the appeal, by parliamentary rule, there were 159 to 16—nearly *ten to one;* and but two Elders in the whole Synod were found ready to vote in favour of the New side. So true is it, that the hope of orthodoxy lies in the popular branch of our ecclesiastical organization. It takes long and hard labour to corrupt the Eldership by false philosophy.

THE ARGUMENT OF THE PROSECUTOR

IN THE

Case of the Rev. Albert Barnes.

The understanding of man is that faculty of the mind or soul by which he *judges*. Judging is that *operation* in which the understanding compares thoughts or ideas and marks their agreement or difference or both. To the mind's performing this *operation* at all, the *possession* of thoughts is indispensable: to the *accuracy* of the performance and of the results of the operation, *precision* of thought is necessary, and the latter must be in proportion to the former. If a man have not the precise materials detached from all others to place in the balances of a just judgment, he cannot weigh them and tell their relative value. *Knowledge* therefore of the whole case is essential to a right decision by our judging faculty. Scales, however, of perfect equipoise, and a beam accurately divided into two equal parts, and a pivot under its centre, are not all the requisites to absolute precision in the results. The pivot of truth, on which the intellectual balance turns, must be brought to a point and kept free from the rust of envy, or the rancid dust-thickened oil of prejudice; this is best affected by suitable cleansing and a little drop of the pure oil of charity. With such precautions we may hope a right and equal judgment. Hence in all litigated questions between man and man the importance of the judging power being kept free from partial views, calculated to throw the beam off its centre, the scales off a true equipoise, or to clot the pivot with the rust of prejudice.

In the case of the Rev. Albert Barnes, I was applied to by a publisher, just about the close of the trial in July, for my notes for publication. Mr. Barnes had consented to give his and seemed desirous that I should do the same. I declined for two reasons. 1. Because my argument was made from very

brief notes constituting mere heads of doctrine and references to proof. 2. And principally as it never was intended from the first, that the case should stop short of the General Assembly, (the grand design being to procure a final adjudication and settlement of the litigated points,) I thought, and stated it, that it would be best to leave the higher courts free from all prejudice of *our creating*, and let them come up to their solemn and important work, without any bias of judgment; and for this end also, I was very desirous to have had the case brought up to the Assembly of last year, before the whole land should be excited into prejudice. I therefore declined the publication, and have still persevered in the belief that this is the correct course. It appears to me, that, as in civil affairs, it is criminal to prejudice the court, it cannot be altogether innocent in ecclesiastical matter. There is indeed a difference in the cases. Ours relate to matters of doctrinal belief, and admit free discussion on the general principles; but still where personal interests are allied to doctrinal opinion, and official character is at stake, prudence should teach *parties* to stand back. *We*, the *parties*, stand at the judicial bar; to that we have appealed; and I conceive we have no right, *during the pending* of our own cause *there*, to litigate at another bar; we have no right, and we can have no right in the very nature of *right*, to a trial at two different tribunals at the same time, and for the same thing.

This is my doctrine. Why then, you will say, does your practice contradict it? Why do you publish your argument in the case of Mr. Barnes? I answer, because, new rights result from new wrongs. I have no *right* to thrust with violence a man out of my house who comes in peaceably and lawfully: but if a man enter for villainous and unlawful purposes, I have a *right* to eject him by force if need be. Mr. Barnes has committed what I suppose a *wrong* in refusing to plead before the bar of his own choice, and then preferring his plea before a tribunal unknown to our ecclesiastical constitution: and out of his wrong my right grows. He has arraigned me at the tribunal of the people: not, you will observe, of God's people only; but of the world at large. His "Defence" is made at a bar where no bill had been preferred against him, until after he there appeared. Not satisfied with the legitimate courts of Christ's house, he has actually spread be-

fore the world in tens of thousands of copies, his entire written argument. Will not the reader justify me in sending my argument for the truth, after this "*Defence*," though it should lag far behind? Justice, wherever her throne be, is the same in her essential characters and indispensable requisites. Whether in the popular bosom or on the supreme bench; she must have her balances and her facts. In the premature effort of my brother, she has had her scales thrown indeed into a very forbidding attitude, one hung to the ground by its ponderous load, the other empty. This however will soon be rectified. Her hand is even now lowering to restore the empty scale to its just equipoise, and receive my argument; when this is fairly in, let her hand rise, and the Church of God, yea, the world itself judge where abides eternal truth.

It needs scarcely be added here, that the argument before the Synod of Philadelphia, was a hasty sketch, and the report in the New York Observer a mere skeleton of that sketch.

Here presented, it is written as if for the Assembly: it has been prepared at intervals of time *picked* up, chiefly whilst from home on a collecting agency. There is no time to me for revision: it must therefore appear from the original rough draft, and if attacked on the score of literature, it will find in me no defender. An apology for its inaccuracies, may be found in the fact, that I did not expect it to be published entire, until I should have had time to write it over: but the emission of some thousands of extra Philadelphians, with the "Defence" of Mr. Barnes, seems to render an earlier emission proper; and, having public appointments in various parts of the country, I must let it go even as it is. It may appear hereafter in another form.

George Junkin.

Philadelphia, March 3, 1836.

Mr. Moderator,

Deep and solemn are the responsibilities of a gospel minister. He is the servant of the Most High, and to his own Master he must render an account of the service he may perform, of that which he may neglect, and of the manner and spirit of both his action and his inaction. The precise period, particular form, and all the circumstances of this account conspire to fill the mind with conceptions awful as eternity, and emotions agitating as the convulsions of dissolving nature.

The precise period fixed upon for this account is none other than that set forth in the sacred volume as the consummation of all things—when the Son of Man shall be revealed in his glory, and all flesh shall see him together.

The particular form of this account is that which belongs to official rank. The minister of God must, as an individual sinner, in common with other men, respond to the interrogations of the final Judge as to the manner in which he spent his brief day upon earth. But besides this, he must answer to him who called him to take part of this ministry, for the substance of its duties and the manner of their performance, or the reasons of their neglect. As a subordinate *officer*—a steward—he must give his *official* account.

All the circumstances are of peculiar solemnity. He will stand in that day before an assembled universe. *There* will be the people to whom he ministered, or should have ministered, in holy things. Spectators they shall be and witnesses for or against him. Souls of immortal mould, lost by his neglect, or saved through his instrumentality, clustering round will encircle the dread tribunal to mark the accuracy of his statements. The omniscient eye of his Judge shall be upon him and upon them—that eye which now beams mercy and compassion, will then as now look through his being. But then, as it doth not now, will it expose to naked gaze the totality of that being, its attributes and its entire actings—especially, however, its official actings. These may be summed up under the two heads of doctrinal instruction and pastoral vigilance. "Take heed unto thyself, and unto the doctrine; continue in them; for in doing this thou shalt both save thyself and them that hear thee." (1 Tim. iv. 16.) And with increasing solemnity he says, "I charge thee, before God and the Lord Jesus Christ, who shall judge the quick and the dead at his appearing and kingdom; preach the word; be instant in season out of season; reprove, rebuke, exhort with all long-suffering and doctrine." 2 Tim. iv. 1, 2.

Agreeably to these serious charges, the man of God is bound to give himself to reading, to meditation, to prayer, and all those labours of intellect which may enable him to come forth to his people well furnished with doctrinal truth. A witness for God, he is laid under sacred obligations to *know* the truth and to speak it *all* in its proper order, time and place. He may not exhibit his own opinions, but God's. He may not plunge into the dark mist of metaphysical and philosophical speculation, and detail the results of his groping research—his rude abstractions, in room of simple gospel truth. His it is to reason out of the Scriptures. These are to be the limit and the rule of all his doctrinal instruction, and its practical application.

But even more laborious and awfully responsible, if more can be, are the duties of his pastoral vigilance. His it is to go forth, *especially* "in the dark and cloudy day," into the defiles of the mountains and the waste and desolate places of the land, whither

the flock of his Master may be scattered, and to seek and to search them out; to collect them into the fold of the Good Shepherd, to go in and out before them and lead them upon the mountains of Israel. And as "the Great Shepherd of the sheep" knows his own sheep, and is known of them, so the under-shepherd is bound to know his own, and peculiarly to watch over and guard those who may be feeble or wayward, so that for *every one* he may render a satisfactory account "when the Chief Shepherd shall appear." In view of these exhausting labours and consuming cares and soul-burdening responsibilities, well may the man of God, compassed as he is with infirmities, exclaim "Who is sufficient for these things?"

To all this, Mr. Moderator, I know your heart most cordially responds. Deeply have you felt these responsibilities, and earnestly have your desires gone forth after that grace whereby alone any man can be sustained under a realising sense of their magnitude. Why then, you will say to me, why harass a christian brother? —why increase the heavy burdens of a minister of God by such a prosecution as this? Has not this brother sufficient cares and labours already for any one man to sustain? Wherefore then add the spirit-chafing and patience-exhausting efforts necessary in defending against charges like these?

These interrogations are exceedingly natural, and very specious. And I am not wholly unapprised of the peculiar difficulties to which he is exposed who voluntarily steps forward to be a public prosecutor of a christian brother, eminent for talents and occupying a distinguished station in the Presbyterian church. The simple fact creates as it were instinctively, a feeling of disgust towards the individual and of indignation against his conduct. Any person can, and almost every person will, apply to such disturbers of the peace, the language which John applies to Satan himself. Accordingly I have already been branded by not a few, "the accuser of the brethren," and *motives* have been attributed to me which are not mine, either by original conception or by legal imputation. Hence, sir, it becomes proper and necessary and just, to premise a few remarks in reference to my present posture.

1. Not all the duties of men and of ministers are pleasant. Doubtless, to have embraced his brother Peter in all the warmth of fraternal feeling, would have been exceedingly gratifying to the heart of Paul, and most congenial with the spirit of love which breathed through his whole conduct: but yet he felt himself constrained to meet him with the power of displeasure on his brow, and the language of stern rebuke upon his tongue. He withstood him to the face, because he was to be blamed. And thus it often happens. The course most agreeable to our feelings is not the course of duty. Who that desires to preserve a conscience void of offence toward God and toward man, has never been constrained to meet duties, even of friendship and love, very trying to both?

2. Among duties of this kind, is the very one in question: as in the case of Paul against Peter; and as contemplated in the constitution of the Presbyterian church, (Dis. v. 5.) where we are told, that "Process against a gospel minister, shall not be commenced, unless some person or persons, undertake to make out the charge." It is perfectly obvious, that if a minister may and can ever be lawfully prosecuted, some person or persons must do it. Yea, that prosecution for error is in some cases right, is evident. (Dis. v. 13) "Heresy and schism, may be of such a nature as to infer deposition: but errors ought to be fully considered." It may therefore, according to the Bible and the constitution, be the duty *sometimes* of *some person* to prosecute a Christian minister. Do you demand the reasons why I think this time is come, and this person is before you?

3. This demand I shall meet, not however to justify my motives, but simply to exhibit reasons for my conduct. *Motives* unexpressed, it is God's to judge. All impeachment of these, I leave with him. No man has a right to judge motives, only so far as they are exhibited in conduct. If by look, word, or act, I should violate the law of love, then condemn me; but not upon the evidence of evil motives, merely suspected and surmised. It is the purpose of my heart in all this business, to be guided by that charity which thinketh no evil; and if I be found to err from this purpose, it will be through an infirmity of nature, and not through unchristian wilfulness. On this point, Mr. Moderator, you will please to keep in mind, that neither quickness of reply, nor elevation of voice, becoming disagreeably shrill as it rises, or even vehemence of manner in action, are infallible evidences of bad temper in a speaker. By reason of these defects, I have been frequently misunderstood in public discussion, and bad feeling has been imputed to me, where there was every thing the reverse. In the late General Assembly, some of my warmest friends of recent acquaintance, fell into this wrong inference, and spoke to me on this subject; I assured them they were mistaken—there was no feeling such as they supposed. As to warmth of manner, approaching sometimes to vehemence, you will bear with it. You love to see it in the pulpit, and why not in a deliberative, or even in a judicial assembly, when the occasion calls for it? If defect it is, it is one which I am not very anxious to correct. My soul desires not alliance with him who can speak on the most serious and important subjects without emotion. If unable to preserve the happy medium in this thing, let me rather be found among the enthusiasts than among the phlegmatics.

4. The great reason why I am before you in the odious character of a volunteer accuser, is this, that *eternal truth is at stake*. Brother Barnes has in these "Notes on Romans," impugned some of the leading doctrines of Christianity. To me it appears, that he has uttered sentiments directly at variance with the standards of our church, and with the Bible: and these, not of

comparative insignificance, but of vital importance. There are doctrines set forth in this volume, as I suppose, *fundamentally erroneous*. Nor am I alone in this opinion. That you may be convinced of this, and thereby disposed to give a more patient hearing, let me present the opinions of the gentlemen who conduct the Biblical Repertory. In vol. ii. p. 92, they say, "It is now, by many who would be esteemed orthodox, and Calvanistic too, considered so absurd to hold the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, that they will not even condescend to argue the point and demonstrate its falsehood. If these be correct in their views of the subject, it must create some surprise, that all theologians, from the days of Augustine, who were not acknowledged heretics, believed firmly in this doctrine and considered it as fundamental in the Christian system. Is it certainly the fact, that these modern impugners of the ancient doctrine of the church, understand the Scriptures better than all who have gone before them? Or is it undoubted, that they are endowed with a perspicuity so much superior to that of Augustine, Calvin, Owen, and Edwards, that what these thought, after profound consideration, might be defended as reasonable, is so absurd as not to merit a refutation? Now we confess ourselves to be of the number of those who believe, whatever reproach it may bring upon us from a certain quarter, that if the doctrine of imputation be given up, the whole doctrine of original sin must be abandoned. And if this doctrine be relinquished, then the whole doctrine of redemption must fall, and what may then be left of Christianity, they may contend for that will; but for ourselves, we shall be of opinion, that what remains will not be worth a serious struggle." Other men then, it seems, and men whose opinions are wont to be treated with respect, coincide with me in opinion. They think the doctrine of original sin, including imputation, viz. the imputation of Adam's sin, and necessarily drawing along with it the imputation of Christ's righteousness—the very doctrines, whose rejection constitutes the leading error of this Book or Notes—these are *fundamental*. Deny these, and "what remains will not be worth a serious struggle." Reject the covenants—as this book does most explicitly, and you take away the foundation of a sinner's hope for eternity. Thus you perceive good reasons exist why *some person* at least should "make out the charges," and prosecute to a final issue, and procure a sentence of condemnation upon errors so fatal to the Christian system.

5. But, Mr. Moderator, the right of securing such a decision by prosecuting an individual minister, is peremptorily denied by the accused in this case. "I utterly deny the *right*," says he "of any man to arraign *me* before a court, merely to make me the occasion for a *discussion* of an abstract doctrine, in theology, politics, or morals." Now if the ground taken by the Brother here be correct, I want to know how, and in what form, any man sustaining a fair moral character, can be tried and convicted of error?

Is it in any case right to try a man for teaching error? What is the design in every such trial? Is it to wreak vengeance upon the man? Is his punishment *the object!* or is it the vindication of *the truth?* Doubtless the latter is the great aim of all discipline and all censure. To remove the offence of teaching error, and to bring back the wanderer from his erratic course into the paths of truth, are the only legitimate objects. But Brother Barnes would have you believe that my object must be to see him punished, his character ruined, his usefulness cut short. Oh! Mr. Moderator, how I would rejoice to see his usefulness increased tenfold, his character for consistency as a Presbtyerian minister, shine forth, and his person and life escape censure and punishment from all but the known enemies of the truth, and thus our beloved Zion relieved from the agonies she endures in consequence of the errors in this book and elsewhere published to the world. These are among the important objects in view. But the Brother says then, "A proposition should have been submitted to the Presbytery, to organize itself into a court of judges, on a trial of skill in controversy, and the propositions should have been submitted for discussion; and charges should not have been brought against a minister of the gospel." Surely this was written for *public* amusement and diversion: that the minds of men might not dwell upon the merits of this case; but be lashed into a foam of indignation against the wanton murderer of ministerial reputation. In reply, let me ask, suppose such a proposition had been made to the 2d Presbytery, what would they have said? They would have said, Sir, you are mistaken. This is not a court of abstract casuistry. We cannot engage in such trifles. Where is your authority in the Constitution of the Church for demanding such a trial?—Show us the *authority* by which we are bound to sit and judge in such a case. On the contrary, the last General Assembly marked out the true constitutional course. True, the Assembly of 1831, did say in reference to these very questions, "If they be answered, they had better be discussed and decided *in thesi*, separate from the case of Mr. Barnes." (Minutes p. 180.) But then there is no authority in our Standards, by which a church court can be compelled to judge on abstract questions. They *may* do it if they choose, but there is no obligation, and we choose to decline. The last Assembly prescribed the proper course,—(see Minutes, p. 26.) "the fair and unquestionable mode of procedure is, if the author [of a book alleged to contain error] be alive, and known to be of our communion, to institute process against him; and give him a fair and constitutional trial." If therefore you desire a legal decision on these points, we say, with that wise Assembly, "institute process against him; and give him a fair and constitutional trial. And until you do this, we beg leave to decline all action in the case." Such, Mr. Moderator, would have been your answer. Such it must have been agreeably to the principles of common sense, as they are embodied in

the laws, civil and ecclesiastical, and the practices of courts in both.

6. But in pressing this point of abstract and moral process, Mr. Barnes gives occasion to me for another remark, viz: That in bringing these charges, I do not originally publish him as an errorist, and thereby assail his character. For he very adroitly assumes the singular position as true, that, until these charges were made out, nobody in all the world had ever heard that he was suspected of maintaining doctrines contrary to our standards! "Suppose," says he, "that Dr. Junkin had arraigned me before a court having competent jurisdiction, on a charge of adultery.—Suppose that the fact was proclaimed abroad, and suspicions were excited, and counsel was employed, and a jury empannelled, Suppose the public mind had had time to be agitated on the subject, and a strong bias should set against my character, and peace should flee from my family, and my public work should be closed.—And *then* suppose that the public should be gravely told, that all this was not designed to injure *me*, but to settle some mooted points about the crime in question; and that all this array of indictment, and of testimony, and of trial, had been merely to bring up the subject before the tribunal in order to obtain a decision on the law. And would it be possible for the community to repress its indignation against conduct like this?" Now, Mr. Moderator, let me anticipate the obvious tendency and design of this illustration, and prevent the rising of yours, and the public's indignation, by stating, that the cases are about as dissimilar as they can well be imagined. (1.) The Brother has never been arraigned before the public law for the crime of adultery: but all the world *knows* that for many years he has been, not *secretly suspected*, but *publicly accused* of holding the errors here charged. For six years the religious press, and in some degree the secular press, have groaned under the weight of this controversy. The charge of corruption in the Post Office Department was not more *public* and *flagrant*, than was the charge of his holding and teaching error, *before these* charges were written. It is therefore all idle and worse than idle, to insinuate that I have given origin to these matters—have "published them abroad"—have "excited suspicions;" to destroy ministerial character." No, Sir, I never drew a pen—never published a line of the volumes that have been poured out upon the public, within the last six years: and therefore I feel it to be unkind in Brother Barnes, to attempt to represent me as an agitator, coming in after "the agitations of that time had died somewhat away," and opening afresh the bleeding wounds of a convalescent church. "The agitations of that time had died somewhat away," *when* these charges were brought. Had they indeed! What! in March 1835! Why, Mr. Moderator, how was it in the preceding General Assembly? Were there no "agitations" there? No, not a mountain wave!—No, not a rolling billow and a sweeping tempest! Why then does my Brother throw out so unkind an insinu-

ation? Why does he seem to wish it understood that I intruded, like an evil angel, into the peaceful paradise of the Presbyterian church, and threw all into agitation and angry strife? But (2.) The hypothesis he presents illustrates the correctness of the remarks I made about abstract judicial process and its absurdity, whilst it differs from the present case in another most material point; viz: That a charge of adultery directly impeaches moral character, but a charge of teaching error does not. A (3d) point of dissimilarity is, that the one offence exposes to civil pains and penalties: the other does not. Let me however pass upon your notice the (1.) as the chief point here. In preferring these charges I proclaimed nothing new. It was universally known that Brother Barnes was supposed by many to hold those opinions. Indeed he himself has stated it. "Charges," he says, "similar to those had been alleged against me. Those accusations had been laid before the General Assembly." Why then—for I repeat a question: why insinuate that the prosecutor has raised this storm? On the contrary, let me propose a query now, which I meant to press home hereafter, viz: Who intruded this controversy into the Presbytery of Philadelphia, and the Synod too? Did the skies lower and the lightnings play and the thunders roar and the rains descend and the floods beat upon this city of brotherly love, *prior* to the introduction of Brother Barnes' "WAY OF SALVATION?"

7. There are special reasons inducing me to undertake this unpleasant service for the church. (1.) I once belonged to the same Presbytery with Mr. Barnes; had lived in the midst of the agitations growing, as I always supposed, out of his peculiar opinions; had many opportunities of marking the origin and spread of the leaven at work in the mass, and had some little knowledge of the brethren in and around Philadelphia—their peculiar temperament and talents. (2.) I do not now belong to that Synod. For more than two years I had ceased to mingle in the deliberations of any of its Presbyteries. This, it appeared to me, was a favourable circumstance. Removed to a distance, not too great to prevent accurate observation of passing events; nor too small to keep me in the whirl of excitement caused by the new theology, I really thought I could look calmly on the scene, and form a tolerably correct estimate of passing events. Therefore, (3.) I had observed one of the necessary practical effects of the protraction of these great controversies, viz. a waning of the cause of Presbyterianism in this city. Grieved to see such a practical result of the controversy, it occurred to me that the cause must be removed, or the evil must increase. Convinced, as I still am, that the true answer to the church's complaint, "Why is my pain perpetual, and my wound incurable, *which* refuseth to be healed?" (Jer. xv. 18,) is found in the fact stated by the same prophet, (vi. 14.) "They have healed also the hurt of the daughter of my people slightly, saying, peace, peace, when there is no peace," I would not avoid the opinion, that the man

who would seize the probe, run it deep into the festering wound, and open up the secret springs of its irritation; though he must first expect the maledictions of the patient, would nevertheless do her the highest service, and ultimately win her gratitude and love. (4.) I had been thrown occasionally into the agitations of ecclesiastical strife, and though *naturally* excitable and quick in temperament, it really appeared to me that prudence and grace might carry me through this storm, as well as others. Or, to change the figure, I had seen the probe applied, the patient and the operator both writhe, and yet the happiest results follow. (5.) I had been a pastor, and knew something of a pastor's cares, and toils, and joys, and sorrows; and therefore was of opinion, that my sympathies stood ready to shield the brother from any severity which truth might drop from my tongue. (6.) The republication of the old doctrines of "THE WAY OF SALVATION," of which the General Assembly of 1831, had said it "contains a number of unguarded and objectionable passages; yet is the Assembly of opinion, that especially after the explanations which are given by him (Mr. B.) of those passages, the Presbytery ought to have suffered the whole to pass without further notice." This republication of the same doctrines, in a form more objectionable than before, and freed from the gloss of explanations, has fairly opened the door, and invited a prosecution, which stands entirely detached from the former collisions. (7.) The general interests of the church, in her charitable enterprises, have been long paralyzed by these agitations. Brethren have been *compelled* to stand in an attitude of resistance against innovation, and to expend much force in this way, which they might, and doubtless would, have expended in the noble enterprises of the day, but for the necessity under which they were laid of defending their own firesides against the intrusions of a new theology. Now, I say, let us come up and discuss and decide, once for all, the whole matters at issue. Let the old landmarks of truth be sought for, and the lines be well ascertained, that every man may know his own territory, and the spot where he is to stand or fall.

These are the leading reasons why this process is begun. But brother Barnes has a variety of objections to the present prosecutor in *particular*. (1.) He belongs to a different Presbytery from himself. This is my (2.) reason above stated, and I think it a good and substantial one, why I may lawfully prosecute. (2.) The brother himself was of good and fair standing with his own Presbytery and church. Answer.(*a*). That he stood fair with his people, *if* he was known to teach dangerous doctrine, is a good reason why some person should make out the charges. For *if* his own people were dissatisfied with his doctrine, it would be evidence that they were not in danger of being drawn away from the true Presbyterian standards. (*b*).That his standing with his Presbytery was fair, was to have been expected; because it was created explicitly and expressly for his protection, and all were

excluded from it, who might be supposed in danger of disturbing him for his belief. Hence the indispensable necessity of his prosecutor being of another Presbytery. (3.) Mr. Barnes seems to object, because he "was pursuing peacefully the duties of a most arduous pastoral charge, requiring all my time and strength; and, indeed, exhausting the vigour of life, and rapidly undermining my constitution, by arduous and incessant duties." Oh! Sir, if Mr. B. had met the requirement of his "most arduous pastoral charge"—had he devoted "all his time and strength," "the vigour of his life," and "his constitution," sacredly to pastoral duties, you had never heard of this prosecution: for then these "Notes" had never been written; and hundreds of thousands of Presbyterian youth, and hoary heads too, had never been endangered by the alarming doctrines of this book. No, Sir, this brother did not devote "all his time and strength, and vigour of life" to pastoral labours. He must extend, what I must think, the baleful influence of "a number of unguarded and objectionable" doctrines over the length and breadth of the land. He must needs write a book, containing the most "objectionable" doctrines of his celebrated sermon, and thrust it forth among our Sunday schools and Bible classes, and churches and people, that thus he may teach to tens of thousands sentiments subversive of our entire system of doctrines. Thus, the fire which was smothered under, by the slightly healing policy of the Assembly of 1831, is, by the breath of this peaceful brother, blown into a flame that sweeps across the continent. Then from the meekness of his peaceful retreat he looks forth upon this tempest of fire, and placidly complains that the uproar produced by the efforts to extinguish it, has disturbed the quietness of his retreat. Oh! that he had paused but a little for reflection—that he had considered the possibility of the refluent flame sweeping through the branches of his own olive tree, and there drinking up the oil of his own consolations. (4.) These charges are substantially the same with those once before the Assembly. So they are, and the Assembly condemned the sermon on "The Way of Salvation," as "containing a number of unguarded and objectionable passages," (Min. p. 180;) but exculpated the writer on the ground of explanations given; and yet now in this book of Notes, we have similar expressions without an attempt to disguise by explanations. (5.) Personal injury I had never sustained at the hand of brother Barnes, and hence, he infers, I could not properly be an accuser. "To Dr. Junkin," says he, "I had done no injury." And again, "By bringing these charges, Dr. Junkin alleges, impliedly, that he has been injured, either *personally*, or as *one of the Christian community*. If *not* injured in one of these senses, there could have been no justifiable pretence for bringing them." On the contrary, if the accused had injured me particularly, it would have been a constitutional bar against my prosecuting; for our book says, that "Great caution ought to be exercised in receiving accusations from any person who is known to indulge

a malignant spirit toward the accused—or who is deeply interested, in any respect, in the conviction of the accused." Now, injury received, affords some ground at least to suspect "a malignant spirit toward the accused," and an interest in his conviction. (6.) Another reason why I should not prosecute is thus stated: "His opinions I have not attacked." How this observation escaped the writer, it is difficult to surmise. My opinions are contained in the Confession of Faith and Catechisms, and these are most unceremoniously attacked in this book. The very language of the Catechism is quoted in derision on page 117, thus, "What idea is conveyed to men of common understanding by the expression they sinned IN him?" And on page 10 and page 128, the leading doctrines of the Confession are stated and rejected with indignity. How then could it be said "His opinions I had not attacked?" (7.) I am President of a College; and therefore ought not to bring charges. "Why should *Dr. Junkin* feel himself called on to stand forth as the defender of orthodoxy, and as the accuser of his brethren? Why should the president of a literary institution feel himself called on to bring solemn and grave charges of error against a pastor in another Presbytery?" In replying to this item in brother Barnes' "DEFENCE," allow me to observe, that I never could see just reasons why Presidents of Colleges, many of whom have *charges* vastly more important to the church at large, than any mere pastoral charge can be, should, because of their office, be deprived of any ministerial right. Why should men, who certainly *need* as much decision of character as any other class of citizens, be shut up to the necessity and degradation of everlasting fluctuation? Is it come to this, in a country that glories in free discussion, and in a state where "the free communication of thoughts and opinions" is declared to be "one of the inalienable rights of man," that, however general the right of opinion and the privilege of publishing it, the entire class who conduct literary institutions, are put under the ban of proscription? Must presidents of colleges necessarily be men of indecision in all matters of doctrinal belief? Or if they may be permitted to entertain opinions upon questions of great interest to the church and the country, must they be excessively cautious and reserved in their publication? On the contrary, is it not entirely befitting those who are entrusted with the government of youth, with especial regard to the development of their faculties and the training of their minds to habits of decided and independent action, to form for themselves, *cautiously* and *prudently*, and to express on all proper occasions, explicitly, openly, and honestly, the moral and religious principles by which themselves and their institutions are governed? Is there a class of men in the whole community, whose opinions that community have a deeper interest and a better right to know?

Now it may be proper here to state that some friends did advise me, in reference to these agitations of the church, to be quiet,

and take no part in them: and I confess the advice seemed very plausible; and when the first *trial* of Mr. Barnes in the Presbytery of Philadelphia came on, it providentially turned up, that a prior engagement called me to a distance from the scene, and I was glad of it: and should still have been pleased to escape the unhappiness of this position. But then every minister has come under solemn obligation to maintain the doctrines of our standards against all opposition, and wherever and whenever the God of providence shall present opportunity: and *therefore*, though often tempted to stand afar off and witness the noble strife for truth, I still met my ordination vows. They forbade shrinking. They told me of claims upon conscience, prior to those of any literary institution, and of more fearful import. The peculiar official relation to a literary institution, does not appear to cancel the obligations officially borne to the church, nor constitute a barrier insuperable to enduring the odium of prosecution. Some think otherwise, however; and I could name the Presbyterian minister who sent his daughter to a Roman Catholic seminary, and his son to Lafayette college: and who removed the former because her Bible was taken from her, and the latter, because the president had prosecuted Mr. Barnes. A similar spirit appears to have moved the brother to make this objection to his prosecutor. On the Monday preceding the publication of the "DEFENCE," brother Barnes and I met in Broadway, and had some conversation: in the course of which he inquired, whether I had come on with a view to do something for the college: I frankly replied, that that was my sole business in New York. On Saturday his Defence appeared, *modified*, you will observe, and *amended* for the peculiar benefit of the college. Whether the giving of this blow had any influence upon the mind of the brother and of the editors, in hurrying forth the Defence so many weeks before a word of argument had been offered on the other side, the world will judge. Whether such an attack be consistent with that meekness which turns the other cheek, when one has been smitten, the church will judge.

An (8) objection to the present prosecution is, that no general name is given to the charges—the term heresy is not introduced—"no charge of *crime* was alleged, nor even of *heresy*." This objection was made in Presbytery, but not until nearly three months after the charges were received and admitted to lie, and a time was appointed for the trial: and, not until the trial was just commencing, was it discovered that the important word *heresy* was omitted in the charges. And so pleased were some of the members with this discovery, that it was actually moved and carried not to proceed unless the prosecutor would take back his charges and alter them by the insertion of that desirable term. In opposition to such a dismissal of the case and shrinking from a trial, I alleged several reasons. (1) The use of the term *heresy* is calculated to excite terrific apparitions in the public mind. In for-

mer times *heretics* were unceremoniously burnt, and our imaginations are scarcely capable of strict subjection to truth when we allow ourselves to talk about heresy: we still associate the gibbet and the stake; the dungeon at best and the rack, with the very name of heretic. The term was therefore omitted. It was felt to be unnecessary and utterly undesirable to use exciting epithets —epithets calculated to inflame popular feeling, and draw forth public indignation. It was politic in the prosecutor; and he is always desirous to act with prudence and policy whenever principle will allow of it. He was sacredly resolved from the outset to abstain from all language calculated to excite improper feeling. Nothing is ever gained to the cause of truth by the use of harsh epithets; and few such there are, that, when used seriously, are better calculated to wound tender sensibilities and call up the worst feelings of humanity, than to charge a man with being a heretic. All this it was my purpose to avoid, and the result shows that the purpose was wise and good. But now might not the question be asked, why did brother Barnes and the Presbytery so much desire the term heresy to be introduced? Did they wish to avail themselves of this handle to work against the prosecution? Were they sorry at not obtaining this advantage and means of creating popular excitement? Why, Mr. Moderator, some of the very court themselves could not repress their own imaginations; but although the charge was not for *heresy* expressly, they could see, and hear, and speak of nothing else. The horrible visions of the tormenting engines and the stake were continually before the minds of some: and the dreadful idea of burning the heretic haunted their imaginations. Now if that fearful word did these things in the green tree what must have been the effect of throwing this torch among the dry leaves, agitated by every passing wind? Surely these brethren would not wish to bring the most solemn and important decisions of a church court under the violent influence of popular commotion! And surely therefore you will admit, it was wise to leave out every unnecessary and obnoxious term. But vagueness of the term was alleged as a reason, and the chief reason, why it was not employed. It is a general term which no man can define with logical precision. It would cost this Presbytery more time and labour, probably, to tell what heresy is, than to try this whole case. There is not much probability that a week's discussion wouldenable you to settle this one term. What is heresy here, may be orthodoxy there. What is heresy with one, may be but a slight error with another. Now I hate and abhor vague and undefinable terms. There is nothing better calculated to entangle discussion, and to mystify argument. This it was my purpose to avoid. I wished to deal in specifics, not in generalities; to point out with the utmost precision the errors of the accused, as set forth in this book. Our Book of Discipline speaks of errors as being more or less dangerous—they "ought to be carefully considered; whether

they strike at the vitals of religion, and are industriously spread; or whether they arise from the weakness of the human understanding, and are not likely to do much injury." This matter I wished to leave for the Presbytery. I have laid down the positions which I think are taught in these Notes, and are dangerous errors. They are laid down with all the precision of which I was capable. I have done my best; if that is bad, be it so; but pass no censure for want of plainness, and clearness, and explicitness. You will probably find them too plain and clear and specific to admit of mystification. (3.) Another reason for omitting the vague term *heresy*, was, that it is not defined in the constitution of our church. This was admitted in the Presbytery; and was therefore not expanded and pressed, nor shall it be here. It may be proper, however, to add, what will appear upon the face of the Presbytery's records, (if ever they see the light,) that when the charges were received and *admitted* as charges, and a day appointed for the trial, there was no objection made on this, or any other ground of informality, except as to the references. This objection was an after thought, and probably owed its conception to the brother who intimated, very unkindly, as some thought, that I had refused the term *heresy*, because I was afraid to meet the responsibility and the risk of a prosecution for slander at the bar of a civil court. The quarter whence this remark came,* made me feel it the more. I thought that brother, with whom, in the days of other times, I had taken sweet counsel—Oh, Mr. Moderator, it was *sweet counsel*, when we drank in the same blessed truths from the same blessed lips—when we mingled our prayers at the same throne of grace in the social meeting—when we went up to the house of God in company—when we mingled our sighs and tears over the symbols of our Saviour's sorrows. I thought that brother had known me too well to impute to me such baseness as shrinking from the moral responsibilities of the position in which I had voluntarily placed myself. But alas, since those halcyon days, another gospel has saluted his ears, and another philosophy has won his heart. But I am anticipating the (2d) remark here. Brother Barnes' imputation of disingenuity or baseness, against my ministerial character, is as unworthy of himself as it is unjust to me. He would not have done it of his own motion. I feel confident he has been ill advised. Yet he has done it indistinctly, perhaps; but eyes there are which have detected it. Speaking of the omission of the term *heresy*, he reiterates the charge of "shrinking"—of want of moral courage, and adds, "it has thrown an air of mystery over all this transaction, which it is difficult to reconcile with the principles of the New Testament, and with the requirements of the Presbyterian church in regard to the character of its ministers." The present prose-

* Rev. George Duffield, who had been my fellow student under Dr Mason.

cutor has never insinuated an impeachment of the motives and moral integrity of the defendant in this case; and he scorns to defend his own, even at "Cæsar's judgment seat," to which his brother has appealed, and whither he has dragged him. He only regrets, that a remark so difficult to reconcile with the spirit of kindness which had hitherto characterized this discussion, should have dropped from his brother's pen. Of a similar character is the insinuation, that the prosecutor is influenced by the spirit of pride, vanity, and self-conceit. "No man has a right to *arraign* me, to give him the occasion of displaying his talent, or eloquence, or learning." Such remarks are unworthy of the writer and his subject. Had they proceeded from me, I think the law of charity would administer a reproof at the bar of conscience.

On the principle of interpretation adopted by Mr. Barnes, and the manner of his applying it, you will indulge a few remarks. It is thus stated in the preface: "The design has been to state what appeared to the author to be the real *meaning* of the apostle, without *any* regard to any theological system; and without any deference to the opinion of others, farther than the respectful deference and candid examination, which are due to the opinions of the learned, the wise and the good who have made this epistle their study." And in his defence he says, "It was, further, my intention in preparing these notes, not to be influenced in the interpretation by a regard to any creed, or confession of faith, whatever. I make this frank avowal, because it is the deliberate and settled purpose of my mind; and because it is the principle by which I always expect to be governed."

My first remark, is, that no man more admires "decision of character," independence of mind, freedom of thought and action, than I do: nor would any reasonable man go farther in resisting all unjust encroachment upon the glorious privilege of independent thinking. Accordingly, it has long been a standing rule with me, when about to expound a text or context, *first* to study the naked scripture, generally in the original, without note or comment; lest the weight of a commentator's opinion should bias my own judgment in the sifting of terms. *Afterwards* my rule has been, to examine authorities, and compare them with the results of my own cogitations. This rule I learned at the feet of our Gamaliel, and twenty years practice has confirmed the opinion of its practical wisdom. But this latter half of the rule is founded on the principle of

My second remark, viz. That independence of mind, does not consist in supercilious contempt of other men's opinions. Real humility, appears to me, entirely consistent with unflinching independence. To possess real decision, a man must possess clearness of perception and accuracy of discrimination: for truth is the foundation of this quality. It is the soul's perception of the truth that gives promptitude in counsel and firmness in purpose. If a man, without this perception, assert his claim to decision of cha-

racter, he mistakes self-sufficiency for independence of mind, and brute obstinacy for the highest intellectual attainment.

3. I dissent from the rule as laid down by Mr. Barnes for another reason, viz. that every man is bound, by the highest authority, to interpret scripture in consistency with scripture—"according to the analogy of the faith." Rom. xii. 6. No man is at liberty to take any given text, and construe its terms according to their plain, natural meaning, *irrespective* of the drift and force of the writer. You are bound to look at the train of his thought and reasoning, and, if it be at all practicable, without an utter crucifixion of language, to understand his terms in the given passage, consistently with that train, honesty requires you so to do. To do otherwise is to "handle the word of God deceitfully." But I am aware, that in these notes, "the analogy of the faith" is made to mean "*the measure of faith*," and faith is made to mean "the *extraordinary endowment* bestowed on them by the gift of prophecy," and that "they had the power of *using* their prophetic gifts as *we* have the ordinary faculties of our minds; and of course of *abusing* them also." And hence "the propriety of *regulating* this office by apostolic authority." (See Notes, p. 262.) Now it appears to me, that the spirit of supernatural revelation, conferring "*extraordinary endowment*," it is not at the prophet's option to abuse. Nor can I see how it should be necessary, for one prophet,—I mean a truly inspired man, to lay down restraining rules for another. A true prophet, supernaturally inspired, indeed may prescribe tests by which to try the prophets; but where the Spirit of God is in a man, foretelling events, I cannot think that even Balaam can go one word beyond what the Lord puts into his mouth: hence this whole interpretation is unfair. It does violence to the apostle's meaning and language. It is contrary to the "analogy of the faith." But the reason why this is preferred, appears at the close. It is to obviate this very use which I have made of it—lest it should be applied "*to systems of theology*" and demand "that we should interpret the Bible so as to accord with the system"—contained in itself. The first thing to be done toward the exposition of any piece of writing is, to read it all over, and thereby to ascertain its general drift—its grand, leading substance—its system. This ascertained, we are to be guided by this in disposing of the minuter parts of its detail. Now this the Presbyterian church has done. This every minister of that church has solemnly declared in the face of heaven and earth, that *he* has done, in reference to the Bible. This declaration he has made in his ordination vows. He has told the church, that he has examined the Bible—that, though he does not pretend to understand all of it, in all its minute parts; yet, that he has arranged in his own mind, its grand leading thoughts—he has set up the great land-marks of truth, and now he solemnly pledges himself to be guided by these in his subsequent researches. This pledge is just and reasonable; and he can neither be a just nor a reasonable interpreter of Scripture who

will withhold such pledge: he must be exposed to perpetual danger of handling the word of God, if not deceitfully, at least erroneously. But no man can be a Presbyterian minister until after he has given such pledge. His ordination vow embraces the confession, as containing the systems of doctrines taught in the holy Scriptures. Now I contend that such pledge cannot be reconciled with the language above quoted. Mr. B. professes to have given what he supposes, "without *any* regard to any theological system," to be the meaning of the apostle. Whereas neither he nor any other man has any right, or can have any right to interpret this particular section of Scripture *without any regard* to the theological system laid down in the Bible. It is right to make the general drift of scripture bear upon particular parts and mould their interpretation: and a right to construe them "without *any* regard" to this, would be a right to do wrong: which no man can ever possess. "I mean that the *mould* should be first formed" in general —it is formed in the general system of the Scriptures and the particulars are to be understood accordingly. The workman has no right to chissel any one stone from the quarry into whatever shape he may think it will best suit: thus proceeding, the temple instead of coming together stone to stone, without "the sound of hammer or axe or any tool of iron," would exhibit a scene of confusion and noise not excelled by Babel's tower. On the contrary, every workman that is worthy to lift up his tool in the preparation of any one stone, is bound to shape it for its destined position in the building. He must be directed by the relative position— the analogy, which it bears to the whole structure. Moses was bound to make all things, even to the minutest pin, according to the pattern showed him in the mount. And every expositor of holy scripture is bound, in common honesty, to have an eye to, and to be influenced by the system of doctrines taught in the Bible. Now that system every Presbyterian minister has solemnly declared to be set forth in the Confession of Faith. That it is thus set forth in explicit terms—printed in a distinct book by itself, surely does it no prejudice. It is certainly as safe there, and as available to each individual, as though it were unwritten and unprinted; but remained floating among the less fixed and stable conceptions of his own mind.

Here then is the grand paralogism of Mr. Barnes in reference to creeds. He admits their great principle, where it is applied to a given portion of Scripture ex. gr. to this epistle: but he denies the same principle in its application to the whole Bible and the grand system of doctrines therein taught. Hence an inconsistency, amounting, in my view, to a direct contradiction, within a very short space. He glories in having been free from the entanglements of all creeds—having proceeded "without *any* regard to any existing theological system."—"He is supposed to be responsible not at all for its impinging on any theological system; nor is he to be cramped by any frame-work of faith which has been

reared around the Bible." And, directly in the teeth of these declarations, he says, "I may here be permitted to state that I am no enemy to creeds and confessions. Never have I penned a sentence against them; and no man has ever heard me speak in their disparagement, or condemnation." An utter disregard to the Confession of Faith—a boasted recklessness whether he offends against its doctrines or not, is not speaking in its disparagement! This conduct is not penning a word against it!!

But I remark farther, that into this paralogism and consequent self-contradiction, he has been led by a correctly, and I doubt not, inadvertently assumed false position; viz: That the Confession of Faith contains a system of human dogmas, and not *the system* taught in the holy Scriptures. For, obviously, if the truths of the Bible are binding upon the conscience of its interpreter, they are so binding, whether they are trans printed into another book or remain in their original position. And if in the Confession, they are the truths of God's word—the system of doctrines therein taught, do they cease to bind the conscience, *because* of their local position? Do these doctrines become mere human dogmas, simply because a human pen has transcribed them! Or, because they are exposed in a varied phraseology! Assuredly the Brother's objections to any influence whatever from the Confession, is based on the assumption, that *its* truths are human, not divine—not the truths of the Bible, but the dogmas of men. This is the protopseudos of all those who have unfortunately received into their system the errors of anti-confessionism, and also of those who have inhaled the exhilerating gas of free inquiry, decision of character, independence of thought and a judgment utterly unbiased by all the opinions of all who have gone before them.

4. But my fourth remark is, that the writer of these notes has mournfully departed from his own rule. I do not say *designedly:* and he himself admits, that "unconsciously" he may have departed from it; for he does not "assume a freedom from bias, and from the prejudice of opinion." The propriety of his admission will appear to his reader, upon reflection on the two following observations. (1.) Mr. Barnes could not have written the following sentences without having some reference to *some* confession of faith. "Yet men have not been satisfied with that.—[The fact of Adam's fall, and man's consequent misery.] They have sought for a theory to account for it. And many suppose they have found it in the doctrine that the sin of Adam is *imputed*, or set over by an arbitrary arrangement to beings otherwise innocent, and that they are held to be responsible for a deed committed by a man thousands of years before they were born. This is the *theory;* and men insensibly forget that it *is mere theory.*"—(Notes p. 10.) Now I ask, where did the Brother find this "theory?" Who, that has read the Presbyterian Confession, can be at a loss for the right answer? How then could he say—"in preparing these Notes, I have never had the Westminster Confesson of Faith before me?"

"Nor have I ever framed a sentence with any desire or intention that it should in any way depart from any such confession!" I am glad he threw in the saving parenthesis, "to the best of my recollection," and I am truly glad, that human recollection is defective. Again.—"Various attempts have been made to explain this [the connexion between Adam's sin and our ruin.] "The most common has been, that Adam was the representative of the race; that he was a covenant head, and that his sin was imputed to his posterity, and that they were held liable to punishment for it as if they had committed it themselves. But to this there are great and insuperable objections." p. 128. Again I ask, where did the Brother find this explanation, which he rejects. "Has it no respect to any framework of faith that has been reared around the Bible!" Oh my Brother, how my heart mourns over such declarations as these; for dost not thou know, that this is the great, leading, distinguishing feature of the Calvinistic system taught in the standards of our Church? Take this doctrine out of the Westminster Confession, and where is the system? Who does not know, that this doctrine of representation, covenant headship and imputation, is the very doctrine that constitutes the thread of its unity, and makes it a system? (2.) My other observation is, that there is a system lying back in the author's mind, whether he is conscious of it or not, a model, or frame work of doctrine, by which he has been uniformly influenced in his exposition. I mean the system of error, summed up in these ten charges. If it shall appear that those errors are taught, and that they are the exact opposite of the system set forth in our standards; then you will see, that the expositor came up to his work with his system already made—all the pieces and parts of his frame fitted and jointed, and put together and pinned fast: yea, and weatherboarded and closed in completely: so thar Paul must stay within its pale, and only put out his head, and see and be seen, and speak and be spoken to, by and through the propet apertures and openings of Brother Barnes' framework. Now Mr. Moderator, it would be curious indeed, if this were true. But it is true: and I shall prove it by Brother Barnes' own words. He had framed his opinions before he came to this work of writing notes. Whether prematurely or not, is not mine to say; but he had framed them, and the pertinacity with which he has held to them shows that he, at least, thought they were correct. He says, "I have not changed my views materially since I was licensed to preach the gospel." Clearly then his Notes were written under the modeling influence of these views. But further.—"In the Theological Seminary at Princeton, my views, *which were the same as now*, were fully known." The italics are mine. They are designed to impress upon your mind the important fact, that the Brother's views, his opinions, his system of doctrines, the sentiments which he considered true—his framework of faith were the same when he was a green student of theology, *before* he was presumed to

have thoroughly, fully, and laboriously run the round of theological studies, the same as now! Hence you perceive that under this system he writes his Notes—within this framework Paul must dwell: there he can rest only on the Procrustes' bed of Brother Barnes' early opinions: or, if he venture forth, he must first be moulded into the annotator's likeness and wear his livery.

The next topic in this "DEFENCE," which must be met, is, the laboured attempt to open a wide gate and a broad way of entrance into the Presbyterian church. This church, the Brother alleges, is founded on liberal principles. It knows nothing of the narrowness and shrivelled up spirit of the Scotch Presbyterians. It has adopted on the contrary a broad and liberal policy, correspondent with the unlimited breadth of our land, and the glory of the nineteenth century. Accordingly, subscription to its standards does not imply belief in the doctrines taught in them, *except in general.* It contemplates a considerable latitude of interpretation. A man in entering her ministry is not expected to embrace all her doctrines: he subscribes "*for substance of doctrine.*" That is, he may reject many particular items of that doctrine; but he must maintain the sentiments of the Confession in the main. This, I think, is the substance of the Brother's doctrine on this point. Now for the substance of my objections.

1. If brother Barnes is right here, then he may well ask "*What are the standards of the church?*" And I throw back the question in tones of defiance; let him or any other man tell me "*What are the standards of the church?* If you may reject one doctrine, as non-essential, may not I reject another? May not the next brother, reject a third?—and the next, a fourth? And what will be left? One man denies the eternal Sonship; another the personality of the Spirit; another, the doctrine of predestination; another, the guilt upon Adam's race of original sin; another, the imputation of Christ's active obedience; another, the whole doctrine of imputation, the covenants of works and of grace! I repeat it, What is left? "*What are the standards of the church?*" Why, sir, is it not as clear as sunshine, that there neither *is* nor *can* be *any* standard of doctrine at this rate. Each man claims the privilege of judging for himself what is essential to the system—he cannot be cramped. What! Shall I sacrifice the independence of my mind! Shall I forego the glorious privilege of independent thought! Shall I cease to be an original thinker, and trammel up my capacious soul within the framework of your conceptions! Shall the freemen of this free and happy country, not have the privilege of thinking for themselves!! Shall we be hurried back into the dark ages!! Shall there be an end of free inquiry and free discussion!! Will the high-toned spirit of American Christianity endure this!!! Again, I repeat it.—If the doctrine of the brethren, who advocate the boasted liberal construction, be adopted, there is an end of constitutional order,

2. Why is this doctrine contended for? Why has Mr. Barnes spent so much time in attempts to cut down Jachin and Boaz, and open a way into the Presbyterian church wide enough for every man who can say, I subscribe "for substance of doctrine?" Is there not, in the fact of his thus pleading, evidence that he needs considerable latitude of interpretation? So it seems to me. If he were not conscious of some considerable departure from the plain doctrines of our confession, he would not display such anxiety to open up a wide door of entrance.

3. The only argument of any plausibility, adduced to prove that the standards of the Presbyterian church are not the published constitution absolutely, but this, with such deviations from its plain meaning as individuals feel constrained to make, is the argument from history. You will keep in mind that we are now prosecuting the inquiry, *What are the authoritative standards of the church?* It is a question of fact. Now suppose the question were asked, What is the Constitution of the United States? Would you answer this by referring to the old articles of Confederation? It cannot be doubted that the great principles—the substance of political doctrines—are there to be found. But are they the constitution? So, it is absurd to look at the occasional acts of the ecclesiastical body, in its *forming condition;* before its system was *matured*, for its actual constitution. Now such is the chief argument from history to prove the lax doctrine. The "Proviso" to the adopting act of the Synod, in 1729, is quoted as proof that latitude of constructions is the law of the church in the nineteenth century; a hundred and five years afterwards. It runs thus:—"And in case any minister of the Synod, or any candidate for the ministry shall have any scruple, with respect to any article, or articles of said confession; he shall in time of making said declaration, declare his scruples to the Synod or Presbytery; who shall notwithslanding admit him to the exercise of the ministry within our bounds, and to ministerial communion, if the Synod or Presbytery, shall judge his scruples not *essential* or *necessary*, in doctrine, worship, or government."

Now this is no part of the standards of the Presbyterian church. It is as effectually superseded by subsequent legislation, as the old articles of confederation are superseded by the present constitution. On May 21, 1788, the Synod record the following minute, viz. "The Synod took into consideration the draft of the form of government and discipline of the Presbyterian church in the United States of America. And having gone through the same, did, on a *review* of the whole, ratify and adopt the said form of government and discipline, as now *altered* and *amended*, as the constitution of the government and discipline of the Presbyterian church in America. And recommended to all their judicatures, strictly to observe the rules laid down therein, in all ecclesiastical proceedings. And they order that a correct copy be printed; and that the Westminster Confession of Faith, *as now*

altered, be printed, in full, along with it, as making a part of the Constitution." In a subsequent part of the same minute, the ratification of the Directory for Worship, and amendment of the Larger Catechism and ratification of it and the Shorter, are recorded. And these, "*as now ratified*" are to continue to be our constitution and the confession of our faith, unalterably; unless two thirds of the Presbyteries" make a change. In a still subsequent part of this minute, the Synod publish a minute of 1764, wherein the spirit of their guardian care over the orthodoxy and piety of their ministers is set forth.—"If any society, or body of men are known to be of erroneous principles; or to be lax, or negligent, as to the orthodoxy or piety of those they admit into the ministry; in such cases none of our Presbyteries are obliged to receive or employ such persons as gospel ministers or probationers, though producing fair certificates, and professing to adopt our confession." And in 1765, the Synod enjoin the examination of a foreign minister "to obtain satisfaction respecting orthodoxy and piety; and not to receive him implicitly on a certificate, however fair and regular, together with his general profession of adopting the Westminster Confession and Catechisms. But if such probationer, or minister, shall come from a church or judicature, generally suspected, or known, to be erroneons, or lax and negligent with respect to the moral conduct or piety of their candidates or ministers; or if they shall come from any number of ministers, who may convene, without any regular constitution (that is a Congregational Association) merely for the purpose of licensing or ordaining, in such case, a certificate from such a judicature, or such ordainers, and a general profession of the partv's adopting the Confession of Faith, is still less satisfactory." And in 1784, their minutes say "The Synod in order to guard the churches under their care against dangers from the admission of ministers or probationers of *unsound principles*, do hereby renew their former injunctions." From these quotations it is demonstrably evident that this adopting act of 1729 has no more to do with the constitution of our church, than the adopting act of the church of Scotland has. The *whole constitution* has been revised since and formally ratified and adopted; that the Synod in 1764–5, '84, and '88, were extremely rigid in their vigilance over the *orthodoxy and piety* of their ministers. A fair and full certificate of good standing from a foreign church—yea even from acongregational convention, would not be admitted as satisfactory: no not even when the person bearing it made a general profession of adopting the Westminster Confession and Catechisms." No! the right of examination was claimed and exercised—and this "to maintain orthodoxy in doctrine; and purity in practice." Even a congregational minister, with clear certificate and profession of "adopting the Confession of Faith," must be examined. Does this look like the lax interpretation system? Is any man able to

believe that these men knew any thing about adoption "for substance of doctrine."

Now it may profit to inquire, wherefore this waking up of the church to a jealousy over her orthodoxy at *this juncture?* The answer is found in the fact that Doctor Witherspoon, about this time became a leading, perhaps it will not be thought insidious to say, the leading man in the Presbyterian church. He brought with him from (despised) Scotland the blood and spirit of John Knox, in 1768. And in 1773 we find the alarm sounded and the churches put on their guard against the laxarian doctrine. The same in '74, and also in '84. But all these are brought up and published and enforced in '88 when Dr. Witherspoon was chairman of the committee for revising the directory as to the mode of inflicting censures and for worship. Indeed it cannot be questioned that this illustrious Scotchman did more than any other man toward moulding into its present form the Constitution of our church. It will therefore let the true light of true history in upon this question, to quote from Dr. Rogers' funeral sermon over this great man. He says,

"The church of Scotland was divided into two parties, with respect to their ideas of ecclesiastical discipline. The one was willing to confirm and even to extend the rights of *patronage* (our liberal construction brethren too, know how to wield this power) the other wished, if possible, to arrogate, or at least limit them, and to extend the rights and influence of the people in the settlement and removal of ministers. The latter were zealous for the doctrines of grace and the articles of religion *in all their strictness*, as contained in the national Confession of Faith. The former were willing to allow a *greater latitude of opinion;* and they preached in a style that seemed to the people less evangelical, and less affecting to the heart and conscience, than that of their opponents. In their concern otherwise to exempt the clergy of their party from the unreasonable effects of popular caprice, they too frequently protected them against the just complaints of the people. These were styled *moderate men,* while their antagonists were distinguished by the name of the *orthodox.* Dr. Witherspoon, in his church politics, early and warmly embraced the side of the orthodox. This he did from conviction, and sense of duty; and by degrees, acquired such an influence in their councils, that he was considered at length as their head and leader." Now it is not at all marvellous, that a man who stood at the head of the rigid, strict, orthodox party, in that church, whence, confessedly we have derived our system; when invited once and again, by the united voice of American Presbyterians, to preside over the only College of any note under their influence, should very soon acquire an ascendency in the American churches correspondent to that which he held among the rigidly orthodox party in Scotland. And such undeniably were the facts:—and here we see the reason why the Synod put themselves so often in the position "to main-

tain orthodoxy in doctrine," their leader, and the man who was appointed to open the first General Assembly ever held in America, the man who had just fought the long battle of orthodoxy in Scotland, and led her forces to triumph over the "*moderate men*," who was "zealous for the doctrines of grace and the articles of religion in all their strictness," as contained in the Confession of Faith, this man was a leader in '88, when the Constitution was moulded into its present form and adopted. Now I ask, is it credible, that the victor of *moderation* in Scotland is its defender in America? Can *any* man believe, that he who led on to triumph the rank and file of those who "were zealous for the doctrines of grace and the articles of religion, in all their strictness," against the hosts of those who "were willing to allow a greater latitude of opinion," in moulding our Constitution, accommodated it to "the latitude of opinion" plan!?

It is remarkable here, that Brother Barnes quotes no authorities in favour of his "very wide latitude," later than the days of President Davies, long before the present Constitution of our church was formed, until 1830. Why so? Why did he not go to the men who constituted really the convention who modelled, altered, and adopted it, to inquire after its meaning? Did he know he would meet Dr. Witherspoon there? Aye, and the present Dr. Green? Now if I wished to know the meaning of any clause in the Constitution of the United States, I should not run back to the days of William Penn, nor even to the incipient committees that cherished the rising revolution. No: I should go to the very age of its formation and interrogate the men who moulded it into its present shape. Their opinions, if certainly attainable, would and should have chief weight in putting construction upon their language. This has been done with our Constitution ecclesiastical, and the result I leave with you.

But as to the "Proviso" of 1729, I have a word more. Even supposing it binding now, (which is absurd,) there are three things required in regard to its "scrúples" of objection against the Confession of Faith. The first is, that they are *scruples*, and in order to admit a minister into the church, they must be *scruples*—merely the 288th part of a pound of truth, "not *essential* or *necessary*." Secondly, the synod or presbytery; not the man who brings them, is to weigh them: they "shall judge his scruples." Thirdly, he, who has them, shall not conceal them, but shall offer them to the weigher, *before* he is or shall be "admitted to the exercise of the ministry."—"He shall [this prescribes duty] in time of making said declaration, declare his scruples." Now let us apply these to the present case. First, are the errors of this book of Notes mere scruples—small matters? This, by a very adroit *petitio principii*, the brother assumes throughout his remarks here. On the contrary, the prosecutor presents them as of vital importance. The opinions of other men have been adduced to the same effect. The wrongs *charged* are *fundamental*.

They are not small dust of the balance—they are not the *scruples* of truth, but the *cwts.* and the TONS. Here then, Mr. Moderator, is a gratuitous assumption, and I beg leave to invite your attention to the fact, that on this *gratuitous assumption*, brother Barnes has built the very strongest of his appeals to the popular ear, and to your ear, sir. He says many fine things in a very fine style, about liberality of sentiment, freedom of thought, slight shades of opinion, the folly of "endeavouring to shake man's belief by authority: to cramp the freedom of inquiry—to place every man on the bed of Procrustes," until really I and you, begin to feel indignant at the man, who would venture to arraign such a liberal minded brother upon some scruple about mint, annise, and cummin. But let us beware of the unfounded assumption. It is not true that the matters at issue are trifling matters, they are the *essence* of the Confession of Faith, and therefore the entire pleading, in this most popular and plausible paragraph, is irrelevant—it has nothing to do with this case. *Secondly*—Did the Presbytery of New Brunswick, when they ordained Mr. Barnes weigh his scruples against the Confession and admit him, believing and acknowledging that they were mere scruples—"not *essential or necessary in doctrine?*" But this will be answered, in the *third* point. Did Mr. Barnes declare his scruples? Did he offer them to the weigher to be weighed? Did he frankly tell the Presbytery at the time, that there were some *little* matters in which he could not exactly agree with the Confession? No, sir! nothing of all this. And yet the "Proviso" of 1729, under which he would shield the latitude of constructive doctrine, makes it his duty—"he shall declare his scruples." He did not do it, and consequently the Presbytery could not weigh them and pass them as scruples. On this point I speak advisedly: after particular inquiry, I cannot find that any such declaration was made. The most I can find is, that he was suspected of holding erroneous opinions on the principal points now in controversy. And Mr. Barnes himself seems to coincide with my information. "Thus by the Presbytery of New Brunswick, by which I was licensed, they were, or might have been, fully known." "Or might have been," clearly admitting that they were not by him openly declared. How then can he plead the overshadowing protection of this "Proviso," when he did not put himself under it at the proper time? Had his present views, which he says he held then, been fully made known to his Presbytery, and had they "judged that his scruples were not essential or necessary in doctrine" and so recorded it, then, indeed, he might effectually plead their own proviso in bar of their prosecuting him. It is however far otherwise; and in every aspect of the case he can find no just protection from the "Proviso" of 1729. By the living constitution—by the law as it *is*—must he and every other minister be judged.

The deranged, confused, and informal manner of bringing these charges has been matter of loud and long complaint. The brother

has presented this complaint so often—he has harped upon it so much, that really, Mr. Moderator, he has given occasion to my growth in the grace of patience. But for the benevolence which I often see beaming from his eye, I should allow myself to think, he meant to provoke to something else than to love and good works. But "charity thinketh no evil;" I will therefore put the best construction upon this reiterated complaint. I will suppose he really feels embarrassed by the manner—the undigested nature, and the mode of presentation of these charges. On each I must remark.

"The *manner*." This may relate either to the circumstances attending their first presentation to him, or to the mode of conduct—the spirit displayed by the prosecutor. If the former, I observe, that I addressed Mr. Barnes by letter [as published in his Defence] before I presented the charges to the Presbytery. Now I admit, that in giving a man a choice of modes, between what, in civil concerns, is called an amicable suit, and a suit, the first notice of which is an officer's visit, I did throw some embarrassment in his way. He is called upon in that letter to say, whether or not he will comply with my earnest wish, to make it an amicable suit. Wherever there is a choice, and especially a choice of evils, there may be embarrassment. But it appeared to me every way the most agreeable to Christian kindness to lay before his mind this choice, and I really thought his mind would not have been much embarrassed in the choice. I did certainly think that, seeing the thing must come, he would have let it come in the *form* of an amicable suit, as I was determined it should be so in fact. If *manner* relates to my mode, temper, spirit, I have nothing to say. Let the Presbytery, and the whole church, and the *world itself*, which is always on the side of lax construction in religion, judge from the facts. If the award shall be, that in this whole business I have not violated the law of brotherly kindness, then I can see how this very thing should be a source of embarrassment. If the prosecution was against me, and the case as desperate as I *now* believe it to be, I think I can imagine how kind and brotherly treatment would embarrass me.

"The undigested nature of the charges." To this I reply, that all men's minds are not cast in the same mould. Men will differ about modes of faith. They cannot all see and think exactly alike. What appears confusion to one is order to another. If a man stands with his face toward a window and I look upon his full, front face, and you upon his side face, our visions will be quite different. I am looking in the face of these charges, Mr. Barnes has only a side view. To convince you, that, if they are crude and indigested, it is my fault only as infirmities of nature are faults, let me give you a history of the manner in which they were prepared. First, then, I read the "Notes" through, taking notes of exceptions and marking the pages as I passed along. Then I re-inspected the exceptionable pages, with the utmost carefulness. Then I ruled off a foolscap sheet into broad columns, and wrote

captions of erroneous doctrines. Then I arranged the exceptionable pages under these heads of exception. Then I turned in upon them the little share of analogical talent which has fallen to my lot, to discover the relative positions of these several doctrines. In this labour the question was to be answered, how do these errors, positive or negative, fit into one another? Having settled this, I numbered them I, II, III, &c. If Mr. Barnes can see no system in them, I know not how to help him out of his embarrassment. Others besides myself have read them since he did, and I have not heard much complaint of indistinctness, or irregularity or confusion. To most minds, I am persuaded, they present the idea of a systematic arrangement tolerably well carried out. Perhaps this is the very feature which occasions the embarrassment. A child of recent birth is known by its father, more readily by its dress than by its countenance. Perhaps the parent of this child is unable to recognise it, for the simple reason, that another hand has dressed it.

The mode of presentation, "is exceedingly perplexing." "He first furnished the Presbytery with a set of charges with reference to the pages of my book, but without *any* reference to the standards of the church or the Scriptures, supposed by him to be violated. This was evidently contrary to the constitution of the church as expounded by the General Assembly in 1824, (Vol. v. p. 219.")

To this I reply, that the *Constitution* is the rule, and the General Assembly has *no power* to add to or take from it. I fully complied with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. It will surely not be maintained, in the nineteenth century, that the incidental remarks made by all the General Assemblies, since the days of '89, shall all form a part of the Constitution; so that if a man literally follow the printed rules in our books and yet be ignorant of some opinion dropped by some Assembly fifty years ago, or fifty months, and of course not be governed by it, he shall lose his cause, on the ground of unconstitutionality. But now Mr. Barnes' reference is to just such an incidental remark of the Assembly. It is not even a formal resolution. It is a mere remark under the sixth head of their minutes in the case of Craighead. They had condemned Craighead and justified the synod, and of course, *secundum artem*, they must censure the synod too. Well they say "There was a great deficiency in the charges preferred against Mr. Craighead, as it relates to precision. All charges for heresy should be as definite as possible." [Mine were definite.] "The article, or articles of faith, impugned, should be specified," [so were mine,] "and the words supposed to be heretical, shown to be in repugnance to these articles" [That is obviously in the argument of the cause, and this was done.] If, however, the specifying of articles and the showing of the words to be repugnant to them, is intended here to mean, that the language of the Confession and the words supposed to be heretical, are to be quoted

in full in the charges: and the showing, to be their comparison; then the curiosity is called for, of the indictment embodying the charges, the law, the testimony and the argument; and all this before the court order a trial! But this point is unworthy to detain us, for two reasons. Because the incidental expression of the Assembly's opinion is no amendment of the constitution, and because Mr. Barnes was fully furnished, about three months before the trial, with references to all the law and all the testimony in his case: my letter containing them is dated April 11, and the trial began July 1. Why "perplexity" should grow out of this I could never see—where the cause of embarrassment lies in this procedure, few will be able to discover; and the validity of "the only inference which" the brother could draw, viz. that the whole subject was undigested in my mind," I leave to other logicians to examine into. Mr. Barnes had stated in Presbytery, that he should be guided by the above construction of the Assembly of 1824; and lest he should make a difficulty of that and prevent a trial, I, by concession, supplied him with all the references, eighty days before the trial. *My* "only inference" was, that the perplexity and embarrassment arose out of the intrinsic difficulties of the case.

Three remarks are yet necessary before we proceed to the charges in detail. The first is, that, in this discussion, Brother Barnes will hear observations upon his book, which cannot prove to him as the loveliness of a song or the skilful touches upon an instrument. It is obvious at a glance, that many things must be said not at all complimentary. He therefore will see the necessity of his remembering two things, viz: that he is the *author* of these Notes and that I am his prosecutor, having them for witness. Now an author is supposed to have some degree of interest in his work, beyond that felt by other men. It is the child of his own bosom. Upon it he has "bestowed many an anxious, a prayerful, and pleasant hour." "They are, he continues, the result of much deliberate attention." They have occupied his hours of leisure, his moments of retirement; when a busy world has been shut out. Exhausted, and perhaps chafed with the toils of a laborious life, and his heart sickened in contemplating the follies and vanities and waywardness with which he has necessarily come in contact, in attending to the out-door business of a weighty charge, how often has he returned, with delight, to the nursery, to beguile his spirit away from perplexing cares, by an hour's toying with the plaything of his bosom! and how often has the warm heart kindled in parental *storge*, as it hung in admiring fondness over the bosom's witching idol? Let no unhallowed foot intrude into this sacred place. Let no uninterested heart presume to judge the weakness of this fond interview. Let Agesilaus enjoy the sports of his nursery unmolested. To this every parent's heart responds a hearty amen. But still, the son of Agesilaus may aspire to be king of Sparta, and having come forth into public life, he must expect to

be, as other men, liable to arrest and cross examination as a witness in court. What I ask is, that the parent, during the progress of this examination, should remember his relations and mine.—They are quite different and involve different feelings. Now these feelings ought to be respected severally: and it is the fixed purpose of my mind to pay all due deference to them. They shall not be wounded except where justice to the cause of truth requires the sacrifice. There shall be no wanton sporting with them, and I have confidence in the Brother's good sense, which will prompt him to make all due allowance for the difference of our relative positions.

The second remark relates to the nature of these charges, as a *system* of error, in opposition to a *system* of truth. Any and every mind is liable to fall into insulated and detached error; but *only* minds of a philosophic mould are capable of erring systematically. Now there is a vast difference between the random gun of the roving Indian and the scientifically constructed and systematic battery of the European engineer—between the brush-wood of Canada and the fortress of Namur—between Black Hawk and the Duke of Marlborough. Where there is no cultivated talent to form a system, there can be little danger from error. Hence the fact, well known, but enigmatical—at first sight strange, almost to incredibility, but yet not anomalous—the fact, that every man who has ever disturbed the church, by the introduction of erroneous doctrines, has been a man of talent. No obscure individual doing business in the country on a small capital, by his failure in business, can produce a great concussion in the mercantile world. No errorist of slender talent, incompetent to throw his errors into a systematic form, can ever do much harm. Standing insulated, as individual foes in an enemy's country, his errors are easily cut off in the detail. Whereas, if he had talent to organize them into solid bands, to run out regular lines and construct his fortress by the rules of art, they would become formidable. Let it not then be pleaded in bar of this prosecution, that Brother Barnes is a gentleman of talent—that his congregation is influential—his position in the church commanding.—Why, obviously, Mr. Moderator, if it were not so, such a prosecution would be the height of folly. These are the very circumstances which demand it and justify it. The pastor of Morristown church might have preached these doctrines all his days, within his own narrow sphere of operation, and it might perhaps never have become the unpleasant duty of any man to prosecute him.* But not so the minister of the metropolitan church. Not so the author of three or four popular volumes having a wide circulation among the youth of our connexion. Not so the consolidation of error into a system Then it has become a formidable matter.—

* This was written before I knew any thing about the Morristown resolutions.

Its batteries may be difficult to silence ; its fortress the permanent abodes of hostility. I repeat the thought—who ever heard, in the church's history, of a dangerous errorist that was not a man of talents? But there is another shade of this thought. Something more than talent, is necessary to answer the epithet *dangerous* to an errorist, especially during his own life. If a man of bad moral character ; or even of doubtful religious character, shall publish erroneous sentiments, even well digested and systematically arranged, who will believe them? Will not the blot upon the man, pass over to his system, and condemn it? Clearly then, reputation, as well as talent, is necessary to constitute a dangerous errorist. Now we have a good illustration of this remark, in both its aspects, in the author of a new heresy in the fourth and beginning of the fifth century. Few men in any age stood higher in reputation for talents, learning and piety, than Pelagius the British Monk. He had travelled extensively, visiting a great number of monasteries, cultivating acquaintance with the learned and the pious, and extending the sphere of his information and at the same time of his influence. "Augustine," says Mosheim, "acknowledges that he had made great progress in virtue and piety, that his life was chaste and his manners blameless." Speaking of him and his friend Celestius, Milner, depending upon Jansenius' account from Augustine, says "They always maintained a character of fair and decent morals." And of Pelagius, he says, "Augustine owns his reputation for serious piety to have been great in the christian world." And again, "Augustine allows the genius and capacity of both these men to have been of the first order." The author of "the early history of Pelagianism" in the Biblical Repertory, who doubtless consulted authorities, far beyond any within my reach at present, confirms these statements. Here then is "genius and capacity of the first order," "great progress in virtue and piety," "a life chaste and manners blameless." But did all these constitute a reason, why the opinions of this great, and virtuous, and pious man, should not be arraigned, and himself censured? No, sir, these were the very reasons why it became imperiously necessary to condemn them and him, for their sake. The truth of God is of more value than the fair fame of any man. If, therefore, it shall be found that this book of Notes bears the mark of talent, in the fact, that its erroneous doctrines are linked together into a connected system, so that a logical mind falling into one of its errors, will be led necessarily to embrace the whole, then you will see the importance of firmness and decision in the condemnation of one and all of them. Moreover, you will observe, that less force of evidence is necessary to establish against an author, a particular sentiment, when it belongs to and forms a part of a system (if the other parts are fully proved) than would be requisite to establish the same sentiment if it stood alone. This principle will not be controverted, and is here mentioned, because it will be referred to in the progress of the case.

My third remark regards the right, on the part of the accused, to explain his own language. A utters words which give offence to B: B complains that he has been insulted and traduced; his character has been vilified. A denies any intention of inflicting such a wound, affirms that his language has been misunderstood, and asks the privilege of explaining. Shall it be granted? Certainly, as a privilege it ought to be conceded; and his explanation, if satisfactory, ought to be accepted. But then you will observe: A *asked privilege*, he did not *demand a right;* for he had no *right* to demand. B *conceded* a *privilege*, for he could not surrender the *right* of self-preservation. And farther, the *explanation* must be *satisfactory*, or B cannot accept it. Now, of this satisfactoriness who is to be the judge?—A or B? The latter unquestionably. But if B remains convinced, that the words uttered were insulting and injurious, can he accept the explanation? Assuredly not. What! not accept an explanation, when the man assures you he *meant* no harm! Certainly not, when he *did harm.* I have nothing to do with his *intentions.* Well, but won't you take his apology and forgive the injury? Oh! that 's quite a different matter. An apology and forgiveness—confession of fault and pardon—this language implies an abandonment of the original ground A took. *Now* he asks pardon, *then* he denied having given any offence. If brother Barnes shall come forward with an apology; if he shall tell the church, that he has offended in *teaching doctrines* contrary to her standards; oh, how gladly will she throw open her arms to receive him; and how delightful will be her duty to forgive! But if he come forward with an explanation—affirming that he has been misunderstood—he didn't mean so—then he denies the offence, and adds an insult to the person's injury. He tells the injured,—the torn, and lacerated, and bleeding church, that she 's a fool and does not understand language. If he aver that he has modified some of his objectionable phraseology, and at the same time state that he has changed not a principle of his doctrine, he superadds contempt to insult and injury. He in substance tells her, you are too stupid to understand language, but not to take offence at terms: these bug-bear words I'll remove out of your way, lest you may be frightened again by them; the sentiments, however, which I shall leave are precisely the same.

But the case is still stronger in judicial process. A, is on trial for the utterance of certain words containing (as is alleged) a slander upon the character of B. The truth of the libel is admitted, or proved—A, did utter the words, but he puts in a plea of justification. He affirms that, taken in their plain and true sense, they contain no slander. Now who is to judge of their meaning? Is it A? or B? or the court? I aver, Mr. Moderator, there is not a man of common sense, who can hesitate a moment on this question. The judges, and not either of the parties are to judge. The jury must decide what the language means. They are not

bound to take A's present explanation, and foist that into the libel and then judge! They are bound by their oath *not* to take his present explanation, but to say whether the language uttered contains a slander.

Now, Mr. Moderator, I press this remark upon your consideration, because I am confident that in many of these charges, brother Barnes can set up no other defence but *explanation*. He will claim the privilege of explaining away the obvious meaning of terms, and thus of forcing upon you a construction, of which you would never have thought, but for the perfection to which the art of eating back words has arrived, in these days of improvement. To the power of explanations, who can set limits, after the recent illustrious attempt to prove, that the free-will doctrine of the moderate Arminian, or old semi-Pelagian school, is contained in the Westminster Confession!

We come now to these charges; and the simple questions on each are three in number, viz. 1. Is this doctrine taught (or denied) by brother Barnes in the passages cited? 2. Is it contrary to the Confession of our Faith, &c.? 3. Is it contrary to the Bible?

CHARGE I.

Mr. Barnes teaches "That all sin consists in voluntary action."

Now it would greatly relieve and shorten this discussion, if he would expressly admit or explicitly deny. Which does he do? Examine, critically, all he has said on the subject, and see how he comes up to the question; Do you teach this doctrine? He gives no answer. You cannot tell whether he admits or denies. No man can tell. His whole answer is equivocal. He does not meet the question.

The relative value of this charge may appear inconsiderable. It is nearly allied, however, to more important errors. If man has no sin upon him legally, for which he is punishable, prior to the period of moral agency or voluntary action, then as we shall see, our Confession is in error. But if *all* sin consists in voluntary action, and man is not liable to penal evil but as he is a sinner, so charged in law; then it will follow, that prior to voluntary action, he cannot be a sinner: original sin he has none. So that the maintenance of this doctrine is a denial of the doctrine of original sin. That he teaches it, see "Notes" p. 249: In all this, and in all other sin, man is voluntary." Here is language too plain to be misunderstood or explained away: it affirms the very point to be proved. Voluntary action is necessary to sin in man. It will surely not avail to assert "that its design was not to teach any thing about the doctrine of what is commonly called original sin"—It does teach something—it denies that doctrine. It is a general proposition,—the fifth in numerical order. If the sole object was, to show that in moral actions, man is *voluntary* and not *compelled* like a mill-wheel, that object would have been attained without generalizing so as to deny original sin. The

idea of *compelling* a *voluntary* agent is an absurdity, and need not detain us.

Proof 2. p. 123. "There is no reason to believe that they [men] are *condemned* to eternal death, or held to be guilty of his [Adam's] sin, without participation of their own, or without personal sin, any more than there is, that they are approved by the work of Christ, or held to be personally deserving, without embracing his offer, and receiving him as a Saviour." Here personal transgression—voluntary action on their part, must precede the possibility of condemnation to eternal death—or being held guilty of Adam's sin. Prior to voluntary action, there is no liability to condemnation—no guilt. Comment here is unnecessary, but you will bear with a remark: and in making it, I wish to excite, in the Brother accused, a salutary fear; and do not intend to insinuate that he is a thorough Pelagian. I know that heresiarch held doctrines which this brother abhors. But in one or two points of his heresy, our brother is with him; and my fear, which I am anxious to transfer to his bosom, is, that, as a consistent reasoner, he cannot hold the ground which now he does hold in common with that ancient disturber of the church's peace, without following him in other dangerous positions. The remark is, that the argument of the above quotation is borrowed from Pelagius; not indeed, I suppose, immediately, but really. It is his precise argument, and how nearly in his words, you shall judge. Pelagius says:

"If Adam's sin hurt those who are not guilty, the righteousness of Christ profits those who believe not." *Milner* II. 370.

The only difference between this argument and brother Barnes' is, that it is more pointed and pithy, because less burdened with verbiage. It is the same precise argument. Now, ought not a Presbyterian minister to be alarmed, when he finds himself inadvertently, (if it so be,) using the same argument with an acknowledged heretic, and for the same purpose? Can any thing possibly prove more conclusively unity of doctrine? But I have more of the same.

"How can a man be considered guilty by God of that sin which he knows not to be his own? for if it is necessary, it is not his own; but if it is his own, it is voluntary; and if voluntary, it can be avoided." *Pelagius*, as quoted, Bib. Rep. vol. II. p. 102.

Take in connexion with this, Proof. 4, p. 124, "As the work of Christ does not benefit the race unless it is embraced, so does not the reasoning of the Apostle lead us to the conclusion, that the deed of Adam does not condemn, unless there be some voluntary act on the part of each individual?"

"If Adam's sin hurt those who are not guilty, the righteousness of Christ profits those who believe not."

I have placed these last two quotations in juxtaposition, that

their substantial identity might be seen at a glance. The righteousness of Christ does not profit the sinner, until he believes; says Mr. B., therefore the sin of Adam does not hurt the sinner until he voluntarily transgresses. The doctrine of both is, that there is no liability to penal evil, but in consequence of voluntary action, and "previously to moral agency, there is nothing in man [nothing moral—no moral character,] but that which God created in him." *Pelagius*, Bib. Rep. vol. II. p. 105.

Again: "Children, in as much as they are children, never can be guilty, until they have done something by their own proper will." *Julian*, an intimate friend of Pelagius, and advocate of his doctrine, as quoted Bib. Rep. vol. II. p. 103.

Proof. 3, p. 192. "They [Jacob and Esau,] had *done* nothing good or bad, and where that is the case, there can be no character, for character is the result of conduct. (2.) That the period of moral agency had not yet commenced." The *doing*, the voluntary agency is necessary to character. Prior to this, there is no sin to expose to punishment. When this voluntary action occurs, it will be, he admits, sinful, and then, but not till then, are they sinners. Whether the point is proved, I leave with you, adding only, that brother Barnes does not say, "I deny that I teach it."

Let us attend for a moment to the standards. Confession, chap. VI. 5. "This corruption of nature, during this life, doth remain in those that are regenerated: and although it be through Christ pardoned and mortified, yet *both itself* and all *the motions thereof are truly and properly sin.* 6. Every sin, both original and actual, being a transgression of the righteous law of God, and contrary thereunto, doth in its own nature bring guilt upon the sinner, whereby he is bound over to the wrath of God and curse of the law, and so made subject to death, with all miseries, spiritual, temporal, and eternal." Larger Catechism, Question 27. "We are by nature children of wrath, bond slaves to satan, and justly liable to all punishments, in this world and that which is to come." Shor. Cat. "All mankind by their fall lost communion with God, are under his wrath and curse, and so made liable to all the miseries of this life, to death itself, and to the pains of hell forever."

On these a remark or two. 1. This corruption of nature is *itself* sin, "as well as all the motions thereof." 2. This corruption of nature, which is sin, doth in its own nature bring guilt upon the sinner. It is not said, his voluntary action alone brings guilt; but their fall placed them under his wrath and curse, and exposed them to death and hell forever. No! says Mr. B., all mankind are not under his wrath and curse, by their fall; they must first act voluntarily, and then, but not until then, are they liable to the pains of hell.

What say the Scriptures? Ep. ii. 3. "And were by nature the children of wrath." Rom. iii. 19. "That all the world may be-

come guilty before God." Psalm. ii. 5. "I was shapen in iniquity and in sin did my mother conceive me." These passages cannot be turned aside. They prove incontestibly, that man is a sinner independent of, and prior to, his voluntary action, and therefore, that "all sin does not consist in voluntary action." Farther proofs on this head are reserved until a future occasion; because, so intimately connected are those errors, that they are jointed into each other, so that the evidence on one often answers for others. All that will be adduced to show the guilt, i. e. the liability of man to punishment on account of Adam's sin, will be good on this point. For, obviously, if the infant human being, prior to voluntary action, is liable to penal evil, it must be viewed by the holy Governor of the universe as under sin.

CHARGE II.

Mr. Barnes affirms, "That Adam (before and after his fall,) was ignorant of his moral relations to such a degree, that he did not know the consequences of his sin would or should reach any farther than to natural death."

Proof. p. 115. "If any inquiry be made here how Adam would understand this, [the threatening of death,] I reply, that we have no reason to think he would understand it as referring to any thing more than the loss of life as an expression of the displeasure of God. Moses does not intimate that he was learned in the nature of laws and penalties, and his narrative would lead us to suppose, that this was all that would occur to Adam. And indeed there is the highest evidence the case admits of, that this was his understanding of it. For, in the account of the *infliction* of the penalty, *after* the law was violated, in God's own interpretation of it, in Gen. iii. 19, there is still *no* reference to any thing further. "Dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return." Now it is incredible that Adam should have understood this as referring to what has been called "spiritual death," when neither in the threatening, nor in the account of the infliction of the sentence, is there the slightest recorded reference to it. Men having done great injury in the cause of correct interpretation, by carrying their notions of doctrinal subjects to the explanation of words and phrases in the Old Testament. They have usually described Adam as endowed with all the refinement, and possessed of all the knowledge, and adorned with all the metaphysical acumen and subtlety of a modern theologian. They have deemed him qualified, in the very infancy of the world, to understand and discuss questions, which, under all the light of the Christian revelation, still perplex and embarrass the human mind. After these accounts of the endowments of Adam, which occupy so large a space in books of theology, one is surprised on opening the Bible, to find how unlike all this is to the simple statement in Genesis. And the wonder cannot be suppressed, that men should describe the obvious *infancy* of the race as superior to its highest advance-

ment; or that the *first* man just created, just looking upon a world of wonders, unacquainted with law and moral relations, and the effect of transgression, should be represented as endowed with knowledge, which, four thousand years afterwards, it required the advent of the Son of God to communicate."

To the truth of this charge, the accused pleads affirmatively; but he denies its relevancy, and puts in a plea of justification. It will therefore detain us only a brief space.

2. I wish here to observe, that no "charge of heresy is based" on this passage, or ever was. On the contrary, I stated, and now state, that in itself considered, it is a small matter, and acquires the little importance I attach to it, simply from its connection with and preparation for others of great importance. 3. If Adam was "ignorant of law and moral relations"—if he was a large baby, thrown into a strange world, without being endowed by his Creator with knowledge, but in an extremely limited degree—if he knew nothing about any kind of death but that of the body, and must so understand the threatening—then, of course, there was no covenant made with him. He could know nothing about terms of a covenant—a covenant of works, there could not possibly be. This is why this charge is placed here. It is a link in the chain of error—a preparatory step to a direct denial of the covenant: and, so I doubt not, it was designed. To this the writer has reference when he complains of men "carrying their notions of doctrinal subjects to the explanation of words and phrases in the Old Testament." This is the key to the whole paragraph, and explains why the writer has collected a series of silly notions, in order to ridicule the idea of Adam's knowledge being adequate to understand the nature of a covenant, and of spiritual and eternal death.

4. The words "Dust thou art," &c., are not the "*infliction* of the penalty." Little as Adam is supposed to have known, I cannot persuade myself he could have committed such a mistake, as to take the *pronunciation* of the sentence for its *infliction*. This error surely belongs legitimately to one of his youngest sons born, at least educated, in the full blaze of the nineteenth century. Now to another of those sons, it appears, that Adam *could* know better, at this juncture, just when the sentence was pronounced, and when he had actually experienced something of spiritual death, as evinced by the fact of his endeavouring to hide from God,—he could better know what spiritual death was, than he could, what natural or bodily death was, which he did not experience for nearly a thousand years afterward. 5. If Adam knew nothing of spiritual death, then I ask, how could God, consistently with justice, visit him with it, as he did, in the tokens of divine displeasure? 6. If he was thus ignorant even after the sentence to bodily death, how could he understand the language, "in the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die?" When he did not die a natural death that day, must he disbelieve the truth of

the denunciation! 7. Brother Barnes endeavours to mystify, by representing me as maintaining that Adam knew *all* the consequences of his sin, and every thing else. This is disingenuous.

That this idea of our first parent's ignorance, is inconsistent with the standards, see Conf. ch. iv. 2. "After God had made all other creatures, he made man, male and female, with reasonable and immortal souls, endued with knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness, after his own image, having the law of God written in their hearts." Larg. Cat. 17.—to the same effect, 20. God afforded man "in the estate in which he was created"—"communion with himself, instituting the Sabbath, entering into a covenant of life with him, upon condition of personal, perfect, and perpetual obedience, of which the tree of life was a pledge:" and the 22. "The covenant being made with Adam," &c., and the Short Cat. 12. "When God had created man, he entered into a covenant of life with him" &c.: and yet, although they were "endued with knowledge"—"after his own image, having the law of God written in their hearts"—had the law of the Sabbath made known to them and a covenant of life, with its condition: yet after all they were "ignorant of law and moral relations!" or as in the amendment, "imperfectly acquainted with law!"

What say the Scriptures?

Gen. i. 27. "God created man in his own image."

What was this image?

Col. iii. 10. "And have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge, after the image of him that created him."

Clearly, then, the image of God, in which Adam was created, consisted *in knowledge;* whatever else it included, this was a leading feature of it.

Rom. ii. 15. "Which show the work of the law written in their hearts."

What is it that shows? Why, the law of nature as contradistinguished from the revealed law given to the Jews. When was that law impressed upon the human heart? Undoubtedly at its first creation, and what remains upon the Gentile conscience, is a defaced relic.

Gen. ii. 16, 17. "And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree," &c.

This reveals to us the covenant of works; but I waive, until we come to that more directly, all remark upon it. If such a transaction as our Confession represents, ever did take place, then this imputation of ignorance to Adam, is as unscriptural, as it is unbecoming the wisest of his sons.

CHARGE III.

Mr. Barnes teaches, "That unregenerate men are able to keep the commandments, and convert themselves to God."

Proof 1. p. 164. "*The carnal mind.* This is the same expression as occurs in verse 6, (τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς) "It does not mean the mind itself, the intellect, or the will: It does not suppose that the mind or the soul is physically depraved, or opposed to God; but it means that the *minding of the things of the flesh*, giving to them supreme attention, is hostility to God." "*For it*—The word (it) here refers to the minding of the things of the flesh. It does mean that the soul *itself* is not subject to his law, but that the *minding* of those things is hostile to his law. The Apostle does not express any opinion about the metaphysical ability of man, or discuss that question at all. The amount of his affirmation is simply, that the *minding of the flesh*, the supreme attention to its dictates and desires, is not and cannot be subject to the law of God. They are wholly contradictory and irreconcileable, just as much as the love of falsehood is inconsistent with the laws of truth; as intemperance with the laws of temperance; as adultery is a violation of the seventh commandment. But whether the *man himself* might not obey the law; whether he has or has not ability to do it, is a question which the Apostle does not touch, and on which this passage should not be adduced. For whether the law of a particular sin is utterly irreconcileable with an opposite virtue, and whether the sinner is able to abandon that sin, are very different inquiries.

Is not subject. It is not in subjection to the command of God. The minding of the flesh is opposed to that law, and thus shows that it is hostile to God.

Neither indeed can be. This is absolute and certain. It is impossible that it should be. There is the utmost inability in regard to it. The things are utterly irreconcileable. But the affirmation does not mean that the *heart* of the sinner might not be subject to God: or that his *soul* is so physically depraved that he cannot obey, or that *he* might not obey the law.

Page 165, 8. *So then.* It follows, it leads to this conclusion.

They that are in the flesh. They who are unrenewed sinners, who are following supremely the desires of the flesh. chap. vii. 18. Those are meant here, who follow fleshly appetites and desires, and who are not led by the Spirit of God.

Cannot please God. That is, while they are thus in the flesh, while they thus pursue the desires of their corrupt nature, they cannot please God. But this affirms nothing respecting their ability to turn from this course, and to pursue a different mode of life. That is a different question. A child may be obstinate, proud, and disobedient; and *while in that state*, it may be affirmed of him, that he cannot please his parent. But whether he might not cease to be obstinate, and become obedient, is a very different inquiry, and the two subjects should never be confounded. * * * He [the sinner] is engaged in hostility against God, and if he does not himself forsake it, it will be endless, and involve his soul in all the evils of a personal, and direct, and eternal warfare with

the Lord Almighty. * * * The Holy Spirit is often represented as dwelling in the hearts of Christians: and the meaning is not that there is a *personal* or *physical* indwelling of the Holy Ghost, but that he influences, directs, and guides Christians; producing meekness, love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, &c. The expression, *to dwell in* one, denotes intimacy of connection, and means that those things which are the fruits of the Spirit, are produced in the heart."

Proof 2, p. 108. "*We were yet without strength.* The word here used (ασθηνων) is usually applied to those who are sick and feeble, deprived of strength by disease. Mark xxx. 38; Luke x. 9.; Acts iv. 9.—v. 15. But it is also used in a *moral* sense, to denote inability or feebleness, with regard to any undertaking or duty. Here it means that they were without strength in *regard to the case which the Apostle was considering*, that is, we have no power to devise a scheme of justification, to make an atonement, or to put away the wrath of God, &c. While all hope of man's being saved by any plan of his own, was then taken away; while he was thus laying exposed to divine justice, and dependent on the mere mercy of God; God provided a plan which met the case, and secured his salvation. The remark of the Apostle here has reference *only* to the race *before* the atonement was made. It does not pertain to the question whether the man has strength to repent and to believe, now that the atonement *is* made, which is a very different inquiry."

Before proceeding in the matter of this charge, allow me three observations. 1. It is possible to teach error by denying the truth—to take away sound doctrine *positively*, by a series of detail in the *negative*, ex gr.: Certain texts of Scripture, say twenty in number, have been depended on to prove the doctrine of the Trinity. I wish to reject that doctrine and yet do not feel it to be prudent to do it openly. It may be done more successfully and safely by denying in the detail, that it is taught in any of these passages. I put a gloss upon the passage which contains a history of Christ's baptism, and conclude, by saying, whatever may be the truth or falsehood of the doctrine of the Trinity, it is not taught *here*. I take up the words used at baptism, "in the name of the Father, &c." and gloss over and conclude, that doctrine has no foundation *here*. And so throughout the whole. Have I not really denied the doctrine of the Trinity? And yet I have not in any one instance said "It is not true—it is not taught in the Bible." Is there a more effectual mode of attacking truth than this partizan war; this slow method of insulated assault?

But then it will be said in reply, "I have only removed certain texts which have been usually supposed to prove the doctrine of the sinners inability," there are yet scores of others left. Very true, but the same process may take away the rest. Now my position is, that when a writer displays a disposition to take away the Scripture props from any doctrine, it is evident he dislikes the

doctrine itself. Just so, the labour expended in the above, to evince that the doctrine of man's inability is not taught in these passages of Scripture evinces a dislike to it, and I question the possibility of any intelligent man's reading them carefully over, without imbibing the conviction, from the moral evidence in them, that their writer was an advocate of human ability. And yet,

2. This is the only charge in which I have felt any hesitancy as to the adequacy of the proof—not of course as to the reality and verity of the case, (for I have no doubt Mr. Barnes holds the common doctrine of human ability as found in the East) but as to the possibility of giving it tangible form. For,

3. Nothing is set forth in this charge but the doctrine that men are able to make themselves new hearts and to live accordingly. It is assumed as an obvious truth, that if men are able to come unto God in the first instance, they are able to live in him.

Now on the comment itself. (1) Mr. B. admits that the phrase, "they that are in the flesh," means—"they who are unrenewed sinners"—unregenerate men.

(2) He admits, that, "*while* they are in this state, they cannot please God." "But"—what? they can change their state—if they choose; they can come out of it.—"But this affirms nothing respecting their ability to turn from this course, and to pursue a different mode of life. Now, Mr. Moderator, I affirm the plain meaning of this language to be, "that unregenerate men are able to convert themselves." No simple unsophisticated mind is able to take *any other* meaning out of it.

(3) The writer however illustrates. "A child may be obstinate, proud, and disobedient, *and while in this state*, it may be affirmed of him, that he cannot please his parent. But"—What? the child, whenever he chooses, may cease to be disobedient—may change his state—can convert himself.—"But whether he might not cease to be obstinate and become obedient, is a very different inquiry."—The same kind of ability is affirmed of men in reference to their Creator, as is affirmed of the child in reference to its parent. A child can convert itself from a state of disobedience to a state of obedience; the unrenewed sinner can convert himself from that state to a state of obedience.

(4) I cannot in justice refrain from the remark, that the whole comment is assertion; dogmatic assertion. *Here* it would seem the annotator felt that he was writing for children and young people.

(5) "We were yet without strength." This "remark of the apostle," he says, "has reference *only* to the condition of the case *before* the atonement was made." Of course, *now* the deficiency of strength does not exist; we are not without strength. The atonement has removed the inability, and consequently put men in a salvable state—that is, all men—in a state where they may be saved *if* they choose and *whenever* they choose. This is a distinguishing tenet, but not of Presbyterianism.

(6) In this comment, *the carnal mind*, is taken abstractly, for the acting of the individual—*the* "*minding of the flesh*"—"giving supreme attention," and this acting is personified, and concerning it the question is raised: Can it be subject to the law of God? Has it—the acting, ability to obey the law? Now this is forced and unnatural. The question of subjection to law relates to persons, and accordingly the apostle draws his conclusion, "So then, they that are in the flesh cannot please God." The carnal mind (to phronema tees sarkos) is therefore equivalent to "they that are in the flesh;" i. e. unregenerate men. These are unable to be of themselves pleasing to God; or by their conduct to please him. They are *unable*, says the apostle: that is true, says his expositor, but they can turn and then it must be otherwise. This doctrine of human ability is contrary to the Standards.

Con. vi. 4. "From this original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all actual transgressions."

IX. 3. "Man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation, so as a natural man being altogether averse from that which is good, and dead in sin, is not able, by his own strength to convert himself, or to prepare himself thereunto."

X. 1. "All those whom God hath predestinated unto life, and those only, he is pleased, in his appointed and accepted time, effectually to call, by his word and Spirit, out of that state of sin and death, in which they are by nature, to grace and salvation by Jesus Christ; enlightening their minds spiritually and savingly to understand the things of God, taking away their heart of stone, and giving unto them a heart of flesh; renewing their wills and by his almighty power determining them to that which is good; and effectually drawing them to Jesus Christ; yet so as they come most freely being made willing by his grace."

2. "This effectual calling is of God's free and special grace alone, not from any thing at all foreseen in man; who is altogether passive therein, until, being quickened and renewed by the Holy Spirit, he is thereby enabled to answer this call, and to embrace the grace offered and conveyed in it."

XVI. 3. "Their ability to do good works is not all of themselves, but wholly from the Spirit of Christ. And that they may be enabled thereunto, besides the graces they have already received, there is required an actual influence of the same Holy Spirit to work in them to will and to do of his good pleasure:"

The inability here affects, 1. The *understanding*. For in the recovery from it, the counteracting grace, begins in the understanding, "*enlightening* their *minds* spiritually and savingly, to *understand* the things of God."—And this is supported by the Scripture.

Acts xxxvi. 18. "To open their eyes and to turn them from darkness to light."

And this is exactly accordant with the history of sin's introduc-

tion. It was by the understanding—"the woman, being deceived, was in the transgression." So are all her posterity.

1 Cor. ii. 14. "But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God."

Why? because he don't like them? Not exactly that—but for another reason lying beyond it—he don't understand them spiritually "for they are foolishness unto him."—Why? because, "neither *can* he know them,"—and why is he *unable* to know them? —"because they are spiritually discerned," and "the God of this world hath blinded the minds of them that believe not,"—of the unregenerate—that is, of all men. "Darkness hath covered the earth." That faculty of man by which he perceives truth and reasons upon it, as it was the first affected by sin, so it is the first affected by the Spirit, in his work of restoring our nature. Then, the understanding being enlightened,

2. The obduracy, the hardness, the insensibility of the soul, is removed; *the affections* are affected—"taking away their heart of stone and giving unto them a heart of flesh." And this part of the Confession is sustained by

Ezek. xxxvi. 26. "A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you; and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and will give you a heart of flesh."

Then the affections being susceptible of tender influences, through the understanding's perceptions of the gospel plan and God's love therein exhibited, and thus prepared to operate upon the will,

Thirdly. The will is renewed. This is that faculty of the soul by which choice is made. The will is the soul or mind choosing —"That which has the power of volition is the man, or the soul," says Edwards, "renewing their wills." For by sin they were "made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil." But now God "worketh in you both to *will* and to do of his good pleasure." Phil. ii. 13. For "the ability to do good works is not at all of themselves."

But here, a very important question turns up: by what kind of influence is this renewing of the will effected? Is it by motives only, according to the manner in which man influences his fellow man? Is it mere persuasion and argument? "Knowing the terror of the Lord we persuade men:" but does God's Spirit do any thing more than persuade men? This is the doctrine of some. But look at the Confession: "and by his almighty power determining them to that which is good." Or, as in the Shorter Catechism 31, "he doth *persuade* and *enable* us." Suasion is used, but *power* is also given. Or as in the Larger Catechism, 67,—"they (although in themselves dead in sin,) are hereby made willing and able." "Man had lost all ability of will"—so as a natural man is not able, by his own strength to convert himself,"

therefore God gives him strength or ability working in him "by his almighty power."

Thus, by the Confession and the Bible, the utter inability of man lies in his *understanding*, his *affections*, and his *will*. The understanding is the leading faculty of the soul; it presents to the affections objects of desire or aversion; the affections are moved and operate upon the will, and the divine power of the Spirit gives ability in all. How satisfactory is this Scriptural and Confession of Faith view of the subject? How gladly would I stop? And how satisfactory it is to the simple-hearted Christian, unspoiled by false philosophy and bewildering metaphysics? But it cannot be. My unfortunate brother has retreated and trenched himself in metaphysics, and I must continue, "faint, yet pursuing."

But before I proceed to discuss "the metaphysical ability of man," as Mr. Barnes calls it, let me make a few observations on his remarks. (1.) He teaches man's moral ability—his ability to change his own heart. What! do you venture such an affirmation? Yes, I do. Mr. Barnes teaches in this "Defence" the very doctrine against which he defends. He teaches that men have power "to choose"—"to make themselves new hearts." The proof! the proof! Well, here it is, in his own words. "The inability of a man to remove a mountain is one thing, and an inability to do right arising from the strong love of sin is another. The one excuses, the other does not. The latter is that which is to be charged on men; for (*a*) it is that only which is referred to in the Bible. The Scriptures when they account for the reason why men do not become Christians, trace it to *sin*, and to disinclination, John v. 40, 44. Particular sins are specified, the love of the world, pride, passion, lust, &c. (*b*) They address men as subject to no other inability. They command men to choose and to make themselves new hearts, all of which suppose that man has power to obey." Here is unequivocal language. Men are commanded "to choose"—"to make themselves new hearts." Two distinct commands are here stated. Now, has man power to obey? Certainly, says Mr. Barnes, it "supposes he has power to obey." And the contrary supposition would be the height of absurdity; for, (*c*) "if not, man is excusable for not obeying." Manifestly then, here is the doctrine of moral ability—ability of will—ability "to choose"—ability to "make themselves a new heart." Now this is the old Pelagian and Arminian doctrine of free will, against which Edwards wrote, and which he demolished. But, I know, brother Barnes denies he holds it; yet you see he teaches it, strongly and clearly! (2) But yet, he admits the contrary doctrine of man's moral *inability*. To this he is constrained and shut up by the Bible and Confession—"an inability to do right" he admits—"it was a *moral* and not a natural *inability*."—"Such his *moral inability* [the italics are his own] i. e. his strong and decided and constant opposition to God by nature, that he will

always remain a sinner unless he is aided from on high." (3) I am extremely anxious you should note it down, that this "*moral inability*"—this "inability of will" as the Confession has it, and which it says is removed "by his almighty power"—this being "utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good," Mr. Barnes admits, with the Confession and the Bible is BY NATURE." It is natural. It exists in man when he is born—he brings it into the world with him. It is antecedent to all volition in him. Its existence does not depend upon his voluntary action at all. It is the result of original corruption, and is never removed but by the Spirit of God, so that "No one can come to me except the Father which hath sent me draw him."

Now for the metaphysics. And 1st, let us state the doctrine of Edwards, referred to by brother Barnes, vol. ii. p. 35. "What has been said of natural and moral necessity, may serve to explain what is intended by natural and moral *inability.* We are said to be *naturally* unable to do a thing, when we cannot do it if we will, because what is most commonly called *nature* does not allow it, or because of some impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the will; either in the faculty of understanding, constitution of body, or external objects." This is the doctrine of natural inability, and I have but one remark upon it here, viz., it includes "defect or obstacle, in the faculty of understanding." If the *mind* be darkened, the powers of perception and reasoning impaired, it is a natural inability. That this is his meaning is indubitably evident from what he says of that natural necessity, which is the basis of the distinction. "By *natural necessity*, as applied to men, I mean such necessity as men are under through the force of natural causes; as distinguished from what are called moral causes, such as habits and dispositions of the heart, and moral motives and inducements. Thus men—assent to the truth of certain propositions, as soon as the terms are understood; as that two and two make four—" Now assent to the truth of propositions is a matter for the understanding—it can only result from perception of the agreement between the ideas compared in the proposition. Let it be set down then as president Edwards' doctrine of natural inability, that it includes "defect or obstacle in the faculty of understanding," as well as "in the constitution of body, and external objects." Keep that, Mr. Moderator, until we see what he means by Moral Inability. It "consists," says he, "not in any of these things; but either in the want of inclination, or the strength of a contrary inclination; or the want of sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act of the will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary. Or both these may be resolved into one; and it may be said in one word, that moral inability consists in the opposition or want of inclination. For when a person is unable to will or choose such a thing, through a defect of motives, or prevalence of contrary motives, it is the same thing as his being unable from the want of inclination, or

the prevalence of a contrary inclination, in such circumstances and under the influence of such views."

Now I have no objection to this definition, and but one to that of Natural Inability. But I have weighty objections to the practical application which many have rashly made of them. The author is indeed not accountable for the abuse. That sin lies upon those who either leave out that part of his definition (and it is the principal part) in which he makes defect of understanding a natural inability, or who boldly maintain that man's understanding is as perfect as before the fall. The fearful desolations which the church has suffered from this abuse, have caused many regrets that ever the distinction was made. Without pretending to wade *through* this difficult subject, because "natural inability or defect in the faculty of understanding," and limited space, equally forbid it and render it physically impossible, I propose the following observations:

1. Against the doctrine, that man unrenewed has full and perfect natural ability, according to Edwards' definition of it, I object, because it is not true. The natural man does labour under a defect of understanding in the things of the Spirit of God. The Bible and Confession and all Christian divines, and all Christian experience unite in the proof. The understanding is darkened, and without the illumination—the *supernatural illumination* of the Holy Ghost it cannot discern the things of the Spirit. This *fact* is undenied and *undeniable*. That man has a faculty of understanding, by which he can read and reason about scriptural truth, is admitted: but that this faculty is unimpaired by sin, is utterly denied. Nothing short of the Spirit shining into the heart can give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God. All the prayers of Christians for light and knowledge imply this. All men feel it. This very discussion shows it. If the understanding is not impaired by sin, why cannot we see things alike? Had man before he sinned any such perplexity? But will it be said, the very prayer for increase of light implies the natural powers to receive it. If we had not the natural power, how could we pray that our understandings may be enlightened? I answer, certainly it implies a natural understanding, competent to receive natural truth, but it implies not a deficiency of light absolutely, for it shines all around. It beams from the pages of God's word, and the natural man's not receiving, is not owing to its deficiency, but to want of capacity—to defect in his perceptive powers.

2. It does not relieve the doctrine of full ability of understanding in the natural man, to say that this defect alleged exists in, or flows from, the corrupt affections. For my 2d observation is, that this very inability is itself a sin, and has its origin, not in the nature of man as he came from the hand of God, but in sin itself and its penal consequences. Now, if this blindness of understanding is a penal evil, it alters not the matter of fact. For our inquiry is not as to its origin, but as to the *reality* of it. Does it

exist? And limiting our view to this, it seems to me impossible to maintain the position, that "the natural man *can*—that he *is able*—that he labours under no defect of understanding—to discern the things of the Spirit of God.

3. Man is not now in his original state and condition. This, you will say, is no information. And yet the opposite seems to be assumed in a large proportion of the discussion on this subject. Mr. Barnes' reasoning presupposes that man is now in a state of probation, and is therefore furnished now with all the means of a fair trial. The same assumption is almost every where made in similar discussions. And with that assumption, I too am ready to admit, that where a thing is commanded as duty, the implication is, that there is power or ability to comply with the command. But when the state of probation is ended, and the nature of man in ruins, the case is very different. Adam, in his pristine condition, had ability commensurate with his obligations. All the powers of his nature were perfect, and the right exercise of them was all his Maker demanded of him; and to have demanded of him more than the faculties of his being were adequate to perform, would not have comported with the nature of God's moral government. But now that he has reduced to ruins his intellectual and moral powers, and cut short the period of his probation—*now* that he is poor, weak, fallen, corrupt, he has not powers commensurate with his duties. To affirm this, is to maintain one of the most ineffable of all absurdities, which it is the purpose of my

4th Observation to deny, viz. That present ability is the measure of present duty. Or, in other words, that a man's inability to meet the requisitions of law, cancels his obligation; that a man cannot be bound to do what he is unable to do. This position I suppose to be among the most unspeakable of absurdities. Possibly I may not have ability to understand Mr. Barnes and others, who have recently laid down this as a moral axiom. But to me it does seem as if they meant to deny obligation, wherever inability exists. "The Bible no where requires more of men than they are able to perform." "It does not lay a claim on any power which man does not possess; nor beyond any power which he possesses. It is definitely limited to the extent of the capacity." Inability, no matter how perversely and wickedly brought about, cancels obligation. On this new axiom in morals, you must indulge me in a few particular remarks.

1. It repeals a great and important principle, viz. that a man is accountable not only for his own sinful act itself, but also for the necessary and legitimate results of that act. If I murder a man, on whose personal labour there is dependent a family of helpless children, I am accountable not for the act of murder only, but for the wretchedness and misery that may follow his family: for the ignorance and vice into which they may be plunged by my deed: for the whole line of evils which hence result. If I sell rum to

my neighbour, am I accountable only for the direct and immediate effects of the act? Or am I responsible for the disability that hence ensues? My neighbour becomes a drunkard; he is *disabled* from sustaining his family; by his example they are trained up in all the ignorance and vice of the drunkard's hovel. Am not I responsible for these disabilities? And does the disability of the drunkard—a disability induced by his own perverse and wicked conduct—release him from the obligation to provide for his household?

But in reply, it is said, the man may be punished for the act of cutting off his hand, but not for neglecting the duties to which he was before bound—to require them, "would be the definition of tyranny." Then clearly, the obligation to duty—the duty of obedience—the duty of providing for his household—is nullified by the man's own act of sin! Hence,

2. I remark, sin is its own apology, and lifts the sinner above law. The lawgiver requires obedience; the subject disables himself by perverse rebellion—he *cannot* obey; *therefore*, he is no longer bound to obey. But,

3. Apply this principle to the commercial transactions of society. A man contracts a debt within the compass of his present ability—he perversely and wickedly squanders his estate, gambles away his property, and disables himself from payment; is he *therefore* not bound? Is he free from moral obligation to pay it? Must justice break her scales, and no more hold up an equal balance, because he chooses to become a villain? Oh no, the children of this world are wise in their generation. The merchant may *forgive* the debt; but forgiveness implies obligation to pay. The master may omit to demand the service, or punish its neglect, but it is an omission of *mercy*. The law may not prosecute the man-seller—the beggared wife and children may be unable to exact justice of him; but then it is because cupidity and lust are too strong for justice. Therefore,

4. This principle is a subversion at once of all moral governments. Let it be known throughout the moral universe, that inability (resulting from the most perverse wickedness,) cancels moral obligation, and there will henceforth commence a jubilee in the realms of rebellion, and their ranks may very soon be filled up; for rebellion is then the surest and the shortest road to independence.

5. But I observe again, if natural inability cancels moral obligation, much more moral inability cancels moral obligation. Your respectful and special attention is invited to this point. It is an *ad hominem* against the ability doctrine. Taking these brethren on their own principles, let us see what the result must be. We contend that man labours under "a defect or obstacle," as Edwards says, "in the faculty of understanding"—that this faculty, in our present depraved state, is unable to discern spiritual things. This is called by many *a natural inability;* and the

axiom of our brethren is, that this *natural inability* destroys moral obligation. Now, brother Barnes maintains that man has *natural ability*, but he lacks moral ability—he labours under a moral defect or obstacle—a defect, or obstacle, or inability utterly unremovable, but by the power of God. Nothing but divine grace can remove it—an inability in that very faculty which gives moral character to himself and all his actions—an inability of will, removable only by the Spirit of God. Now, I repeat it, IF NATURAL INABILITY DESTROYS MORAL OBLIGATION, *a fortiori*, MORAL INABILITY DESTROYS MORAL OBLIGATION. Let the advocate of human ability make his election. Let him either admit man's total depravity in understanding, will, and affections, and thus become a consistent Calvinist: or let him go over entirely and maintain moral ability, and thus become a consistent Arminian. How can a rational man hold this half way course? Surely, the attempt to suspend himself between the horns of this dilemma, by a metaphysical hair, half sawed off, is sufficient evidence of defect in man's understanding.

6. But now, to retreat into Arminianism, and maintain man's full ability, is to abandon the Bible and Confession of Faith, and especially as defended by the great Edwards, in his unanswerable treatise on the will. The main object of that treatise is to establish the doctrine of man's necessary moral dependence, in opposition to the Arminian doctrine of free will. And this object he accomplishes most triumphantly. He demonstrates that there is no self-determining power in the will; no state of indifference, and no absolute contingency in the issues of human action. He defends Calvinism against the old standing objection, that it makes man a mere machine, destroys his accountability, and makes God the author of sin. He states, and abundantly refutes what is now supposed to be new theology; a leading feature of which is, that man's will, in order to be free, must have choice, with power to contrary choice—he states this doctrine in the language of Dr. Whitby, in such passages as these, viz. "If all human actions are necessary, virtue and vice must be empty names; we being capable of nothing that is blameworthy or deserving praise; for who can blame a person for doing only what he could not help, or judge that he deserveth praise only for what he could not avoid." (*Ed.* vol. ii. p. 133.) "*Who can blame a person for doing what he could not help.*" "*It being sensibly unjust to punish any man for doing that which was never in his power to avoid.*" And to confirm his opinion, he (Dr. Whitby,) quotes one of the fathers, saying, "*Why doth God command, if man hath not free will and power to obey?*" And he cites another, saying, "*A law is given to him that can turn to both parts:* i. e. *obey or transgress it; but no law is against him who is bound by nature.*"—p. 151. Agreeably to this, Mr. Barnes observes, "If Dr. Junkin charges me with error in this, he holds the contrary, that is, that unregenerate men are not able to keep the command-

ments; that there is no ability of any kind to yield obedience; that in no conceivable sense has man any power to repent, to believe, and to love God, or to love his fellow men." Dr. Junkin does maintain this, and he asks you to compare Mr. Barnes and Dr. Whitby, and see how exactly they agree. But Dr. Whitby has been battered to pieces by President Edwards, and it is vain for brother Barnes to collect the broken fragments of his system, and construct therefrom a habitation for Calvinistic Presbyterianism. For,

7. I do affirm (what my Brother denies) "that unregenerate men are not able to keep the commandments; that there is no ability of any kind to yield obedience; that in no conceivable sense has man any power to repent, to believe, and to love God, or to love his fellow men."—Here we are fairly at issue. Mr. Barnes affirms (to throw out both negatives) that man unregenerated has in some sense ability *to yield obedience—to repent—to believe*, and *to love God;* I peremptorily deny. And I remark (a) Ability is an efficiency, capacity, power toward the production of an effect. The term is relative, "as the word *unable* is relative, and has relation to ability, or endeavour, which is insufficient." (Edwards.) It exists where, upon exertion, the effect follows, and a rational agent is said *to be able* to do a given thing, when upon the putting forth of his energies toward that thing, it is done: and when it does not follow upon such exertion of his powers, he is said to *be unable.* In other words, *ability* implies the existence of a power of causation and always refers to the proper effect. (b) Every effect is proportioned to its cause both in nature or quality, and in degree. Like produces like. Physical ability can produce only physical results. Strength or mere brute force can effect only strength or resistance of the same kind. Intellectual ability can be efficient only to intellectual results. Intellectual power or ability may plan the machinery by which a man can lift a ton weight: but to say that a man's intellect has ability to lift a ton, is absurd, equally with affirming that mere natural strength *is able* to plan the machinery. Nor is the absurdity a whit less, when it is affirmed that man *has natural ability* to perform a moral act. Each part of his nature—his animal, his intellectual, his moral powers—has its own *peculiar ability*—one faculty or class of faculties cannot perform the functions of another. Animal ability (or strength) and intellectual or moral results: intellectual ability and animal or moral results; and moral ability and intellectual or animal results, are all equally absurd. (c) To yield obedience is a moral result—to repent (I mean saving repentance) is a moral operation—to believe in and love God, are not animal, nor intellectual, nor physical effects or results, but *moral;* yea, the very essence of all morality, and therefore (d) In the very nature of the thing, no natural ability of any conceivable kind, can qualify man to repent and love God. Moral ability *alone can* qualify him—by that *only* can he turn to God and live in him.

Now this moral ability exists not in the soul unborn of the Spirit. There death reigns until the Spirit of life takes up his abode there. So long as faith, repentance, and love to God constitute the essence of morality, so long must he, who is in a state of moral death remain unable, in any and every sense, to obey, to repent, to love God. To maintain the contrary, is to subvert the entire Gospel, and to make the agency of the Spirit in man's conversion unnecessary, and the atonement of Christ utterly in vain.

8. I therefore object to the doctrine of human ability including the manner of its application. Because (a) It inflates the pride of the human heart. Tell men they are able to make to themselves new hearts, if they please—that they have power to love God—as much ability to love him as to hate him—they can do the duty of repentance and faith if they choose—tell them this and you swell their souls in vanity. No news more grateful can be poured into the carnal ear. Nothing can be better calculated to produce two effects in their proper time; which I mention as farther reasons of objection. (b) The man who thinks he can repent whenever he pleases, will, almost inevitably, fold up his hands and defer the duty until a convenient season. Every minister of experience must know, that to arouse men from the slumbers of this belief, is the first step, and Oh how important and how difficult a step it is, to induce them to believe, that they are dead and their life is hid with Christ in God! This is the broad road of Arminian Antinomianism, along which the great mass of human millions are rushing downward to perdition. Tell them 'you are in the road to ruin'—we know it and we don't mean to follow it long—we *can* turn out *when we please* and shall take good care to do it in time for safety. Ah! Mr. Moderator, you know this is the ruin of the race. The pride of *free will* and *human ability* is "the broad way" to hell. (c) When these believers in man's natural ability take the notion to be converted; when the time of their *choosing* has come, *if it ever come*, then they are the dupes of their own delusion. They convert themselves and of course *they* can undo what *they* have done: they can convert themselves back again. I mean to say, that false hopes and consequently spurious revivals are a necessary result of the doctrine we oppose. Simple people, who were *born* Arminians and believers in human ability, as all men are, considering themselves able, when they please, to repent, believe, &c. thus rest in their confidence; and upon a little excitement, take up false hopes and rush to the wildest extremes. For (d) the manner of teaching the doctrine of natural ability leads to delusion. Even if the distinction were unexceptionable and clear in itself; yet it is not kept up; but without qualification men are said to be able to repent, love God, &c. You have the example in the "Defence" before you.

9. All that is said about the tyranny of demanding of men duties beyond their present ability, may be said with equal force and

is daily said, against exacting the claims of justice at all. What cruelty! to demand of poor imperfect creatures holy obedience, and to punish them for non-compliance. This is the most popular argument of Universalists and Unitarians against the doctrine of God's vindictive justice: and I can view the attempt to soften down these features of the Gospel which make it unpopular with the carnal mind, in no other than the most unfavourable light. I know very well men do "reject the system which professes to hold" the doctrine of total inability; they "reject it with abhorrence," and that because it is "so much at variance with the great original impressions of truth, made on their minds:" but I know also that these "great original impressions of truth," are false impressions and impressions of falsehood; and I have no desire to mould the gospel according to them. And I "would dare to preach it to Mr. Barnes' people, or to any other people," in its most abhorrent form. Because I know that the tendency of it is to stain the pride of all human glory, to drive man out of himself—to expel from his soul the pride of "free agency," and make him feel that he is totally helpless and undone—that there is no ability in himself or in any created being to bring deliverance, and thus to compel him to fall down upon his knees, beat upon his bosom, and cry out in the deep consciousness of his utter inability, "God be merciful to me a sinner."

10. This doctrine of human ability and the argument for it founded on the allegation, that unless man is able he cannot be bound, you will allow me to say is the old Pelagian sentiment, and the modern Arminian hobby. Pelagius says, "First it is disputed whether our nature is debilitated by sin. And here, in my opinion, the first inquiry ought to be, what is sin? Is it a substance, or is it a mere name devoid of substance? not a thing, not an existence, not a body, not any thing else (which has a separate existence) but an act; and if this is its nature, as I believe it is, how could that which is devoid of substance debilitate or change human nature?" Again. "Every thing, good or evil, praiseworthy or censurable which we possess, did not originate with us, but is done by us; for we are born capable of both good and evil; but not in possession of these qualities; for in our birth we are equally destitute of virtue and vice; and previously to moral agency there is nothing in man but that which God created in him." Bib. Rep. vol. ii. p. 105. Again. "Why do we loiter and blame the infirmity of nature? He would not command us what is impossible." Milner, vol. ii. p. 385. "Now if before the law, and long before the coming of our Saviour, men led holy lives, how much more after his coming are they able to do it." p. 384. And yet Milner says, "He speaks of the grace of Christ, expiation by his blood, and encouragement by his example." In like manner Edwards, who studied them largely, says of the Arminians, "They strenuously maintain, that it would be unjust in God to

require any thing of us beyond our present power and ability to perform." vol. ii. p. 152.

Now observe, 1. Pelagius denies any moral character good or bad, prior to voluntary action. 2. He attempts to *prove* that sin could not debilitate human nature. 3. He teaches that ability is the measure of duty—God "would not command us what is impossible." That "would be the definition of tyranny." 4. This very same doctrine is held by the Arminian school, and supported by the very same argument. God would be a tyrant if he demanded of us any thing beyond our present ability. 5. These are the doctrines and the argument of brother Barnes in this book. I say not that he is a Pelagian or Arminian; but that on *these points* he holds with both, and wish so to operate on his mind (and the minds of others) as to induce him to reconsider seriously what he has written; in the confident assurance that, if he will re-consider, he will retrace and retract and renounce these sentiments: and in so doing will restore peace to a bleeding church.

CHARGE IV.

Mr. Barnes teaches, That faith is an act of the mind, and not a principle, and is itself imputed for righteousness.

To this the accused puts in a plea of justification, confessing the fact that he so teaches, and maintaining that he teaches therein the truth.

Proof. p. 94. "*Abraham believed God.*" In the Hebrew, "Abraham believed *Jehovah.*" The sense is substantially the same, as the argument turns on the act of believing. The faith which Abraham exercised was, that his posterity should be like the stars of heaven in number. This promise was made to him when he had no child, and of course when he had no *prospect* of such a posterity. See the strength and nature of this faith further illustrated in verses 16—21. The reason why it was counted to him for righteousness was, that it was such a strong, direct, and unwavering act of confidence in the promise of God. *And it.* —The word "it" here evidently refers to the act of believing. It does not refer to the righteousness of another—of God, or of the Messiah; but the discussion is solely of the *strong act* of Abraham's faith, which in *some sense* was counted to him for righteousness. In what sense this was, is explained directly after. All that is material to remark here is, that the *act* of Abraham, the strong confidence of his mind in the promises of God, his unwavering assurance that what God had promised he would perform, was received for righteousness. The same thing is expressed more fully in verses 18—22. When therefore the righteousness of Christ is accounted or imputed to us; when it is said that his merits are transferred and reckoned as ours; whatever may be the truth of the doctrine, it cannot be defended by *this* passage of Scripture. Faith is always an act of the mind. It is not a created essence which is placed within the mind. It is not

a substance created independently of the soul, and placed within it by Almighty power. It is not a *principle*, for the expression, a *principle of faith*, is as unmeaning as a principle of joy, or a principle of sorrow, or a principle of remorse. God promises, the man believes, and this is the whole of it. Beyond the mental operation, there is nothing in the case, and the word is strictly limited to such an act of the mind throughout the Bible. There is not a place that can be adduced where the word means any thing else than an act of the mind, exercised in relation to some object, or some promise, or threatening, or declaration of some other being." p. 95. "Remark (1.) That it is evidently not intended that the act of believing on the part of Abraham, was the *meritorious* ground of acceptance; for then it would have been a work. Faith was as much his own act, as any act of obedience to the law. (2) The design of the Apostle was to show that by the *law*, or by *works*, man could not be justified. Chap. iii. 28. iv. 2. (3) *Faith* was not that which the law required. It demanded complete and perfect obedience; and if a man was justified by *faith*, it was in *some other way*, than by the law. (4) As the law did not demand this [faith, "confidence in God," see page 30,] and as faith was something different from the demand of the law, so if a man were justified by that, it was *on a principle* altogether different from justification by works. It was not by personal merit. It was not by complying with the law. It was in a mode entirely different."

Observation 1. "Faith is always an act of the mind." But now Abraham lived an hundred years at least after he was called to a knowledge of the truth. How many acts of the mind did he perform during that space? Each and every one of these acts is distinct. When the mind has acted, the act is over, and past, and gone; and yet we never speak of faith in the plural number. We never say Abraham's faiths; and why would such an expression be absurd? Obviously, because faith is not the act itself, but the principle, the habit, the abiding disposition of the soul, whence the distinct acts of believing issue. And therefore,

2. We always speak of the acts of faith. So Mr. Barnes says, "the strong act of Abraham's faith." He could not write without contradicting his own doctrine. What sense is in the phrase, "the strong act of Abraham's act of the mind?" It is impossible to introduce this definition of his, without multiplying most strange and unmeaning expressions. If "faith is always an act of the mind," and "not a principle" of action, who *can* explain the phrase "an act of faith."

3. If "faith is an act of the mind only," and not a principle of grace in the soul, from which the acts proceed, then it must follow that Abraham was justified by an act of his mind, which "was as much his own act, as any act of obedience to the law." Here it is indubitably taught, that the individual, personal act of Abraham's mind is the ground of his justification before God.

Not the righteousness of the Saviour, as the church has always believed, but the *act of the man himself* was imputed to him for righteousness. "The word it," says Mr. Barnes, "here evidently refers to the act of believing. It does not refer to the righteousness of another—of God, or of the Messiah." Now it is righteousness which justifies—when a man has the righteousness required by the law, he must and will be justified by the judge. If, therefore, Abraham's own act is his righteousness—is the ground and cause of his being justified—he is not justified by Christ's merits at all, but by his own act. But brother Barnes will say, you draw an inference from my language which I deny; I am responsible not for your inferences, but only for my own acts. In reply, I aver it is not so. It is not an inference from his position. It is the very position itself. Abraham's act is his own, and this, his own act, is put down as his own righteousness. This is Mr. Barnes' doctrine. He teaches it. Very true, he denies it. But if in three lines a man denies and teaches the same thing, let him bear the blame. "In this act, faith is a mere instrument—a condition on which men may be treated as righteous." "In this act, faith," which "is an act of the mind," is "a mere instrument," and "a condition" of salvation. This is salvation by works, and yet the author denies it in the same breath. Oh, Sir, how difficult it is to get clear of the doctrine of imputed righteousness! how difficult it is to make a man believe that his own act is not his own work! To escape from this difficulty, he has found it necessary to maintain one of the strangest positions ever laid down by a moralist, viz. that *confidence in God is not required by his law.* For he perceived that if confidence in God were required by his law, and if Abraham were justified by confidence in God, he was justified by an act of obedience to law—by a work. Reduced to the dilemma of maintaining either that Abraham was justified by the righteousness of Christ, or that confidence in God is not required by his law, he chooses the latter as the lesser evil. You are surprised and grieved! So am I, but it is even so. Mr. Barnes says, "*Faith* was not that which the law required. As the law did not demand this; and as faith was something different from the demand of the law." Now, on p. 30, he translates πιστις,) faith, by the phrase, "confidence in God," and uses it not less than seven times on that page; and so on p. 94, "confidence in the promise of God"—"strong confidence of his mind"—confidence in God not required by his law!

4. Another difficulty of this system which denies faith to be a habit or fixed principle of the renewed man is, that a Christian can have no character: he is a believer, and consequently a justified man, only during the act: but the act is momentary, and when it is past and gone, the man is not a believer; he is not in a justified state beyond the continuity of the act of the mind. Now from all these, and some other difficulties, the plain and

simple doctrine of our Confession, and of the Bible will deliver us. What then is faith according to these? I answer,

5. Saving *Faith* is a gracious principle—a holy habit—an abiding fixed disposition of the soul—whereby it receives and rests upon the testimonies of God concerning his Son and salvation through his righteousness. I had written the above, before I asked a friend at my elbow (in whose house I am sojourning) for Dr. Alexander's Bible Dictionary; and here I put down his definition, viz. "*Saving* faith, is that gracious quality, principle, or habit, wrought in the heart, by the Spirit of God taking the things of Christ and showing them to us, whereby we receive and rest on Christ alone for salvation, as he is offered to us in the gospel." Now that this is the doctrine of the standards is evident.

Conf. xiv. 1. "The grace of faith, whereby the elect are enabled to believe to the saving of their souls, is the work of the Spirit in their hearts: * * * it is increased and strengthened." ii. "By this faith, a Christian believeth," &c. "But the principal acts of saving faith, are, accepting, receiving, and resting on Christ alone," &c, Larg. Cat. 72. "Justifying faith is a saving grace * * *; whereby he * * * receiveth and resteth on Christ," &c. 73. "Faith justifies a sinner in the sight of God, not because of those other graces which do always accompany it, or of good works which are the fruits of it; nor as if the grace of faith, or any act thereof, were imputed to him for his justification," &c. Here I shall be indulged in a few particulars. (*a*) Saving faith is a grace. "By grace are ye saved through faith"—Ep. ii. 8. "Who believe according to the working of his mighty power."—i. 19. Now grace "is *free favour, unmerited kindness.*" "The new spiritual principle produced in the heart by regeneration." It is therefore not the act of the sinner's mind, but the principle from which the acts do proceed. This is evident, (*b*) because faith is weak or strong—it is increased, it grows by its exercise. "Lord increase our faith," Luke xvii. 5. Lord increase our act of the mind! No, but strengthen the holy habit—the *gracious principle.* (*c*) "By this faith, a Christian believeth." By this act of his mind, a Christian acteth with his mind! Manifestly, faith is the *principle*, which is called into action when the Christian believeth—"*whereby* he receiveth Christ"—"the principal acts of saving faith"—the principal acts of the acts of the mind! But enough of this. Mr. Barnes admits it. He says, "The great, leading, deeply-cherished principle of his [the believer's] soul is to obey God. It becomes the habitual bent and disposition of his mind; an inclination or disposition, for the formation and cherishing of which, he is responsible—an inclination, or preference, or disposition which lies *back* of any specific act of believing." Oh, *si sic omnia!* Yet even here, he would be more satisfactory, if he had attributed this principle to the renewing of the Holy Ghost, and not, as *seems* to be the case, to the man's own course of action. "It *becomes* the habitual bent," but it so

becomes by renewing grace. Had my brother confessed this at first, and condemned his doctrine, that faith exists only in the act, he had done nobly, and saved time and labour. He has now found out that "a principle of faith is not unmeaning, no more than a principle of confidence in God." Now I rejoice to observe.

6. That I can unite with brother Barnes in pressing the obligation upon the believing sinner, to cherish this principle, and carry it on to perfection. It grows by its exercise; and when Peter commands us to grow in grace, my soul feels the moral bonds of that command. But I would always go farther, and press this obligation upon the whole world. The unregenerate—all men who hear it—are bound by the same divine authority which says, "worship God," "remember the Sabbath day," to believe the gospel, to repent of their sins, and live in the practice of holy obedience. But then I deny that this obligation is ever either increased or diminished by man's ability or his inability. It rests not at all on such a basis, but simply on the immutable authority of the everlasting God. The will of God, not the ability of man, is the basis and measure of moral obligation.

7. It is scarcely necessary to reply to the remarks of brother Barnes, about faith being a created essence, put into the soul—or about my supposing "that the mind does *not act* in believing." This is too futile, and I know not why such absurdities should be *imputed* to me.

8. But I must be allowed to set the annotator and the Presbyterian standards in juxtaposition on another point. He says, "the *act* of Abraham"—not "the righteousness of another—of God, or of the Messiah;" but "the *act* of Abraham, the strong confidence of his mind, was received for righteousness." The standards specifically deny this very position. Lar. Cat. p. 73. "Nor as if the grace of faith, or any act thereof, were imputed to him for justification." I just leave these two statements to a perpetual menace of each other, and add my

9th Observation, viz. That faith is to be understood *objectively* in the passage (Rom. iv. 3,) under consideration. That is, when Abraham's faith is said to be imputed to him for righteousness, the *object* on which his faith terminates or rests, is so reckoned for righteousness. That is, the righteousness of Christ, or Christ as the Lord our *Righteousness*. Now, that this is the true sense is evident, because "Abraham rejoiced," says the Redeemer, "to see my day, and he saw it and was glad;" John viii. 5, 6. Can any man doubt for a moment that Abraham's seeing Christ's day, was his believing in the promised Messiah and trusting to his righteousness alone?

On this point let us hear the voice of the dead. Doctor Wilson, the predecessor of Mr. Barnes, has spoken so admirably on it, that you will doubtless hear him with pleasure. In his notes on Ridgley, vol. III. p. 108, he states the doctrine thus, "Others, [in the margin he refers to Whitby and Macknight, two distinguished

Arminians] understand Abraham to have been justified on the account of the mere act of believing :"—They make faith a work of merit. Doctor Wilson rejects this notion, thus, "Faith is the mind's assent to external evidence; faith thus strictly considered as an act, is man's act, as much so as any can be, and as the understanding at least in its application to the evidence must be accompanied by the consent of the will, here is every thing that is necessary to constitute a work, and accordingly it is commanded as a duty, the neglect of which is criminal :"—"that it is not the mere act of believing in Christ which is the ground of such justification is plain from this, that he expresses the same thing by the words, being justified by Christ." If it is true that we are justified by faith, and also that we are justified by Christ, it must be meant in different senses, and to give effect to these words differently connected, it seems necessary to suppose the righteousness of Christ as the meritorious cause or ground of justification, and faith the instrumental."—"It is not the *holiness of his faith* that is accounted for righteousness to him; faith is a holy duty. [Brother Barnes denies this, in saying that faith is not required by the law,] but not more so than some others, and not so much so as love, "now abideth faith, hope, love, and the greatest of these is love." Nor are Christians ever said to be justified by love, joy, peace, patience, or by any other grace except by faith,—and no doubt it is because faith lays hold on him for whose sake alone we can be justified."

"Or faith may be put for its object as the words fear, hope, joy, and love are. God is our fear, our hope, &c. 'Thy faith hath saved thee,' it was not her faith but its object, Christ's power, that healed her."

"The seed which was promised," continues Dr. Wilson, "embraced Christ, whose day Abraham saw afar off; so this faith [he is speaking of Abraham's faith, in the precise case where Mr. Barnes insists that his *act itself* is imputed for righteousness,] had the Redeemer for its object. In the epistle to the Galatians there follow the quotation these words, 'as many as are of faith are the children of Abraham,' these are called his spiritual seed, and believe in Christ, now if all who believe in Christ are thereby the children of Abraham, and Abraham their father or pattern of faith, his faith must have been of the same kind."—

Thus, Dr. Wilson explicitly maintains, that not Abraham's faith—not the act of his mind, but the object of that act, that is, the righteousness of Messiah, was reckoned to him for righteousness. Mr. Barnes sets himself in his comment to deny and reject this. Dr. Wilson teaches, that faith, "considered as an act, is man's act," and is a work; and he argues, that to insist that the act itself was imputed to Abraham for righteousness, [the precise thing which Mr. Barnes does insist on] is to maintain justification by works. And he proves most conclusively, that, the term faith ought to be understood objectively—it "had the Redeemer for its

object." And on p. 128, 129, using the language of another, he says, "As the righteousness by which the sinner is justified, is the sole work of Christ *for him*, so this [faith] is the sole work of the Holy Ghost *in him*."—"Thus we see that faith is entirely distinct from the righteousness which justifies."—The righteousness of Christ and not the "act of the mind, is that which is imputed," in order to justification.

11. *Finally*, that the accused has used some expression seeming to admit a doctrine utterly inconsistent with his main position, does not affect the truth of this charge. He denies that "the act of believing on the part of Abraham, was the *meritorious* ground of acceptance,"—and speaks of "the merit by which all this is obtained, as, the work of the Lord Jesus Christ."—But when a writer lays down and laboriously supports an erroneous sentiment, and afterwards, looking to consequences, throws in a phrase or two as a salvo, savouring of the opposite doctrine, we are bound to receive his main positions as his real meaning. Yet in his Defence, where he reiterates these expressions, he soon looses sight of them and reverts to his old ground. He says, "the grand desideratum in a plan of salvation was to restore to an alienated world, *confidence in the existence*, the *government* and *the perfections of God*. This Abraham evinced; and it was such a state of mind as furnished the proper *evidence* of reconciliation, and he was reckoned as in fact a justified man. His faith in God was so strong as to give an unerring indication that he was recovered, and was reckoned to him "for righteousness," or "in order to justification," just as "faith is now." Here faith is "a state of mind," furnishing "evidence of reconciliation,"—"a state of mind to which God had promised acceptance,"—and that state of mind, is *his own act*—"beyond the mental operation, there is nothing in the case." Whether the Bible and Standards of our church can be reconciled with these views, it is for the court to judge.

CHARGE V.

Mr. Barnes denies, "That God entered into covenant with Adam, constituting him a federal or covenant head and representative to all his natural descendants."

Proof 1. p. 114. "From these remarks it is clear that the apostle does not refer to the *man* here from any idea that there was any particular covenant transaction with *him;* but that he means to speak of it in the usual popular sense; referring to him as the fountain of all the woes that sin has introduced into the world."

Proof 2. p. 128. "The most common [explanation] has been that Adam was the representative of the race; that he was a covenant head, and his sin was *imputed* to his posterity, and that they were held liable to punishment for it, as if they had

committed it themselves. But to this there are great and insuperable objections.

(1) There is not one word of it in the Bible. Neither the term representative, covenant, or impute are ever applied to the transaction in the sacred Scriptures. (2.) It is a mere philosophical theory."

Proof 3. p. 115. As quoted under charge II.

Proof, 4. p. 121. "A comparison is also instituted between Adam and Christ in 1 Cor. xv. 22—25. The reason is not that Adam was the *representative or federal head* of the human race, about which the apostle says nothing, and which is not even implied, but that he was the first of the race; he was the fountain, the head, the father; and the consequences of that first act introducing sin into the world, could be seen every where. The words *representative* and *federal* head are never applied to Adam in the Bible. The reason is, that the word *representative* implies an idea which could not have existed in the case—*the consent of those who are represented.* Besides the Bible does not teach that they acted in him, or by him; or that he acted *for* them. No passage has ever yet been found that stated this doctrine."

Proof 5. p. 128. "(2) Nothing is said of a covenant with him, [Adam.] No where in the Scriptures is the term *covenant* applied to any transaction with Adam. (3) All that is established here is the simple fact that Adam sinned, and that this made it certain that all his posterity would be sinners. Beyond this the language of the apostle does not go; and all else that has been said of this is the result of mere philosophical speculation. (4) This *fact* is one that is apparent; and that accords with all the analogy in the moral government of God. The drunkard secures commonly as a result, that his family will be reduced to beggary, want, and wo. His sin is commonly the certain occasion of their being sinners; and the immediate cause of their loss of property and comfort, of their being overwhelmed in wretchedness and grief. A murderer will entail disgrace and shame on his family."

1. Under Charge II. it has been fully proved, that Mr. Barnes holds Adam ignorant to such a degree that it is impossible he should have known any thing about a covenant. If that charge is substantiated then there was no covenant established with Adam.

2. But before we proceed to the other proofs, let us settle the idea of a covenant. The Hebrbw word (Berith,) as critics generally agree, is formed from a verb that signifies *to cut*, and has reference to the ceremony of cutting, killing, or dividing an animal, usually slaughtered upon occasion of establishing important agreements between men. See Jer. xxxiv. 18—20. This ceremony most likely had its origin in the divine institution of sacrifices, with which Moses was familiar, and whence he borrowed the term. Herman Witsius speaks the truth when he

says, vol. I. p. 47, 48. "Improperly it denotes the following things; 1. An immutable ordinance about any thing. In this sense God mentions, *his covenant of the day and of the night.*"—2. "A sure and stable promise, though it be not mutual.—*This is my covenant with them, my Spirit shall not depart from them.*" Is. lxix. 21. 3. "It signifies also a *precept;* and *to cut a covenant* is to *give a precept.*"—"But *properly*, it signifies *a mutual agreement between parties with respect to something.*" On p. 51, he says, Having premised these things in general about the terms, let us now inquire into the thing itself, and the nature of the covenant of God with man; which I thus define: *A covenant of God with man is an agreement between God and man, about the method of obtaining consummate happiness, with the addition of a threatening of eternal destruction, with which the despiser of the happiness offered in that way is to be punished.*" The covenant on God's part comprises three things in the whole. 1. *A promise* of consummate happiness in eternal life. 2. A *designation* and *prescription of the condition*, on the performance of which, man acquires a right to the promise. 3. *A penal sanction* against those who do not stand by the prescribed condition." p. 52. And p. 53. "It becomes the covenant of two parties, when man consents thereunto, *embracing the good* promised by God, *engaging to an exact observance of the condition* required, and, upon the *violation* thereof voluntarily owning himself obnoxious to the threatened *curse.*" If asked for a definition of my own I would say, 'A covenant is a mutual agreement between two or more parties, containing a stipulation (or statement of something to be done) on the one part, and a restipulation corresponding to it on the other, and attended by a penal sanction.' It requires *properly*, 1. Intelligent agents. 2. (of course,) The exercise of volition in the parties. 3. A proposition made by the one to the other, of something to be done. 4. A condition of reward offered in the proposition, when the other party shall have fulfilled his condition. 5. A condition of penalty threatened, if he shall not do the thing set forth in the proposition, or upon the other party if he shall withhold the promised reward, after the thing shall have been done. This is the idea of a covenant, and it is one of the simplest and plainest things in the theory and practice of morals. I hire a servant for ten dollars per month, to do certain work. He does his work, agreeably to contract, and receives his pay. This is a simple contract or bargain. I propose to a builder to erect me a house, according to a plan submitted, for a sum of a thousand dollars, within a given time, or pay a hundred dollars damages; and if I shall not pay him, on the delivery of the key at the given time, I shall forfeit a hundred dollars. He agrees to my proposition. This is a covenant, and it differs from a simple contract only in its formality; just as a simile, in rhetoric, differs from a metaphor. Suppose Abraham had said to Eleazer his servant, 'Go and take a wife to my son

Isaac from my kindred, and return with her within three months, and I will give thee thy freedom and an outfit of five camels and and an hundred sheep, a tent, and furniture. But if thou neglect or refuse, I will deprive thee of thy stewardship, and yet retain thee as a slave.' Eleazer, panting for freedom and comparative independent affluence, assents to the proposition. It is now a covenant, just as complete as the preceding, except that the penalty on Abraham, if he shall refuse to do his part, is not expressed, and though implied, it might be difficult for the weaker to enforce its exaction. Again, I say to my little boy, "My son, if you'll be a good boy, kind to your mother, and diligent in your studies until I return home, I'll bring you a new cap; and if you don't I'll chastise you. Will you agree to it? Yes, that I will." Here is a covenant. Here is simplicity itself, and yet men pretend that young people have difficulty in understanding the old theology of the covenants. Had the builder, the steward of Abraham, or my son any difficulty? Oh no! it is the grandeur of its simplicity which commends the covenant of God to the people of his love. Now, Mr. Barnes denies God's covenant with Adam.

3. Proof 1. When Paul says, "by one man sin entered into the world," brother Barnes insists that "he does not refer to the *man* here from any idea that there was any particular covenant transaction with him." Is not this a denial of the covenant? Could any man who believes in the doctrine of the covenant of works, use such terms? But, p. 128, he says, "The most common explanation has been, that Adam was the representative of the race; that he was a covenant head, &c." "But," adds he, "to this there are great and insuperable objections." Can language be more explicit? "But to this"—to what? Why, to the *fact* stated before, that Adam was a covenant head—a representative. "It is a mere philosophical theory." "It"—what? Not surely the terms *covenant*, *representative*, *federal head*; nay but *the fact* of Adam's standing in this moral relation to his posterity and to God—not that the terms *covenant* and *represent* are or are not used in the Bible, but the moral headship—the relation itself—the moral connexion "is a mere philosophical theory."

Proof 4. Here the moral or legal connexion between Adam and his posterity is rejected both in name and thing. He denies not simply that the *terms* are used, but the things—"not that Adam was the *representative* or *federal head* of the race"—this "is not even implied." And he gives a reason why it *could not* be, viz. "the word *representative* implies an idea which could not have existed in the case, *the consent of those who are represented.*" Thus you see how precise he is; not the term but the idea—the thing meant is rejected. He with clearness and perspicuity of language denies the moral connexion—"the Bible does not teach that they acted in him, or by him, or that he acted *for* them."

The italics are his own, and they are put in to give *force* to his denial that Adam acted for his posterity. No moral connexion exists. The whole is resolved into mere physical, *animal headship.*

Proof 5. "Nothing is said of a covenant with Adam." And he illustrates by reference to the effects of a drunkard's conduct upon his family, and a murderer's. He most unequivocally and peremptorily denies any other relation between Adam and his posterity, than exists between the drunkard and his. Adam's sin made it certain that all his children would be sinners. But the drunkard's sin does not make it certain that all his children will be drunkards. It very often happens that they shun the vice of their parent and become most exemplary men. Some of the first men in the church and the world have had intemperate parents. There is absolutely no *moral connexion* between them to secure such a result. There is a connexion of physical relation, and this is all Mr. Barnes seems to admit in the case of Adam. This will appear hereafter: it has appeared that he denies Adam's posterity to be sinners, prior to moral action: and they all do exist prior to moral action; so that he denies that Adam's sin made any of his posterity sinners. And it will further appear, that he denies their liability to suffer punishment on account of his sin: so that the declaration of Paul, that "by the disobedience of one many were made sinners," is rejected, or must be explained away. The relations of Adam and his posterity are physical, only there is no moral unity—they are not one moral and corporate body as it were, with their parent as head, acting "*for* them." "No passage," says Mr. Barnes, "has ever been found that stated this doctrine—that he acted *for* them."

What says the Constitution of our church?

Conf. VII. "*Of God's covenant with man.*" This is the heading of the chapter, and might of itself be sufficient to prove the opposition of Mr. Barnes to our standards. Section first speaks of God's condescension to man, "which he hath been pleased to express by way of covenant." Sect. II. "The first covenant made with man was a covenant of works, wherein life was promised to Adam, and in him to his posterity, upon condition of perfect and personal obedience." Chapter xix. 1. "God gave to Adam a law, as a covenant of works, by which he bound him and all his posterity to personal, entire, and perpetual obedience; promised life upon the fulfilling, and threatened death upon the breach of it; and endued him with power to obey it." Lar. Cat. 20.—"entering into a covenant of life with him upon condition," &c. 22. "The covenant being made with *Adam*, as a public person, not for himself only, but for his posterity; all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him and fell with him in that first transgression." Short Cat. 12 and 16, to the same effect. On the contrary, Mr. Barnes says, "the Bible does not teach that they [his posterity] acted in him, or by him,

or that he acted *for* them." And he sneeringly asks, (p. 117,) "What idea is conveyed to men of common understanding by the expression "they sinned IN him?" Thus the very words of the Confession, as well as its doctrine, are held up to ridicule. Contradiction cannot be more palpable.

Here you will allow me to make a remark for application on the other points as well as this, viz. Mr. Barnes does not lay the language of the Confession down alongside of his own. Why does he not quote the words in full, which he is alleged to contradict? Surely if he were conscious of a perfect agreement with the standards, he would compare them together—he would present both at one view to his readers, that they might see the exact coincidence. But no, the language of the Confession is withheld from the public eye. Can any man be at a loss for the reason?

But perhaps the standards, in teaching the doctrine of "the Covenant of Works," go beyond the Bible; and if so, we are bound not to follow them: at least we are not conscience-bound to follow them: for the word of God is the only infallible rule, and He only is Lord of conscience. Let us therefore inquire whether the Bible teaches the doctrine "of God's covenant with man." Gen. ii. 16, 17. "And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat, but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die."

On this remark. Man was bound to obey his Creator in all things, prior to, and independent on any covenant made with him: just as Eleazer, in the case supposed above, was bound to obey Abraham, and my son to obey his parent. The covenant does not *create moral obligation:* the obligation is mere *law:* and hence the Confession says, "God gave to Adam a law, *as a covenant.*" That modification of the law, which appends the promised reward, and secures the consent of Adam, is what constitutes it a covenant. Our inquiry is, not whether the *term* covenant is used here; that we are to lose sight of the subject before us; but, is the thing itself here? Have we the moral substance? Are the essential requisites of a covenant transaction here! To this I affirm: Mr. Barnes denies. Now the proof of the positive rests on the affirmant: and let us to it. 1st. Requisite, "intelligent agents," and here they are, God and Adam. There is no room for disputation on this point. 2d. "The exercise of volition in the parties." Now that God exercised volition and expressed his will to Adam is undeniable—He *commanded* him. And that Adam acquiesced in the divine proposition is evident (*a*) from the silence of Scripture, as to any objections. You will say 'this is negative proof:' so it is, but negative proof may contain positive evidence. If Adam had not *consented*, his withholding consent would have been plead by him as a reason why the penalty should not be pronounced and executed. He was certainly sufficiently disposed to excuse himself, and if he could have laid hold of that

plea—if he *could* have said in truth, 'I never *consented* to the proposition about this tree of knowledge,' it would certainly have been a better apology than to say, "the woman whom thou gavest to be with me, she gave me," &c. (*b*) Adam *could* not as a holy creature refuse or withhold his consent of will, to a proposition so reasonable. His refusal would have been sin, and he would have been a fallen creature. To refuse his consent and to remain a holy creature are irreconcileable impossibilities. But now Adam, *after* this proposition was made to him, continued a holy creature. For he was such *when* he gave names to the other creatures, and *when* his rib was taken out to form his wife. And therefore, it is evident, he did consent at the time—he implicitly acquiesed in the terms proposed. (*c*) He could not but acquiesce, because the terms were most reasonable, and all for his benefit: and he was under the law of his being which led to seek his own blessedness, and he was in possession of *perfect reasoning powers;* and no temptation had as yet been presented to pervert them. (*d*) Eve knew of the proposition or command of God, and assented to it. (iii. 2, 3.) She replies to the serpent, "God hath said, 'Ye shall not eat of it," &c. Now this knowledge she derived from her husband, for the proposition was made to him before she was created. The evidence of her assent is explicit and undeniable, and to my mind, is perfectly conclusive, that Adam also willingly and cheerfully acquiesced in it. 3d. "A proposition made by the one to the other, of something to be done." Such proposition was made by God to Adam. Controversy about this, there cannot be. The thing proposed to Adam was, obedience in the matter of the fruit forbidden. Abstinence from the fruit. 4th. "A condition of reward offered in the proposition, when the other party shall have fulfilled his condition." Now I aver that such condition is set forth in the words before us. Not indeed *explicitly*, but *implicitly*, that is, by plain and unavoidable implication. The threatening of death upon disobedience, implied and contained a promise of life to obedience. "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." The simple reading of this language convinces every rational mind, that life was set before Adam as well as death: and on this principle Paul reasons—Gal. iii. 11, 12. "But that no man is justified by the law in the sight of God, *it is* evident, for the just shall live by faith: And the law is not of faith; but the man that doeth them shall live in [by] them." Doing the things required in the law, secures life: and v. 21. "If there had been a law given which could have given life." The law given to Adam, contained a promise of life to obedience. This is universally admitted, and I waste time in the proof. 5th. "A condition of penalty threatened." And here the text is explicit—"thou shalt surely die."

Thus every item essential to a covenant exists in the case: and I challenge denial in reference to any one of them. But let us see what notices of this transaction occur in other Scriptures.

Job, xxxi. 33. says "if I covered my transgressions as Adam, by hiding my iniquity in my bosom." This passage is cited, simply for the translation of the Hebrew words, *ke Adam;* it shows that those terms mean *as Adam.* Now compare this with Hosea vii. 7. "But they *ke Adam, as Adam,* transgressed the covenant." And in the 82d Psalm, "Ye shall die like man, [as Adam] and fall like [as] one of the people." The Lord, by Hosea, complains against Judah and Ephraim, that they have transgressed the covenant. What covenant? Undoubtedly that which God made with their fathers. Deut. v. 3. "The Lord made not this covenant with our fathers but with us, even us, who are all of us here alive this day." This Sinai covenant, is plainly referred to by the prophet. Judah and Ephraim transgressed it: as Adam transgressed the covenent made with him. Here the term *covenant* is applied to the transaction with Adam: and there is no evasion. For if it be alleged, that *Adam* here is used in a generic sense, for the race in general,—"they, like men commonly do, transgressed the covenant"—it returns upon us, what covenant do men commonly transgress? Adam is a general term for the race—the *whole race.* Now what covenant had God given to the whole race? It cannot be pretended, it is the covenant with Noah, and this is the only covenant comprehending the race—the whole race, except only the covenant with Adam. If therefore, *Adam* means man in general—the race; then it is demonstrably evident, that with *the race* God had made a covenant. I ask when, and where, and how? And to these there can be no answer full and fair, but by admitting the doctrine "Of God's covenant with man," as laid down in our Confession.

In 1 Cor. xv. 22, "For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive," there is a parallel drawn between Adam and Christ; showing that all die in Adam. If, therefore, the headship of Adam is denied, it is incumbent on those who deny to show in what other sense all could die in him, than by virtue of the moral relation to him. The same is evident from Rom. v. 12, 19, "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin"—"by one man's disobedience many were made sinners." If the consequences of the legal relation are realised, and God's government be just, the relation itself must have existed. The fact is undeniably true, that death, preceded, of course, by condemnation and *just* exposure to death, passed and still passes through upon all mankind, and many of them, viz. all infants, had not personally sinned; therefore they sinned in their first father Adam, the moral head of the race.

Allow me here to add the testimony of the late learned and lamented Dr. Wilson. He is very explicit in maintaining the representative character of Adam, and his opinions ought to havgreat weight *here.* In Ridgley, vol. II. pp. 77, 78, he has a note on this passage, viz. "We shall proceed to inquire how the pro-

vidence of God had a more immediate reference to the spiritual or eternal happiness of man, in that he entered into a covevant of life with him." In the note approbatory and explanative, Dr. Wilson says, "The first intelligent creatures were purely spiritual, and each stood or fell for himself. He united in man the spiritual and the corporeal natures; he formed his soul innocent and holy, and made ample provisions for the comfort of his body; and as it would have been inconvenient to have brought all of the human family, which were to be in every generation, upon the earth at one time, and still more so, that, every one standing or falling for himself, the earth should be the common habitation of beings perfectly holy, happy, and immortal, and also of cursed, perishing beings, he constituted the first man a representative of his race. That he represented the race appears from this, that the command was given to him before his wife was formed, and also because it does not appear that her eyes were opened to see her guilt and miserable condition, until he had eaten of the fruit, "then the eyes of them both were opened." The same is reaffirmed in the note on page 103. "The command had been given to Adam; he was the representative of Eve and his posterity." Let no man slander the illustrious dead, by saying that Doctor J. P. Wilson denied the covenant of works and Adam's representative character.

I proceed now to remark on the Defence of Mr. Barnes.

1. He mistakes or misstates the case before the court. "My statement in my 'Notes' is definite, and designed to be so. *It is simply that the terms covenant, federal headship, and representative, are not applied to the transaction in the passage under consideration in my Notes, nor in the Bible.* And the simple inquiry is, whether this *is* so or is *not*—and on this the Presbytery is to find a verdict." So, then, Mr. Moderator, it is a mere question of terms! And this solemn charge of dangerous error amounts only to this, Mr. Barnes denies that the terms *representative* and *federal headship* are found in the Bible! Strange! indeed! And pray who affirmed that these words are in the Bible? Is it indeed so? Is this the precise point of this 5th charge, that Mr. Barnes denies a position, which every person who has ever read the Scriptures denies? Have I charged him with such a wonderful heresy? Or have I charged him with denying the *doctrine* of the covenant of works, the federal or covenant headship and representative character of Adam? This is certainly what I intended, and if I have made such a mistake as to charge as an error the rejection of these terms, then truly you will make short work of this charge, and acquit the accused. But let us take heed. This diversion must not lead us away from the point before us. The controversy is not about terms. The word *terms* is not used in the charge. It is a question of *things*—a question of *doctrine*; and yet the substance of this "Defence" has reference only to the meaning of a few words, and to the question whether they are

found in the Bible. Now, no man can read the passages above cited from the "Notes," without perceiving, that whilst he does reject the terms in question as unscriptural, he also rejects the *things* meant by them—the *doctrine*. He states the doctrine of our Confession, and rejects it—calls it "a mere philosophical theory." What is a philosophical theory? The terms *covenant, representative, federal head?* Are the mere *words* a theory, or does he mean the *sentiments*, the *doctrines*, the *things taught?* How futile! Oh, no; he denies the legal-connexion—the moral relation. "The Bible does not teach, says he. Does not teach what? That the terms are used! Nay, it "does not teach that they acted in him, or by him, or that he acted *for* them."

2. Mr. Barnes objects to the term covenant—rather he denies the existence of the thing, because the transaction meant by the term implies "*equality* between the parties." I have demonstrated that absolute equality is not requisite. My son or slave and I may make a covevant; yet, absolutely, we are not on a scale of equality. Dr. Ely and his slave Ambrose have entered into a covenant for the benefit of the latter, and the glory of the former—are they absolutely equal? So far from equality being requisite to great and important "*leagues, compacts, agreements*," it is most commonly absent. Treaties between nations are substantially and often formally covenants, and yet it is notorious, that they are very frequently entered into when one of the parties is beaten and conquered. But the obvious scriptural fact is, that God has often covenanted with his people, and Gesenius ought not to have been quoted as saying, that the Hebrew word "means properly, a *compact*, *league*, *agreement*, between man and man." His first observation has reference to the cutting of victims into two parts, and passing between them, of which the only examples in the Bible are that of God's covenant with Abraham, and the case referred to in Jeremiah. And he says, "Spec. et creberrime de fœdere pactoque Deum inter et Abrahamum juncto." Gen. xv. 17.) "The special and most frequent application is to the covenant and compact entered into between God and Abraham." Now every reader of the Bible knows that Gesenius is right. The term is in fact applied in but comparatively few instances in the Bible to compacts between man and man. It is used more than twenty times in reference to the agreement between God and man, before it is applied once to agreements between man and man. Now it is from the general and original application of a term we learn its meaning. Yet I will concede that there is a relative equality—there is a letting down of the high and mighty —there is condescension on the part of the great, when he contracts a covenant with his inferior. Dr. Ely condescended in covenanting with Ambrose. Joshua condescended when he made a league (a covenant,) with the beggarly Gibeonites. On the same principle, but infinitely greater is the condescension of our God, in proposing terms to Adam; threatening death, and promis-

ing life as the reward of that obedience to which Adam was bound, independently of the promise or the threatening. There can, however, be no such "equality or liberty to reject the terms," as Mr. Barnes speaks of, in any case where God proposes a covenant, as it is undeniable he often did. The brother's argument against a covenant of God with Adam, applies equally against his covenant with Noah, Abraham, and Israel.

3. Mr. Barnes' 6th objection is, because the phrase "federal or covenant head," is not to be found in the Confession of Faith, or in the Catechisms." Is the word *constitution*, which he uses three lines below, found in the Confession? The argument here is, that because the term is not in the Confession, therefore, to omit its use is not heresy. But then its force lies in the gratuitous assumption, which I have shown to be false, viz. that the dispute is about the term, not the thing—the mere phrase, not the doctrine. But, in reality, the reasoning from the fact, that certain words are not in the standards, or in the Bible, ought to infer that the doctrine is not there; and if a certain term is not in the Bible, the idea expressed by it is not necessary to be held. Now the word trinity is not in the Bible, is it therefore no error to deny the doctrine. The phrase "social organization," a favourite with Mr. Barnes, is not in the Bible. The words society, happiness, result, explained, system, numberless, independent, communities, sympathy, aid, grouped, constituted, clans, conduct, whelm, union, race, (species,) improved, advancement, endeavour—all these, twenty-two in number, are found in a single column (page 129,) of Mr. Barnes' book, yet none of them are in the Bible. I have taken the trouble to set them forth, simply to exhibit practically the futility of this argument, against any given doctrine, because the terms by which it may be most conveniently expressed are not in the sacred volume. To say, then, that "in expressing his views of this transaction, he has confined himself as strictly as possible to the language of Scripture," is altogether inaccurate; the word "transaction" is not in the Scriptures, and every reader must see, that it is much more vague than the Scripture term covenant, and therefore cannot express the idea so accurately.

4. Mr. Barnes supposes that the doctrine of a covenant with Adam is made the basis of error in those who hold it. And specifies the doctrine of personal identity with Adam as the error; and alleges that his view avoids it. Now (*a*) the covenant of works is taught in our standards, and the doctrine of personal identity is not taught there; nor is it held by any who honestly and truly hold to the Confession. I shall show, in due time, that Mr. B. utterly mistakes when he says Edwards holds it. (*b*) Personal identity with Adam is perfectly irreconcileable with the doctrine of the covenant of works. For if his posterity were personally one with Adam, they and he are not millions of persons, all represented by one individual of those millions; they are one individual, and incapable of representation; and this is the perfec-

tion of absurdity. (*e*)The doctrine of physical unity; or animal identity—oneness with Adam as the parent of our bodies, is held forth as the only connexion with him. Now this physical identity may, and I think must, lead to dangerous error. How can brother Barnes avoid the odious doctrine of physical depravity!

5. "The consent of those who are represented," he considers as included in the idea of representation. This is obviously true, and it is manifestly not true. That is, s*ometimes* the consent of the represented is given personally; but in the *vast majority, generally*, it is not given by them personally. And as Webster is brought into this theological discussion, let us hear him on both sides. "REPRESENTATION—7. The business of acting as a substitute for another." And "SUBSTITUTE," he defines, "One person put in the place of another to answer the same purpose." Representation, then, is one person acting "for another"—"in the place of another"—"put in the place," that he might act, and so acting for another. There is not a word said in his entire definitions about *consent of the represented;* and for the obvious reason, that the creation or production of the relation is one thing, and the relation itself is another. *How* Adam *became* a representative is one thing. His *action* "*for his posterity*," is another thing. The *fact* of his acting for them is affirmed in our standards and the Bible; it is denied by this brother; the *manner* of his appointment is also set forth; it is by God's constituting or establishing with him the covenant of works. This also is denied. To represent, says Webster, is "to supply the place of; to act as a substitute for another." But now if the question be, how is one man to act for another? the answer must be—in various ways. 1. A commercial agent, i. e. a man to act for another in commercial business, is appointed with his consent; and this consent must be evinced, in order to the business transactions being binding. This doctrine is well laid down and illustrated in the citations from Kent's Commentaries. 2. But similar agency exists in various cases where no account is given—yea, where the consent is withheld. Guardians act for their wards; trustees under the drunkard's law act for the man and his family; legislators act for the whole mass of population, whose consent is not given—as childree, women, persons who never vote, and all minorities. Individual, personal consent is not asked. In every conceivable sense, (for the purposes of the appointment,) the guardian represents—he *acts for his* ward. And in the national compact, covenant, agreement, provision is made whereby a few represent and *act for* the whole, without *their consent;* minors are sometimes asked who shall represent them; but this is not necessary; their consent is not given. But Mr. Barnes says, it is given in forming the constitution by those who were then capable of giving consent; or it is given by their continuing under it. But can a minor withhold that consent? Is he not bound independently on it? Just so in God's covenant with Abraham and Israel; it bound all

their posterity, and their withholding consent was rebellion against God, and a breach of his covenant. So Adam *acted for his posterity*—their consent was not asked. Minors and minorities have men to act for them without their consent. Is this hard? Is it unjust? No more unjust was it in God to constitute Adam a head to act for his people.

6. He says, in the Defence, "That posterity are subjected, in consequence of this act of Adam, to the same train of ills as if they had themselves been personally the transgressors—that is, that his posterity are "indubitably affected." And the most like admitting the legal consequence of the transgression upon his posterity, is on page 124. "*Unto condemnation*. Producing condemnation; or involving in condemnation." Now the superficial reader would here suppose, that he teaches guilt—liability to penal evil as a necessary effect of Adam's sin, upon his posterity. But when you look forward you find, that this penal evil comes only after voluntary action. There is a tendency to sin in our nature; and when this tendency is developed, for that developement he is punishable. And he proceeds to explain the whole on the principle by which a drunkard brings ruin upon his family: and such men may bring pain and wo, but not as a penal evil. But I must waive this for the present as it runs into

CHARGE VI.

Viz. Mr. Barnes denies "That the first sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity."

Proof 1. p. 10. "A melancholy instance of this [substituting theory for fact] we have in the account which the Apostle gives (ch. v.) about the effect of the sin of Adam. The simple *fact* is stated, that that sin was followed by the sin and ruin of all his posterity. Yet he offers no explanation of the *fact*. He leaves it as indubitable; and as not demanding an explanation in his argument, perhaps as not admitting it. This is the whole of his doctrine on that subject. Yet men have not been satisfied with that. They have sought for a theory to account for it. And many suppose that they have found it in the doctrine that the sin of Adam is *imputed*, or set over by an arbitary arrangement to beings otherwise innocent, and that they are held to be responsible for a deed committed thousands of years before they were born. This is the *theory*, and men insensibly forget that it is *mere theory*."

Proof 2. "(3.) It comports with the Apostle's agreement to state a cause why all died, and not to state that all sinned in Adam. It would require an *additional statement* to see how *that* could be a cause. (4.) The expression in whom all have sinned conveys no intelligible idea. As men had not an existence then in any sense, they could not then sin. What idea is conveyed to men of common understanding by the expression

"they sinned IN him?" The meaning of the expression, therefore, clearly, is, *because* all have sinned all die."

"I understand it, therefore, as referring to the fact that men sin *in their own persons*, *sin themselves*—as indeed, how *can* they *sin* in any other way? and that *therefore* they die."

Proof 3. p. 119. "The difference contemplated, Rom. v. 14, is not that Adam was an *actual* sinner, and that *they* had sinned only by *imputation*. For (1.) The expression to sin by imputation, is unintelligible and conveys no idea. (2) The apostle makes no such distinction and conveys no such idea. (3) His very object is different. It is to show that they *were actual sinners*; that they transgressed law; and the proof of this is that they died. (4) It is utterly absurd to suppose that men from the time of Adam to Moses were sinners *only by imputation*.

Proof 4. p. 119. "Death reigned; and this proves that they were sinners. If it should be said that the death of *infants* would prove that *they* were sinners also, I answer,—(a) That this was an inference which the *apostle* does not draw, and for which he is not responsible. It is not affirmed by him. (b) If it did refer to infants, what would it prove? Not that the sin of Adam was imputed, but that they were *personally* guilty and transgressors. For this is the only point to which the argument tends. The apostle says not one word about imputation. He does not even refer to infants by name, nor does he here introduce at all the doctrine of imputation. All this is mere philosophy introduced to explain difficulties; but whether the theory explains or embarrasses the subject, it is not needful here to inquire. (3) The *very expression* here is against the supposition that infants are intended, and that the sin of Adam is imputed to them. The doctrine of imputation has been, that infants were personally guilty of Adam's sin; that they "sinned *in* him:" that there was a *personal identity* constituted between them and Adam, see (Edwards on original sin;) and that therefore *his sin* was *theirs* as really and truly as if committed by themselves. Yet here the apostle says that those of whom *he* was speaking had *not* sinned "after the similitude of Adam's transgression." But if the doctrine of imputation be true, it is certain that they had not only *had* sinned after the similitude of his transgression, but had *sinned the very identical sin*. It was precisely *like* him; it was the very thing itself; and they were answerable for that very sin as their own. This doctrine, therefore, cannot be intended here."

Proof 5. p. 121. "Nor have we a right to *assume* that this [ver. 15,] teaches the doctrine of the imputation of the sin of Adam to his posterity. For (1) the apostle says nothing of it. (2) That doctrine is nothing but an effort to explain the *manner* of an event which the apostle Paul did not think it proper to attempt to explain. (3) That doctrine is in fact no explanation. It is introducing an additional difficulty. For to say that I am

guilty of the sin of another in which I had no agency, is no *explanation*, but is involving me in additional difficulty still more perplexing, to ascertain how such a doctrine can possibly be just."

Proof 6. p. 127. "The word is *in no instance* used to express the idea of *imputing that to one which belongs to another*. It here either means, that this was *by a constitution of divine appointment* that they in fact became *sinners*, or simply declares they *were* so in fact. There is not the slightest intimation that it was by imputation."

Proof 7. p. 128. As quoted under Charge V.

Mr. Moderator, we now approach the more serious and solemn parts of our discussion. And as we advance I seem to hear the solemn sounds, "Put off thy shoes from off thy feet, for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground." Yes, we come to the holy mount—the sacred seat of the Most High—the strong holds of truth divine.

Our discussions heretofore have respected principles, important indeed, but, with the exception of the last, only relatively so; we have passed the out-posts and the horn-work and the crown-work, and now approximate the citadel of truth. Let us enter and examine the interior, and see whether every thing is in due order for successful defence—her guns all well mounted and manned—her magazine fully stored—her rank and file thoroughly drilled—her officers all at their posts. And where do we find brother Barnes? Where but at his proper station, as a good soldier of Jesus Christ should be. See him at his gun, with every thing in complete order—his thirty-two well rammed home—all primed and ready—his match lighted and whirling round his head—But hold! my brother, your gun points directly into the magazine! Discharge her, and we are blown up—our citadel is in ruins and our cause lost for ever. Yes, Mr. Moderator, the doctrine of imputation is fundamental in the Christian system. Destroy this and all is gone. Deny this and affirm what else you please, it is all to no purpose. Adam's sin is imputed, i. e. charged in law to his posterity; and Christ's righteousness is imputed, i. e. charged in law to his posterity—his spiritual seed. Do you not see and feel this to be the very essence of the gospel! I see, or think, I see it. I feel, or trust, I feel it. Yes, nothing is more plain and undeniable. I *feel* sin upon me—the sin of my life and the sin of my nature. Adam's sin imputed, and my own sin imputed. I am a condemned wretch. How shall I escape? Blessed be God! As in the first Adam I became or was made a sinner; so in the second Adam I became or am made righteous. His death takes away my sin, and his life or righteousness secures me in life. This is "my title clear to mansions in the skies." Take away the doctrine of imputation and the title is gone. Rob me of the imputed righteousness of the Son of God and I have no title to heavenly joy.

Deny the representative character of Adam and the imputation of his sin to his posterity, and you must deny the representative character of Christ and the imputation of his righteousness to his posterity—the Rock is removed from beneath the feet of my faith—the foundation of my hopes for eternity is taken away. But thanks be to God, his love will never direct Omnipotence to create a Samson with powers to tear away the pillars that sustain the throne of his mercy. His covenant is sure. It is established as the heavens, and confirmed by the oath of Him that cannot lie—"even the sure mercies of David." It was advisedly and deliberately I said, concerning brother Barnes' denial of this doctrine, "if it be true, then I cannot read my title clear to mansions in the skies;" for there is no *title*, nothing which gives the believing sinner a *right* to an inheritance on high. Now to make it clear as day that the accused does deny "that the first sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity," Remark

Proof 1. He explicitly and in terms declares it; his language is, "that the sin of Adam is *imputed*, or set over by an arbitary arrangement to beings otherwise innocent, and that they are held to be responsible for a deed committed by a man thousands of years before they were born—is the *theory*, and men insensibly forget that it is *mere theory*." Now the term *theory* is applied to "the philosophical explanation of phenomena, either physical or moral," [Webster,] and when the application is correct, the theory is true. Thus we speak of the theory of combustion—the theory of animal heat—the theory of light and vision—the theory of morals. But when we speak of a *mere theory*, we therein deny the truth and reject the principles of the explanation—we affirm that the relations alleged therein do not exist, and the allegations are false. Thus the doctrine of imputation is explicitly denied.

Proof 2. He maintains that the expression "in whom all have sinned" conveys no intelligible idea. Now on this let me remark: (*a*) it is the most literal and exact translation of the Greek ἐφω παντες ημαρτον (eph ho pantes hemarton) and this no man will deny—"in (or by) whom all sinned or have sinned." (*b*) There is not an instance, but one, in the whole New Testament, in which the Greek words εφ ω, are or *can* be translated "for that" or *because*. If there is, let it be produced. The nearest to it is Matt. xxvi. 50. "Friend, *wherefore* art thou come?" But here the literal rendering, makes the sense full and clear. "Friend, in whom? by whom? by whose authority? in whose name, art thou come?" Knapp, however, prefers the reading εφ ο, the accusative case, which of course removes the difficulty as to the construction of the diction in the text. In Luke v. 25., there is an ellipsis of the antecedent, precisely as in this place under consideration, (Rom. v. 12.) "He took up that *whereon* he lay"—*that in which* he lay. Here it is impossible to translate *eph ho* as a causal particle *for that* or *because*. Mark ii. 4. "They let down the bed *wherein* the sick of the palsy lay,"—*wherein, in which* he

lay. Here again it is impossible to render the *eph ho*, as a causal particle, *for that*, or *because*. Phil. iii. 12. "I follow after, if that I may apprehend that *for which* also I am apprehended of Christ." Here *eph ho* is translated *for which* and the antecedent is supplied, *that*. In Rom. ix. 30, Paul applies the term translated *apprehend*, to the act of faith, laying hold on Christ's righteousness—"*attained* to righteousness." And in 1 Cor. ix. 24, "So run that ye *may obtain*" the prize. So here, "I follow after, if that I may apprehend [*him*] *in whom* I am apprehended of Christ"—or "I may apprehend [the thing] *by which* I am apprehended." But to render it a causal particle, *for that* or *because*, destroys the sense. One other instance only occurs. 2 Cor. v. 4. "We, that are in this tabernacle, do groan, being burdened: not *for that* we would be unclothed," &c. Here the sense of the passage is not destroyed by rendering it *for that* or *because*. But it is equally or more explicit by the literal rendering; "we groan, being burdened: *in which* we would not be unclothed"—"*by which* [conduct] we do not wish to be unclothed." (*c*) The same preposition, *epi*, is so to be understood in other connections. 2 Cor. vii. 7. "He was comforted *in* you." Matth. xiv. 8. "Give me here John the Baptist's head *in* a charger." Acts xiv. 3. "Speaking boldly *in* the Lord." To this reading, the only serious objection I have heard, is the distance of the antecedent; this, however, is more specious than substantial: as will be seen upon considering the position I next lay down, viz. That the word διῆλθεν (dielthen) always requires a case to be governed by it, *expressed* or *implied*. This position can be established by reference to all the instances wherein the word is used in the New Testament. Space, however, will not permit the insertion of the whole. I have examined them all, and feel confident of the correctness of the affirmation. Allow me to designate a few instances. Matth. xii. 43. "He *walketh through* dry places." Here the governed case is expressed, and the preposition, included in the verb, is repeated, *dia*, *through*. The same occurs xix. 24. "*To go through* the eye of a needle." Mark iv. 35. "Let us *pass over* unto the other side"—*Let us pass through* [the sea] unto, &c. Here the governed case is understood. Luke ii. 15. the same—verse 35, "A sword *shall pierce through* thy own soul also." Here the case is expressed and the preposition is not repeated. So xix. 1. "*Passed through Jericho*."—And many other instances might be cited, all showing that where it is not *expressed*, a case must be supplied before it is possible to apply the ordinary rules of grammatical construction and make the sentence full. Seeing, therefore, that the verb, *passed through*, requires a case, the difficulty is obviated, for that case is the antecedent to the pronoun *whom*. The sentence therefore precisely translated, stands thus. "Wherefore, as *through* one man sin passed in upon the world, and *through* the sin, death; and so (or even so) upon all men, death *passed through* [him] in whom

all have sinned." Owen, in his Treatise on Justification, Vol. XI. ch. XVIII. p. 400., says of this passage, The Apostle "declares, how all men universally became liable to this punishment, or guilty of death, ἐφ ᾧ παντες ημαρτον 'in quo omnes peccaverunt;' 'in whom all have sinned.' For it relates unto the one man that sinned, in whom all sinned; which is evident from the effect thereof, in as much as in him all died;" 1 Cor. xv. 32. Or as it is here, on his sin "death passed upon all men." And this is the evident sense of the words, επὶ being put for εν which is not unusual in the Scripture. See Matth. xv. 5. Rom. iv. 18. v. 2. Phil. i. 3. Heb. ix. 17. And it is so often used by the best writers in the Greek tongue. So Hesiod, 'Metron de epi pasin ariston,' modus in omnibus rebus optimus. So ἐφ ὑμίν ἔστιν 'in verbis situm est.'—And this reading of the words is contended for by Austin against the Pelagians, rejecting their 'eo quod,' or 'propterea' [for that or because.] But I shall not contend about the reading of the words."

Mr. Barnes also affirms here, that men can sin no other way than in their own persons, thereby denying that "we sinned in him, and fell with him in his first transgression." His language is plain—"men sin *in their own persons*, *sin themselves*—as indeed, how *can* they *sin* any other way?"

Proof 3. There is here an attempt to make the doctrine of imputation ridiculous, by a phraseology not sanctioned by reputable Calvinistic writers. (1) "The expression to sin by imputation is unintelligible, and conveys no idea. (2) The Apostle makes no such distinction, and conveys no such idea." Here it is obvious that the doctrine of imputation is held up to scorn. An absurd phraseology is coined, and the real doctrine is lashed over the absurdity. We teach with the standards, that Adam sinned as a public head—a representative and the guilt of his sin was imputed to his posterity; and they were thus condemned—"they sinned in him and fell with him," into condemnation and death.

Proof 4. "Death reigned; and this proves that they were sinners. If it should be said, that the death of *infants* would prove that they were sinners also, I answer— (*a*) That this was an inference which the Apostle does not draw." Here is a plain denial that infants are sinners representatively,—that "they sinned in him." (*b*) "If it did refer to infants, what would it prove? Not that the sin of Adam was imputed," &c. Plainly rejecting imputation.

Proof 5th is equally explicit. He lays down three arguments against imputation. 1. The silence of Paul.—"The Apostle says nothing of it." 2. "It is nothing but an effort to explain the *manner* of an event," unexplained. 3. It is no explanation at all, but an increase of the difficulty; it occasions a challenge of God's justice.

Proof 6. The comment here is on v. 19. "For as by one man's [Adam's] disobedience, many were made sinners, so by the obe-

dience of one, [Christ] shall many be made righteous." Now no language can be more explicit, than his denial of Adam's sin being imputed to the many, and their being thus made sinners. The whole scope of his reasoning is against it. "There is not the slightest intimation that was by imputation." And as an argument (which I shall notice hereafter) he alleges that if Adam's posterity are condemned for his sin, without their own act, then Christ's people are constituted righteous by his act, without their own voluntary agency. The Apostle says explicitly that "the many were made sinners, by the disobedience of the one"—he does not say, they were placed in such a position, that whenever they would act morally, they would become sinners. This is the gloss; but the text contradicts it expressly: "They were made, *i. e.* constituted sinners." How? No matter: any way at all, so as it is not by *imputation.*

Proof 7, quoted above. The doctrine of the Covenant of Works, is there graphically set forth, and is utterly rejected as "a mere philosophical theory." "Neither the terms representative, covenant, or impute are *ever* applied to the transaction in the sacred Scriptures."

On these various points of proof, I think it the less necessary to dwell, because in his pleadings, Mr. Barnes admits the truth of the charge and puts in a plea of justification—he sets up a defence, and on that we must join issue. But let us first look into the standards of the church, and see whether they teach that Adam's sin is imputed to his posterity. Confession, ch. vi. 3. "They being the root of all mankind; the guilt of this sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation. Ch. iv. From this original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all actual transgressions." Larg. Cat. 22. "The covenant being made with *Adam*, as a public person, not for himself only, but for his posterity, all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him, and fell with him in that first transgression." 25. "The sinfulness of that estate whereinto men fell, consisteth in the guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of that righteousness wherein he was created, and the corruption of his nature, whereby he is utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all that is spiritually good, and wholly inclined to all evil, and that continually; which is commonly called *original sin*, and from which do proceed all actual transgressions." Short. Cat. 18, to the same effect.

Here observe 1. There was a covenant. 2. Adam was its public person—its head. 3. He acted in the whole matter for himself and his posterity. 4. They sinned in him—he acted for them, and by consequence, 5. His sin, in all its legal effect, is charged in law upon them. 6. The immediate legal effect is condemnation to death—"thou shalt surely die." 7. A necessary

effect of this is loss of original righteousness on the one hand and original corruption—indisposedness, disability and opposition to all good, and inclination to all evil, on the other. These things are obvious, and to labour the proof of the doctrine of imputation being taught in our standards, would be lighting tapers to seek the sun at noon day. I will now proceed to the defence of brother Barnes, and some other points which will turn up in the progress of the discussion.

1. My first remark is upon his distinction between the guilt of sin and sin itself—the former, he says, is imputed, according to our Confession, but not the latter. "To impute *sin itself* to a man is one thing; to impute the *obligation to punishment*, is another thing." But while he admits the latter to be taught in our standards, he does not here say he *believes either*. He alleges this distinction to be real and accurate and material, and my not observing it, a clear evidence of "the loose and indigested manner in which these charges have been brought up." Now, Mr. Moderator, I really had taken up the notion, loose or strict, that to charge a man with the sin of another—or with his own sin—to hold him accountable in law for it, was the precise thing meant by imputation. When the debt of Onesimus was put on Paul's account—charged to Paul, this was imputation. Onesimus contracted the debt; a legal obligation lay upon him; Philemon, who held this obligation, transferred it from Onesimus to Paul, and this is the precise thing meant by imputation. The imputation of sin is the transfer of its legal obligations. Owen, xi. 207, after argument and illustration, concludes: "Wherefore to impute sin, is to lay it unto the charge of any, and to deal with them according to its deserts." Edwards, II. 309, "But yet when the *doctrine* of original sin is spoken of, it is vulgarly understood in that latitude, which includes not only the *depravity of nature*, but *the imputation* of Adam's first sin; or, in other words, the liableness or exposedness of Adam's posterity, in the divine judgment, to partake of the punishment of that sin." So the conducters of the Bibl. Rep. II. 459: "According to him, for one man to bear the iniquity of another, is to have his guilt imputed to him. This is our doctrine, and the doctrine of the Reformed churches. This is what is meant by imputation.—He [Christ] is said to bear our iniquities, precisely in the sense in which, in Ezekiel, it is declared "the son shall not bear the iniquity of the fathers." And all Calvinistic writers speak every where of "the imputation of Adam's sin," meaning explicitly the transfer of its legal relations and effects. The distinction therefore which the brother makes, has no foundation in fact, and is opposed directly to the universal language held by divines on the subject of imputation. In this charge it is my design to bring up the doctrine of imputation in one aspect of it and in the VII. in another aspect.

2. Mr. Barnes labours much to prove that the idea of personal identity with Adam was the doctrine of the older Calvinists—

"that the posterity of Adam are not condemned for his sin as being the sin of another charged on them, but *as truly and properly theirs;* that they are subject to condemnation not as in themselves innocent beings made guilty by imputation." The obvious design of this attempt is to make the impression, that the Calvinists of this day [the old school] have renounced Calvinism, and by consequence he and others may, with equal impunity, renounce the whole doctrine of imputation, both as now held and as he says it was formerly held. [This argument was formally advanced by a member of the Presbytery.] And I admit, the argument would have an overwhelming power, if it had a foundation in truth—if it were true that we have forsaken the old doctrine of imputation and embraced a new doctrine, then indeed any who please may reject ours and embrace one still newer. But fortunately this is not the case, and the brother's attempt to make it out is an utter failure. Neither Edwards nor any other Calvinist of note ever taught that Adam and his posterity were *personally* one—that we sinned in him personally, but only putatively—he being our representative and *acting for us.* On this subject remark (1) Edwards affirms the doctrine of a *covenant one-ness—a federal identity*—a moral unity. Thus the members of a congregation are one. How? personally? No, but socially, legally. Thus the whole inhabitants of a city are one—not *personally* but *legally*—by *compact, agreement, covenant.* Their *charter* is the legal instrument by which they are bound together. This, and not their physical relations as parents and children, make them *one* moral body, having a moral head, who acts, agreeably to the covenant compact or charter, for the whole. This is seen in his Treatise on Original Sin, p. II, ch. i. sec. 3. Works, II. 425, &c., where, though he uses not the word covenant, he does use terms which afterwards he uses as synonymous with it. He calls it, p. 432, "God's establishment." "But I shall take notice of one or two things further, showing that Adam's posterity were included in God's establishment with him." And p. 438, "the constitution he established with them." And having summed up his heads of argument, he concludes—"I cannot but think it must appear to every impartial person, that Moses' account does, with sufficient evidence, lead all mankind, to whom his account is communicated, to understand, that God, in his constitution with Adam, dealt with him as a *public* person—as the head of the species—and had respect to his posterity, as included in him." Compare these with P. IV. iii. vol. II. p. 543, where he meets the objection against imputation, *that such imputation is unjust and unreasonable, inasmuch as Adam and his posterity are not one and the same.*" And he meets it by affirming that his posterity is "*one with him*" —that is in a certain sense. "That God, in every step of his proceeding with Adam, in relation to the covenant or constitution established with him, looked on his posterity as being *one with him.*" Here is a unity with Adam, not personal, but "in relation to th

covenant." It is a federal union, whereby Adam is constituted "as the moral *head* of his posterity"—"there being a *constituted one-ness or identity.*" These italics are Edwards' own, and unquestionably they and the phrase "moral head" were designed to point out a covenant, a federal or moral headship, in contradistinction from the natural headship or physical connexion as the parent of their mere animal nature. And so Stapfer, whom he quotes, says. "Seeing therefore that Adam with all his posterity constitute but one *moral person*, and are united in the same covenant, and are transgressors of the same law, they are also to be looked upon as having, in a moral estimation, committed the same transgression of the law, both in number and kind." Stapfer, too, makes the unity dependent on the covenant—it is not a personal identity as brother Barnes will have it—but a federal unity constituting Adam and his seed "one *moral person*," just as a charter in law constitutes the corporators one moral person. Edwards, p. 548, states as an objection of his opponents, "First *difficulty*—That appointing Adam to stand, in this great affair, as the moral *head* of his posterity, and so treating them as *one* with him, as standing or falling with him, is *injurious* to them." Here again is the covenant of works—"appointing Adam to stand—as the moral head of his posterity;" nothing about personal one-ness. In this sense the action of Adam is the action of his people—representatively—he acted for them. But brother Barnes loses sight of this, and fixes his eye upon the illustrations from a tree and its branches, and from the metaphysical nature of identity, and delights to dwell upon the phrase "arbitrary constitution;" but he should do Edwards the justice to state that this "arbitrary constitution" "is regulated by divine wisdom." It is, in fact, as every candid reader will admit, simply and only "the covenant of works." I can therefore find no just ground for the doctrine of "personal identity" with Adam, without treating Edwards unfairly. The Biblical Repertory *seems* to admit it, but shows plainly that the admission makes that great man inconsistent with himself.* I think if they look at him again, they may be convinced that Dr. Janeway wrote his essay to disabuse Edwards on this point, not without good grounds to sustain him.

I am surprised to hear Mr. Barnes adduce Calvin as teaching the doctrine of personal identity—and that, after the quietus given by the Biblical Repertory to the very same assertions in the Christian Spectator; and especially am I surprised at his citing the very passage there cited, and giving the same mistranslation of Calvin's words, after the severe and deserved rebuke given to the Protestant by the Repertory for it. Allow me to quote the paragraph, as the best possible refutation. Rep. vol. III. p. 418. "The Protestant need only throw his eye the second time upon the above passage, to see that he has misapprehended

* Vol. iii. pp. 453—6.

its meaning and erred in his translation. He makes Calvin say, 'We are condemned, not by imputation merely, as if punishment were exacted of us for another's sin, but we undergo its punishment (viz. the punishment of Adam's sin,) *because we are chargeable with* ITS *criminality*, (viz. the criminality of Adam's sin,) [directly against the reviewer again.]" Yes, and against Calvin too; for there is nothing in the original to answer to the word ITS, and the assertion entirely alters the sense. Calvin does not say, that we are chargeable with the criminality of Adam's sin, but just the reverse: "Non per solam imputationem damnamur, acsi alieni peccati exigeretur a nobis pœna; sed ideo pœnam ejus sustinemus, quia et culpæ sumus rei, quatenus scilicet natura nostra in ipso vitiata iniquitatis reatu obstringitur apud Deum." "We are condemned not on the ground of imputation *solely*, as though the punishment of another's sin was exacted of us; but we endure its punishment because we are *also* ourselves culpable, (how? of Adam's sin? by no means, but we are culpable,) in as much as, viz. our nature having been vitiated in him, is morally guilty before God." (Iniquitatis reatu obstringitur apud Deum.) Here is a precise statement of the sense in which we are morally guilty, not by imputation, but on account of our own inherent depravity. Two things which the Protestant seems fated never to distinguish."

Nor is Mr. Barnes less fortunate in his proof from Calvin's Institutes. Take the whole passage, and it is plain Calvin teaches the same doctrine as in the above citation, viz. that men are condemned not only on account of Adam's sin, but also for inherent, or native depravity. His words are, "these two things, therefore, should be distinctly observed: first, that our nature being so totally vitiated and depraved, we are, on account of this very corruption, considered as convicted and justly condemned in the sight of God, to whom nothing is acceptable but righteousness, innocence, and purity. And this liableness to punishment arises not from the delinquency of another: for when it is said that the sin of Adam renders us obnoxious to the divine judgment, it is not to be understood as if we, though innocent, were undeservedly loaded with the guilt of his sin; but because we are all subject to a curse, in consequence of his transgression, he is, therefore, said to have involved us in guilt. Nevertheless, we derive from him not only the punishment, but also the pollution to which the punishment is justly due. Wherefore Augustine, though he frequently calls it the sin of another, the more clearly to indicate its transmission to us by propagation; yet, at the same time, he also asserts it properly to belong to every individual. And the apostle himself expressly declares, that 'death has therefore passed upon all men, for that all have sinned,' that is, have been involved in original sin, and defiled with its blemishes." Institutes, Book II. ch. i. § 8. Hence, clearly, Calvin maintained, that men are condemned on account of depravity inborn—"they bring their con-

demnation into the world with them"—and also on account of their first father's sin—"we are all subject to a curse in consequence of his transgression." The same thing he also teaches in his creed written for the school at Geneva. "Quo fit, ut singuli nascuntur originali peccato infecti, et ab ipso maledicti, et a Deo damnati, non propter alienum delictum *duntaxat*, sed propter improbitatem, quæ intra eas est." Biblical Rep. vol. III. page 421. "Whence it happens that they every one are born infected with original sin, and on account of it cursed, and condemned of God, not on account of another man's delinquency *only*, but on account of depravity which is within themselves." This is the precise doctrine of our Confession, chap. VI. § 6. "Every sin, both original and actual, doth in its own nature bring guilt upon the sinner, whereby he is bound over to the wrath of God," &c. And sec. 1 states, that our first parents "sinned in eating the forbidden fruit;" and sec. 3, "the guilt of this sin was imputed to all their posterity." Thus Calvin and our Confession agree in making imputation include both the guilt of Adam's sin, and the depravity resulting from it; and neither teach the doctrine of personal identity.

The attempt to make Boston teach this doctrine is equally unsuccessful. Even in the passage he quotes, he is refuted—"for God's justice doth not punish men for a sin which is *no way* their's." No, truly, the sin is *some way* their's, or they could not suffer for it. But how? Is it by personal identity with Adam? Let Boston himself answer. "Adam, by his sin, became not only guilty, but corrupt; and so transmits guilt and corruption to his posterity. Gen. v. 2. Job. xiv. 4. By his sin he stript himself of his original righteousness, and corrupted himself: we were in him representatively, being represented by him, as our moral head, in the covenant of works; we were in him seminally, as our natural head; hence we fell in him, and by his disobedience were made sinners; as Levi in the loins of Abraham paid tithes. Heb. vii. 9, 10. His first sin is imputed to us." State. II. § 1. Thus Boston holds no doctrine of personal identity, but of representation, or moral unity with Adam, on the ground of which representation "his sin is imputed to us," and by the natural connexion we became depraved, and this depravity is sin in us.

But most of all am I amazed at Mr. Barnes' attempt to prove that the doctrine of personal identity with Adam, and his moral turpitude becoming ours, was held by Turretin. How any man, after reading the articles on imputation in the Biblical Repertory, vol. III. could venture such an assertion, is most marvellous to me. I can hardly conceive of a more triumphant refutation than is there given to this allegation. Nor is the wonder diminished at all by the passage adduced in proof by Mr. Barnes. Turretin, as he quotes him, says, "they have sinned in him, [Adam,] and are bound with him (communi culpa) in a *common criminality*." But how? If brother Barnes means by *common criminality*, mo-

ral turpitude, and thinks that Turretin maintains that the moral turpitude of Adam was infused into his posterity, he is mistaken: for by *communi culpa*, the very next branch of the sentence shows, he means the sin of Adam as our *common head*, as our *representative*. And again—"the justice of God does not inflict punishment upon him that does not deserve it, [immerenti,] *but upon him that* DOES DESERVE IT. [merenti.]" True, but how does he deserve it? Is it by a personal identity and infusion of moral turpitude? Or is it by *moral, federal, covenant* unity and consequent imputation? Let me answer in the language of the Biblical Repertory, vol. III. p. 438. "Now, as to the second point, viz. that Turretin and other Calvinists do not use the words *guilt, demerit, ill-desert*, &c. as the Spectator understands them, in a moral sense, we have already proved it, and might abundantly prove it again, because they expressly, repeatedly, and pointedly affirm the contrary. Thus, when he says, 'We are constituted truly sinners by the imputation of Adam's sin,' he tells us as plainly as language permits, in what sense. 'Ista veritas est imputationis, non infusionis, juridica, non moralis.' 'To impute is a forensic term, meaning to set to one's account. 'Non est actus physicus, sed forensis et judicialis'—it is to render one a sinner in the eye of the law, not morally—as the imputation of righteousness renders legally, not inherently just." After he had read all this, for brother Barnes to say, "the sentiments of these men, who were surely competent to state what old Calvinism was, cannot be mistaken," amazes me! How strangely does he mistake them!

Before I quit this point, let me present what I doubt not has been the belief of the church in all ages, in the language of the late Dr. Mason, vol. I. p. 170. "The world, then, is full of the imputation of sin. And why shall it not as well be imputed *to* a representative for expiation as from a representative for punishment?"

From this strong ground we are not to be driven by the plea, that righteousness and sin, being moral and personal qualities and acts, cannot be transferred to a surety. We know it. Neither do the Scriptures teach, nor we maintain, any such transfer. Instead of establishing, it would destroy our doctrine. "For if my personal sin could be taken from me, and made the personal sin of another, he must then suffer for himself, and not for me, as I would be personally innocent. He would not be under the imputation of my sin, because I would have none to impute; and I could not enjoy the benefit of his righteousness; because, on the one hand, I would require none, and, on the other, he, as suffering for himself, would have none to offer. So that here would be no representation, neither the substance nor the shadow of a vicarious atonement. Therefore, while my personal demerit must for ever remain my own, the consequences of it are borne by my glorious surety. It is this which renders the imputation of

sin to the Lord Jesus, a doctrine so acceptable to the conscience, and so consoling to the heart of a convinced sinner. And this simple distinction between a transfer of personal acts to a substitute, and the transfer of their legal connexion, which is properly imputation, relieves the friends of truth from the embarrassment in which an incautious manner of speaking has sometimes involved them, and blows into the air the quibbles and cavils of its enemies." The doctrine of personal identity with Adam, and transfer of personal acts, always has been a figment cast upon Calvinists as a slander, and so esteemed by them. I should not have spent so much time in refuting the charge, but for the use made of this caricature to impress the popular mind with the absurdity of Calvinistic dogmas, and thus to bring the real doctrine of imputation into discredit, and to give currency to the idea that Calvinism is one "mere philosophical theory" pursuing after another.

We admit that personal acts cannot be transferred, but affirm that they are imputed. Imputation lies in transferring to a surety not the qualities and acts themselves, but their *legal connexion.* It is a transfer of *obligation* and of *right.*

We now proceed to what Mr. Barnes is pleased to call "the second theory on the subject of imputation," but which is the simple and only doctrine ever held in the church to any extent. "It consists, says he, in the doctrine that the sin of Adam is not reckoned or imputed to his posterity as *truly* and *properly their's*, as that for which they are blameworthy or ill-deserving, but is their's simply by imputation, or putatively; that a sin is reckoned to them, or charged on them, which they never committed, and that they are subjected to punishment for that sin, without being personally or really to blame. A part of this punishment is said to consist in *the sin itself*, with which man comes into the world, and a part in the personal sufferings to which he is subjected in this life and the world to come, and which are in all respects the same as if the infant had himself committed the sin. This is said to be by a sovereign arrangement of God appointing Adam to be in all respects the representative of his posterity." If there be no intention here to insinuate that infants suffer in the world to come, and if there be no *peculiar* meaning in his terms, I feel prepared to admit this as a correct statement of our doctrine and the doctrine of the standards. And this doctrine Mr. Barnes rejects under ten distinct heads of remark. These in order.

1. "That it is an abandonment of the ground of the older Calvinists." This, I have shown above, is incorrect. On the last clause only, viz. "Turretin says, the ill-desert of Adam is transferred to his posterity." Bib. Rep. vol. III. p. 436. This theory says it is not; I would remark, it is unfair to append the Repertory's sanction to that saying of Turretin, without telling us in what sense the term "ill-desert," according to the Repertory, is used by Turretin. "They [the opponents of Princeton,] consider

Turretin to use the word ill-desert in a moral sense"—"in this they commit an obvious mistake. Turretin and old Calvinists generally, do not use the words guilt, demerit, ill-desert in a moral sense"—"the ill-desert of which Turretin speaks as being transferred, is not moral character or turpitude, but legal responsibility, such as exists between a sponsor and him for whom he acts." This they abundantly prove, and this brother Barnes ought in candour to have stated as their opinion.

2. This theory appears at least to be a departure from the Confession of Faith. The language of the standards of our church was evidently derived from the theory that the sin of Adam *was* truly and properly ours. Thus it says, "All mankind sinned in him, and fell with him." Now you will observe that this is Mr. Barnes' first theory, which he rejects—which all reject. Consequently he rejects what he believes to be the doctrine of the standards. But it is not the doctrine of the standards, as has been made to appear. The phrase "all mankind sinned in him," &c. he says, is proof that Adam's sin "*was* truly and properly ours!" Strange! when the first part of the sentence tells how it is ours, viz. by his acting, "not for himself only, but for his posterity"—for us, *representatively*, we sinned in him not *personally*.

3. The third objection is, because our doctrine "employs the word impute in an unscriptural sense." In meeting this it may be well to remember that it is not a dispute about the term, but really concerning the thing—what is imputation?

Owen has given, no doubt, the correct idea of the term and the thing: Justif. Works, xi. 205, "Hashab, the word first used for this purpose, signifies 'to think, to esteem, to judge,' or 'to refer' a thing or matter unto any; 'to impute' or 'to be imputed' for good or evil—To judge or esteem this or that good or evil, to belong unto him, to be his." And so the corresponding Greek terms.

It has been very common on this subject to admit *first* an imputation of that which properly belongs to the person before, and secondly, of what did not properly belong to him prior to the imputation of it. But there often arises obscurity from the vagueness of the terms *properly belong*. The chief confusion however I think arises from not considering that imputation is an action of judgment, and when applied to morality and the proceedings of a *ruler* and judge has exclusive reference to legal relations. Now legal relations are clearly distinguishable from moral conduct and character. I perform a moral act—I defraud my neighbour. The moral turpitude is one thing: and the legal relation or my exposure to punishment is another thing. Imputation is the act of my ruler and judge declaring the connexion between the act and its punishment. It includes two things. 1. The judgment that the act is mine *properly—personally*. 2. The legal consequence must follow—I must be punished. The latter is based on the former. Onesimus borrows money of Philemon, and is debited thus: 'One-

simus, to money borrowed, two mites.' Can this money be recovered of Paul? Certainly not: Paul did not borrow the money—the act of contracting the debt is not his, and it never can become his. And so it is in every possible case. The act of Adam never can become *properly* my act. The act of Christ never can become *properly* my act. And *thus* all Calvinists deny the *possibility* of Adam's sin and Christ's righteousness being imputed; and this is not therefore at all what they mean by imputation. But now the other part is, can such a relationship be constituted between Onesimus and Paul, that the legal obligation may be transferred to the latter? May not Paul become surety for his friend? and thus come under his legal relations? Suppose this suretyship entered into before the debt was contracted? In either case, Onesimus failing, there is a transfer of legal obligation: and Philemon imputes to Paul, not the act of Onesimus, but the legal obligation: he charges him with liability to a demand of law—he *transfers the legal obligation:* Paul is bound in law by an act which was not his own. The obligation to pay the two mites is now "reckoned to a man which did not belong to him." This is the *fact* of the case. Thus far there can be no diversity of opinion. But, says Mr. Barnes, Paul assumed—he assented to the debt, and thereby made it his own. This is not exactly according to truth. Paul's *assumption* did not make the debt his own. Because, if it was Paul's own, it was not Onesimus's, he was released; for, the reckoning of it to both, would be a double reckoning and manifestly unjust. Philemon *only can* make the transfer of legal obligation: *until he* does it, the obligation still lies upon Onesimus and not on Paul. Philemon may choose to let his book account stand as originally it stood, and Paul and Onesimus both cannot change it in any way but by paying the debt. Yea, farther; Paul cannot pay the debt—his offering Philemon two mites lays the latter under no obligation to receive it and enter a credit to Onesimus, except he do it as the *agent*—the *representative* of the debtor. In that case, *if* Paul be the legal representative of Onesimus and not otherwise, is Philemon bound to receive it, and to enter the proper credit. Paul's agency is necessary, and his assent is necessary to his becoming agent, and liable to the demand. When both Paul and Philemon are agreed, *then only* can the transfer of legal obligation take place. "The simple truth then is, that things are reckoned just as they were not," before Philemon so reckoned them: but yet reckoning, or setting down against Paul a debt of two mites, which were not set down against him the minute before, is based upon certain relations existing between Paul and Onesimus. This is a plain case: now let us apply it. Philemon, by hypothesis, is God; Onesimus is Adam: Paul, his posterity. Adam had sinned: God reckons—sets down in the book of his account, 1st, the act; 2d the guilt of it—the obligation to punishment—these are properly Adam's own. But now the point is; Can God or does he reckon or impute this obligation to

the posterity? In answering this brother Barnes and I will agree thus far, that God cannot and will not unless there is a legal relation existing, as the basis of the imputation—there must be a connexion between Onesimus and Paul—Adam and his posterity. What then is that basis? The *assent* of the posterity, says Mr. Barnes; the covenant of works, wherein God appointed Adam a covenant head of his posterity, affirm our standards. "So if man *assumes* the crime of Adam, or *assents* to it," says Mr. Barnes, "it may be reckoned unto him just as it is—that is *as* assumed or assented to." Clearly, the *assent* of man according to this, is necessary to God's imputation of Adam's sin to him: such imputation depends upon such assumption—voluntary action—assent must precede liability to punishment—"by the offence of one, judgment did [not] come upon all men to condemnation," it could only come by the assent of all. On the contrary the legal relations on which this imputation takes place are found in the fact of the one man's moral, legal, covenant unity with his posterity. HE REPRESENTED THEM.

Still more clear will the truth shine forth if we apply this case to illustrate the relation men sustain to the second Adam. Here, Philemon is in the place of God; the sinner is represented by Onesimus; Paul occupies the place of Jesus. The sinner has transgressed: God imputes the act and the legal obligation to him; Jesus, (in becoming the head of the new covenant) assumes his liabilities; God imputes or reckons him "under the law"—"made sin for us"—the legal obligation is transferred; not the acts of men; not their moral turpitude; but their liability to suffer the curse, pass over to the great Surety. As Onesimus contracted the debt, so the sinner is charged in the book of God's account: as Paul assumed the debt of his friend, so Jesus assumes the debt of our sin: as Philemon imputed it to Paul, so God imputed our sin to Jesus: As Paul's agency, flowing from his connexion with his friend, is the basis of the imputation; so the suretyship of Christ, resulting from his headship over his church, is the basis of the imputation of their sin to him, and consequently of his righteousness to them. Jesus obeyed the law of God—God imputed the act and the legal relation to him, because they were properly his own: but Jesus is so connected with his people by a moral arrangement, (the covenant of grace,) that God may and doth impute to them, not the acts of Jesus *personally*—not his moral purity and character—but his legal relation, his right to reward, his title to heaven, his righteousness. "For as by one man's [Adam's] disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one [Christ] shall many be made righteous." Thus their sin, in its legal consequences, is reckoned to their Saviour, which was not his before the imputation; and his righteousness is reckoned to them which was not theirs before the imputation.

I have one or two brief remarks yet on this third head of objection. "God's reckonings are according to *truth*," says Mr. B. "In the theory which we are now considering, man is reckoned

as having committed a sin, which, in the same breath, we are told he *never committed.*" Now in one sense these statements are according to truth, and in another they are not. That we committed *personally* the sin of Adam is not true. That we committed *representatively* the sin of Adam is true. That God reckons things as they are is true. That God reckons things as they were not before the reckoning is equally true.

As to the term impute or reckon, let us see whether it implies always a setting down of things as they were *before* the reckoning. Num. xviii. 27, 30, "And this your heave-offering shall be RECKONED unto you as though it *were* the corn of the threshing floor and as the fulness of the wine-press;"—"it *shall be counted* unto the Levites as the increase of the threshing-floor and as the increase of the wine-press." Was this tithe of the tithes the corn of the threshing-floor or *the fulness* of the wine-press? Or was it only a *sample* of the whole? Job xix. 15—"my maids count me for a stranger." Was Job really a stranger? or was he only treated as one? But the plainest cases are in Rom. iv. 3. "Abraham's faith *was counted* to him for righteousness." Was his faith in reality his righteousness? V. 6: "God imputeth righteousness without works." Was the righteousness his before it was imputed? Paul says, no, it was without works, and yet righteousness was *reckoned* to him. Every man has sinned, and yet God does not impute sin—"Blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin." Every man has sinned; now if God imputes things always as they were before the imputation, all men must abide forever under the curse due to sin.—V. 11, "that righteousness might be imputed to them also." Was it theirs before the imputation? If it was, then they needed not imputation to make it theirs; and if they needed no imputation, they needed no faith to secure the imputation of righteousness to them. 2 Cor. v. 19: "not imputing their trespasses to them." Now, if God always imputes things as they were prior to the imputation, he would reckon them sinners—fasten down their trespasses upon all men, and they must perish.

4. Mr. Barnes says the doctrine of imputation, above stated, "is a violation in almost express terms of the principles of the divine government, as laid down in the Bible. Ezek. xviii. 2, 3, 4, 19, 20—"the fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge." That is, "Why do you charge this as a principle of the divine administration that the children are punished for the sins of their parents." Mr. Barnes puts capitals in, thus: 'The soul that sinneth IT shall die. THE SON SHALL NOT BEAR THE INIQUITY OF HIS FATHER; NEITHER SHALL THE FATHER BEAR THE INIQUITY OF THE SON." Now let us first ascertain what it is *to bear iniquity.* Is it not to suffer pain? to endure sorrow and privation? Is it not to experience death as a penal evil? Does Mr. Barnes then mean to say, that in no case does the government of God allow the son to bear the iniquity of the father? Why

then has he affirmed the contrary of this? Had he indeed forgotten his own language? p. 128. "This *fact* is one that is apparent; and that accords with all the analogy in the moral government of God. The drunkard secures commonly as a result, that his family will be reduced to beggary, want and wo. His sin is commonly the certain occasion of their being sinners; and the immediate cause of their loss of property and comfort, and of their being overwhelmed in wretchedness and grief. A murderer will entail disgrace and shame on his family," &c. Is not this the children *bearing the iniquity of their fathers?* When the youthful offspring of Achan, of Korah and his company, of the whole seven nations of Canaan, were cut off, were put to death by God's command, whose iniquity did they bear? Was it their own? Or their fathers? Mr. Barnes knows well and has well stated the doctrine, that the son does often bear his father's iniquity. He knows well the principle on which it proceeds, viz. that of moral unity. "God has therefore *grouped* the race into separate communities." And to the whole extent in which the parents represent or act for their children, the consequences of their acts follow them. And the denial of this is a rejection of the entire basis of all social organization, whether of immediate divine or human arrangement. Then you contradict Ezekiel? No, I do not; neither does Mr. Barnes in the passage last cited. What then does Ezekiel mean? Why he simply affirms that every *individual* shall suffer the legitimate consequences of his own sin—that no *individual* shall suffer for another's own *private* or *individual* offence. He is speaking of *individuals*, and rebuking the error, which would transfer legal obligations without any moral, social, or *covenant* relation existing as the basis of the transfer. But now our doctrine is, that a covenant does exist, wherein our first father Adam represented the race—he was their federal head and acted for them, and the moral government of God must be subverted before the sin of the father shall cease to be visited upon his children.

5. The fifth objection is the same as the first. "It is an abandonment of the old system."—And only to correct some expressions is it necessary to notice it again. "We have," says he, "in this system of God's imputing to men, sins which in no proper sense belong to them."—What brother Barnes may mean by *proper sense*, I know not. But I know, and he should know, that the old school system makes the representation of all men in Adam, his acting as their federal head, the basis of imputation. His sin was their's representatively, and therefore is imputed; just as Christ's righteousness is their's representatively, because he is their ever living head and surety, and is therefore imputed to them.

6. "The theory is liable to a sixth objection, that it makes sin both cause and effect. It teaches that the *sin itself*, with which men are born is a punishment for Adam's sin." On the whole paragraph, I have these remarks: 1. The very ground of objec-

tion is a truth of our Confession, the guilt of this [Adam's] sin, was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity," and "every sin, both original and actual, doth in its own nature, bring guilt upon the sinner, whereby he is bound over to the wrath of God," &c. 2. It is a prominent doctrine of the Bible, and an important principle in the government of God. Nothing is more common and more fearful than the *judgment* of God, which delivers men up to sin as a punishment for past sin. Rom. ii. 21—30. Because of their wickedness—"God also gave them up to uncleanness," &c. "And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind," &c. "My spirit shall not always strive with man." God hardened Pharaoh's heart—delivered him up to his own free will—as a punishment for his sin. On what other principle can Mr. Barnes justify the ways of God to man?" The fact he admits—men are born with a corrupt tendency to sin, and so soon as they act, they will sin. Here is the fact, and it is undeniable. Now how is this reconcileable with God's justice? If this *inborn corruption* is not a judicial infliction; nor the result of the individuals own actual—his personal sin—as is clearly the case—how can it be reconciled with the justice of God? "How can justice make punishment precede transgression or ill desert?" How can the sufferings of infant humanity, be reconciled with the idea, that no moral reason—no just exposure to pain and woes, existed prior to the endurance of them? 3. The paragraph *intimates* that we teach that "the holy God should create sin in the heart of innocence." This is *uncandid*, at least, for two reasons. 1. The whole world knows that we profess to believe that all men are by nature under condemnation, are guilty and not innocent. 2. It is equally well known, that we reject with abhorrence the doctrine of God's *creating sin*. And the *fact* of existence lies in the way of all schools alike.

7. "It explains nothing." This is mere assertion. I assert the contrary. It explains very many things, and very satisfactorily; but not every thing. He here repeats and again under the 8th, the incorrect affirmation, that our system makes men "*guilty* of a sin, which in no sense we committed." How often have I shown that in some sense we did commit it; viz. in our representative Adam?

8. "It is mere theory." This again is mere assertion. "The doctrine, it is believed, is not to be found in the Scriptures." This again is simply assertion. I can drop the negative and use the sentence in perfect truth. "The doctrine, it is believed, is to be found in the Scriptures." But under this 8th head, something else is introduced. If our native depravity and guilt through Adam, lays us under condemnation and death, it must be repented of before forgiveness can issue. Did you ever repent of original sin? This question has vapoured long enough—let us dispose of

it. And first, I remark. Repentance is turning from sin to God. *Short. Cat.* 87. "Repentance unto life is a saving grace, whereby a sinner * * * doth * * * turn from it [sin] unto God.* * *" This is *repentance* in the strict and true sense. Secondly, Its *accompaniments* are however set down in the answer, viz. 1. Sorrow, "with grief and hatred of sin." 2. The impelling and showing motives are also set forth, viz. (*a*) conviction, "out of a true sense of his sin," (*b*) illumination or the knowledge of the gospel, "and apprehension of the mercy of God in Christ." And thirdly, The concomitant purposes of the soul in future, "with full purpose of, and endeavour after new obedience." Now in this true and scriptural idea of the term, I aver that every gracious man can and doth repent of original sin. Look *first* at the "impelling motives to action, "out of a true sense of sin." A true sense of original sin views it in its threefold relations, viz. "The guilt of Adam's sin, the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of his whole nature." Now let a man see that "he is condemned already," that "by nature he is a child of wrath," that "the judgment is by one [Adam] to condemnation"—that "he is dead in trespasses and sins." Let him see that so far from having by nature any original righteousness, he is vile and polluted—that, unclean thing, he was born of an unclean thing—that his very root and origin is vile—that he "was shapen in iniquity and in sin did his mother conceive him." Let him see all this, and you will soon perceive, that he feels the corresponding sense of danger, and sorrow, and grief, and hatred of sin. For what other purpose did David (Ps. 51.) revert to the fountain of his original corruption? Was it not explicitly, to deepen upon his own sorrowful soul, a sense of shame and sorrow for sin? But, there is another impelling motive—"an apprehension of the mercy of God in Christ." Now, I defy any man, to have a *right* apprehension of the mercy of God in "the second Adam, unless he also sees and knows something of the relations he himself sustains to the first Adam, and the direful consequences of them. The most glorious views of divine truth are given in this very connection. Never, until we see, and feel, and know our death in the one, do our souls burn for life and glory through the other. Oh, how the soul of the pious heart kindles at the contemplation.

> "Lord, I am vile, conceived in sin:
> And born unholy and unclean;
> Sprung from the man whose guilty fall,
> Corrupts the race and ruins all."

Well, does such a view prepare the mind for the expression of shame, as in hymn 26.

> "Backward with humble shame I look
> On our original," &c.

Therefore, *secondly*, The "grief and hatred of sin, which, in various degrees of strength, accompany true repentance, are

highly excited by a consideration of our native depravity. When we look at the rock whence we are hewn, and to the hole of the pit whence we are digged, then it is the soul sinks in sorrows unutterable, and finds relief in tears. This is accordant with universal Christian experience. Salutary fears moreover result from a view of our guilt—our exposure to punishment on account of Adam's sin. And I see not how a man can be lifted up into the high joys of *forgiveness* through the second Adam, who has not been plunged toward the borders of despair through his condemnation in the first.

Hence, *thirdly*, The thing itself—the turning unto God from sin—"doth turn from it into God."

And, *fourthly*, The concomitant purposes and feelings—bent upon holy obedience. All the essentials of a true and saving repentance are experienced in a view of original sin. David's soul was kindled by it into a deeper fervour of self-abasement. Watts failed to string his lofty lyre, until he drew the life of his humility from the same views: and kindled the fire of his love by turning toward the second Adam.

Let me here remark, that this same objection was urged by Dr. Taylor, the great champion of Arminianism; hence we may suppose some alliance between that system and theirs who use the objection now. Edwards, Vol. II. p. 559. "Dr. Taylor urges that sorrow and shame are only for personal sin; and it has often been urged, that repentance can be for no other sin. To which I would say, that the use of *words* is very arbitrary. But that men's *hearts* should be deeply affected with grief and humiliation before God, for the pollution and guilt which they bring into the world with them, I think is not in the least unreasonable. Nor is it a thing strange or unheard of, that men should be *ashamed* of things done by *others*, in whom they are nearly concerned. I am sure it is not unscriptural; especially when they are looked upon in the sight of God, who sees the disposition of their hearts, as fully consenting and concurring." Such is the answer of the immortal Edwards to this old query, about original sin: And that his doctrine "is not unscriptural," any man of a sanctified and penitent heart, will be fully satisfied, if he will read the 22d Psalm, and listen to the sighs of Gethsemane, and the groans of Calvary. Did not the holy soul of the Saviour, viewing the sins of others,—the original guilt and pollution, and the actual corruptions of his own dear people, turn from it all with abhorrence! Did he not in the deep heavings of his sorrowful soul, weep over the obduracy of the human heart? O Jerusalem, Jerusalem! "Oh that my head were waters, and mine eyes a fountain of tears, that I might weep day and night!" "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me." Thus anguish of soul in view of the sins of the people; sorrow for their obstinacy, and revulsion of heart from sin, as seen in them, agitated the holy soul of our holy Redeemer. And though it cannot be said that he repented in the full sense of

the term, yet it is undeniable, that all the foregoing, Christ did experience, and that they enter into the common notion of repentance. But some men will say, "Repentance is remorse of conscience." I deny it. The catechism alone quoted gives the true idea. But *remorse* is hell on earth, and its full import will be known only in eternity. Remorse of conscience is no essential part of saving repentance. A despairing frame, approaching toward remorse, there may be, preceding true repentance, but it is not essential, and in the great majority of true conversions, has no existence.

9. Mr. Barnes' ninth objection is, that this doctrine "will greatly embarrass a man's ministry, produce ease in sin, and hinder the prayers of the gospel, and disgust men of common understanding with Christianity." These are heavy objections, if true. But first, it is the doctrine of all the Reformed churches, as the Biblical Repertory has most triumphantly demonstrated. Did it embarrass Luther and Calvin and Knox and Owen? When did the church see such men before or since? Whose labours were ever more blessed? Did it embarrass Edwards? And does it embarrass the great majority of sound Presbyterians at this day!! Secondly, I have shown that it is the very doctrine to make men feel the greatness of their sin. But the opposite system, which makes human nature not quite so bad, flatters man's abilities and pampers his pride. Thirdly, the truth of God cannot hinder the progress of the gospel. Fourthly, "it disgusts men of common understanding with Christianity." To this I plead guilty; it does so, I admit.

Mr. Barnes, under the sixth remark on the next charge, advances the same idea. "And is there no danger that men will regard the system which proclaims it as at variance with all their just conceptions of a righteous government, and religion as opposed to the common sense of the world?" In both these cases the language is certainly unguarded. Are we then bound to square God's truth "to the common sense of the world?" Must religion be made palatable to the world, and modelled to suit the world's conception of a righteous government?" Are we bound to dress up Christianity that she may not "disgust men of common understanding?" "Let a minister proclaim that his hearers are one with Adam, and then common sense will revolt at it." So it will. "The world, by wisdom, know not God"—"common sense will revolt at it." Yes, the common sense of the world will; but the common sense of the *great mass* of Presbyterians in this country, who have heard this doctrine all their lives, is not yet revolted at it. "The infidel will smile." Very well, let him smile. Tell him of a just God, a coming judgment and an opening hell, and he will smile. Tell him of a bleeding Saviour, and an opening heaven, and he will smile. Preach the terrors of the Lord, and the mercies of redeeming love, "and the infidel will smile." What then? "Is the offence of the cross ceased?" Ah! my brother, there are many other things, besides the doctrine of

our sinning "in Adam and falling with him in his first transgression," which "disgust men of common understanding with Christianity," and make "the infidel smile."

10. Mr. Barnes' tenth reason for rejecting this doctrine is, that other, men in great numbers, have done it. And men, too, of high standing. And he quotes Dr. Woods, of Andover, where he objects to the imputation "of any sinful disposition or act," which has nothing at all to do with our doctrine, and is wholly irrelevent.

Thus I have gone over Mr. Barnes' ten reasons for rejecting the great leading doctrines of the Presbyterian Church. His statement of it is clear, and his rejection explicit and full, and frequently repeated.

The only other form of doctrine is the simple statement of the facts. This, the accused says, it was his design to teach. Now, as I shall have occasion to remark hereafter more fully, the facts may be admitted and the doctrines, the moral connexions and relations of them denied.

CHARGE VII.

Mr. Barnes denies "that mankind are guilty, i. e. liable to punishment on account of the sin of Adam."

Proof 1, page 123. "There is no reason to believe that they are *condemned* to eternal death, or held to be guilty of his sin, without participation of their own, or without personal sin, any more than there is that they are approved by the work of Christ, or held to be personally deserving, without embracing his offer, and receiving him as a Saviour."

Proof 2, p. 127. The word is *in no instance* used to express the idea of *imputing that to one which belongs to another.* It here either means that this was *by a constitution of divine appointment* that they in fact became sinners, or simply declares that they *were* so in fact. There is not the slightest intimation that it was by imputation. The whole scope of the argument is, moreover, against this; for the object of the apostle is to show not that they were charged with the sin of another, but that they were in fact *sinners* themselves. If it means that they were condemned for *his* act, without any concurrence of their own will, then the correspondent part will be true, that all are constituted righteous in the same way; and thus the doctrine of universal salvation will be inevitable. But as none are constituted righteous who do not voluntarily avail themselves of the provisions of mercy, so it follows that those who are condemned, are not condemned for the sin of another without their own concurrence, nor unless they personally deserve it.

Sinners.—Transgressors; those who deserve to be punished. It does not mean those who are condemned for the sin of another, but those who are violators of the law of God. All who are con-

demned are *sinners*. They are not *innocent* persons condemned for the crime of another. Men may be involved in the *consequences* of the sins of others without being to blame. The consequences of the crimes of a murderer, a drunkard, a pirate, may pass over from them, and affect thousands, and whelm them in ruin. But this does not prove that they are blameworthy."

Proof 3, p. 128. "Various attempts have been made to explain this. The most common has been that Adam was the representative of the race; that he was a covenant head, and that his sin was *imputed* to his posterity, and that they were held liable to punishment for it as if they had committed it themselves. But to this there are great and insuperable objections. * * * (3.) It explains nothing. The difficulty still remains. It is certainly *as* difficult to see how, in a just administration, the sins of the guilty should be charged on the innocent, as to contemplate simply the universal fact, that the conduct of one man may involve his family in the consequences. (4.) It adds another difficulty to the subject. It not only *explains* nothing, removes no perplexity, but it compels us at once to ask the question, how can this be just? How can it be right to charge the sins of the guilty on those who had no participation in them? How could millions be responsible for the sins of one who acted long before they had an existence, and of whose act they had no consciousness, and in which they had no participation?"

Proof 1. A simple reading of this language must satisfy every mind, that the author does deny men to be condemned on account of Adam's sin—they are not "held to be guilty of his sin"—"without personal sin." And what renders it unequivocal is, that he uses an argument to prove it, viz. if men are held to be guilty without personal sin of their own, then men would also be approved by the work of Christ without embracing his offer. The same is adduced in proof second, and more fully stated: "But as none are constituted righteous who do not voluntarily avail themselves of the provisions of mercy, so it follows that those who are condemned, are not condemned for the sin of another without their own concurrence, nor unless they personally deserve it." Condemnation cannot take place without personal sin—it cannot take place on account of Adam's sin. Now the brother must excuse me for repeating here the argument of Pelagius. "If Adam's sin hurt those who were not guilty, the righteousness of Christ profits those who believe not." Milner, chap. II. page 370. The precise argument of the above quotation. But the argument is more specious than valid. It ought to be fairly balanced, and would stand thus. Personal sin is necessary to condemnation, therefore personal righteousness is necessary to justification. Assuredly, if we are not put into a state of condemnation by Adam's sin, we are not put into a state of justification by Christ's righteousness.

Proof 3. Here you see the common doctrine of our standards

stated—"they were held liable to punishment for it, [Adam's sin,] as if they had committed it themselves." This he denies. "But to this there are great and insuperable objections." Need I proceed any farther in the proof? Surely he denies that men are liable to punishment on account of the sin of Adam.

Confession, chap. VI. § 3. "They being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation." § 6. "Every sin, both original and actual, being a transgression of the righteous law of God, and contrary thereunto, doth in its own nature bring guilt upon the sinner, whereby he is bound over to the wrath of God, &c." Lar. Cat. "The sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell, consisteth in the guilt of Adam's first sin."

27. "The fall brought upon mankind the loss of communion with God, his displeasure and curse, so as we are by nature children of wrath, bond slaves to satan, and justly liable to all punishments in this world and that which is to come." Shor. Cat. 18, 19, to the same effect.

Here, by guilt, is meant liability to punishment. "The guilt of this sin was imputed," and thus mankind came under death and corruption; they were surely liable to the punishment of death, when they actually experienced it. Original (as well as actual) sin "doth in its own nature bring guilt upon the sinner," and by this guilt he is "bound over to the wrath of God." The fall (or Adam's sin,) brought upon mankind God's curse, *so as by nature*, we are "justly liable to all punishments." Here the language is explicit. It cannot be more so. 1. Guilt is liability to punishment. 2. Mankind are made guilty by the fall, on account of Adam's sin. 3. A third point is settled here. Punishment is endurance of pain, misery, death, as an expression of God's displeasure. In Confession, chap. VI. § 6. By guilt "he is bound over to the wrath of God, and curse of his law, and so made subject to death, with all miseries spiritual, temporal, and eternal." In Lar. Cat. § 27, "these very things are called punishments, to which by the fall, by nature mankind are justly liable." And § 28; "The punishments of sin in this world are either inward, as blindness of mind, a reprobate sense," &c. Thus, punishment is subjection to evil, to death—suffering death as justly due for sin, or on account of sin. Thus, clearly, the term *punishment* is applied to all the evils we endure "in this world and the world to come," including native depravity, "blindness of mind, a reprobate sense;" and the liability to these proceeds from original sin; this "brings the guilt upon the sinner," and his actual sin increases it. The doctrine of our Confession then is, that all mankind are justly liable to punishment on account of Adam's sin—liable to suffer under the claims of law—as a matter of *justice*; for the language is "*justly* liable to all punishments."

Let us now see what the Bible says. Rom. v. 12–19. In the

twelfth verse the apostle speaks of the entrance of sin into the world through one man, Adam, "in whom all have sinned." Then he suspends the comparison he had begun, as is his frequent custom, that he may strengthen his position incidentally, as it were, brought in, viz. "in whom all sinned." Yet this position, apparently incidental, is important to fill up his subsequent comparison of the first and second Adam. He therefore proceeds to prove, that all sinned in the one man. His first position is, that sin was in the world, prior to the existence of the Mosaic law. His second point is, that the existence of sin proves the existence of *a* law; for sin is the transgression of law, and imputation of sin is its legal charge upon an individual; the charging of sin proves *a law.* His third point is, that sin was imputed, notwithstanding the non-existence of the Mosaic law, from the creation until Moses. This position he supports by reference to a general and undeniable fact, viz. that death was *righteously inflicted, reigned* —it was not the *domineering* of lawless power, but the exercise of *lawful authority*—"death *reigned.*" But now death hath right of dominion only from the law, through sin—"the strength of sin is the law," and "the sting of death is sin." Sin puts the law's power into the hands of death. Here, then, is proof that a law existed, and had been transgressed; for hence death. True, men sinned, and therefore they ought to die. Nay! but the death occurred in cases where no personal sin existed—they had not sinned like Adam, who, by his personal acts, broke the covenant immediately of himself, and who stood also like the second Adam, a public representative—"the type of him that was to come." These, of whom I speak, says Paul, had sinned some other way, as is manifest from the fact that they died. Their death proves them under condemnation—their condemnation is a sentence for violated law—their violation of law could not be, like Adam's, their own personal act. What then? Why then it is true they sinned in him, and fell with him—"in whom all sinned." Now death is a penal evil, therefore, these (infants,) were liable to punishment on account of Adam's sin. The apostle then, v. 15, 16, 17, illustrates certain points in which the comparison he is about to make does not hold between the type and the anti-type. And in v. 18, resumes the comparison, and perfects it. "Therefore, as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men to justification of life. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous." Here, as I mean not to give an *exposition* of the context; it may be sufficient to remark,

1. The comparison dropped in the 12th verse is resumed, between Adam and Christ. *As—even so;* and this regards the *manner* of the condemnation and justification respectively, i. e. the principle of law and right is the same in both. *As*—in what manner? How? Unquestionably by the representative charac-

ter—the federal headship of the parties respectively. 2. "The offence"—*the fall* of the one, is the ground and cause of the sentence of condemnation; and the righteousness, the full compliance with law of the other, is the ground and cause of the sentence of justification. Clearly, then, condemnation is through Adam's sin; but condemnation is the declaration that a man is liable to be punished. Men are therefore guilty on account of Adam's sin. 3. The guilt of Adam's sin is imputed to all his natural posterity, not because they are his *natural* posterity, (for they become such in *consequence* of their moral relation to him, in as much as the moral world was not made for the material, but *vice versa*, the material for the moral,) but because he represented them in the covenant of works; so the righteousness of Christ is imputed to all his spiritual seed, and because he represented them in the covenant of grace. All whom Adam represented are condemned in him; all whom Christ represented are justified in him. Universalism may take what advantages here the truth will afford it. If it can be proved, that Christ represented all, then universal salvation, of course, is the true doctrine. But if he represented only his own sheep, for whom he prays, and not those of whom he says, "I pray not for the world," then old fashioned Calvinism has no difficulties here.

Rom. vi. 23. "The wages of sin"—that which is justly due to it—"is death." But—"in Adam all die," therefore in him have all earned the wages of sin, and are liable to punishment on account of his sin.

Eph. ii. 3. "—And were by nature children of wrath."—By nature, that is, in their natural condition, before any gracious change had been made on them by the Spirit of holiness—they were children of wrath—subject to God's wrath—under condemnation—liable to punishment for the sin of nature. But against this it is objected, that nature means disposition, temper, characteristic feeling. Thus we speak of good nature, meaning kindly disposition. To this I reply, that a case in which such a construction is required, cannot be pointed out in the writings of Paul. He uses the term eleven times; seven in this epistle: chap. i. 26. —"even their women did change their natural use into that which is contrary to—disposition! no, but to the proper laws of their being. Chap. ii. 14,—"do by nature—in their natural condition —the things," &c. V. 27,—"shall not uncircumcision which is by nature—*natural*." IX. 21,—"spared not the natural branches [branches according to nature, not according to their temper or disposition: it occurs twice more in the same verse.] Gal. ii. 15 —"we who are Jews by nature"—not by temper and disposition, but naturally; by birth. IV. 8,—"which by *nature* are no gods." So here we were children [ones begotten] of wrath by *birth*—naturally. Bretschneider gives it—"1. Vis genetrix. 2. procreatio, nativitas, generatio."

Permit me to present one more argument on this subject. You will keep your eye upon the precise point in dispute. It is the question whether men are liable to punishment for Adam's sin—whether they are guilty and exposed to wrath on account of his first transgression passing over in its legal effects upon them. Mine is the affirmative, brother Barnes's the negative. The argument to which I allude was pressed, many centuries ago, on the consideration of Pelagius, who said, "Therefore we conclude that the triune God should be adored as most just, and it has been made to appear most irrefragably, that the sin of another never can be imputed to little children." And again, "Hence that is evident, which we defend as most reasonable, that no one is born in sin, and that God never judges men to be guilty on account of his birth." Bib. Rep. ii. p. 103. Here is the precise point now in controversy, and that profound scholar was bearded with the argument I am about to present; but he never met it fairly. It has often been presented since, and has never been met. I could most earnestly wish it might *now* be met; but I fear it will not for the best of all reasons. I press it, however, upon brother Barnes's consideration, and entreat his candid attention to it. It is the argument from the state of infants. It always appeared to me unanswerable; but never, until I was called to perform the last duties to the loveliest babe [I speak as a father, you can pardon my weakness] the loveliest babe these eyes ever beheld, did I see and feel and know and appreciate the force of the argument and the sweetness of the doctrine it establishes. These knees, Mr. Moderator, sustained that lovely form—these eyes watched every heaving emotion of that labouring bosom, and every groan and shriek of writhing nature pierced this aching heart—as I doubt not it pierced the heart of God and moved the sympathies of Him who groaned in Gethsemane, and shrieked on the cross of Calvary. The physician, whose skill God would baffle, stood watching with anxious heart, the last, last pulsations of ebbing life. I observed—"Doctor, men may speculate as they please about original sin and the liability of infants to penal suffering on account of Adam's sin; but *if* no sin lies upon this child in any sense, what kind of a God have we? Where is his justice, if this sweet babe is not suffering for the sin of another? Oh! if I did not believe the doctrine of original sin, I would call God a monster of cruelty and turn atheist. Either a just sentence of law requires all this, or there is no God."

"But besides," said I, "this child has never committed any sin of its own personally—it can have no sin upon it as a legal cause of this agony, but that of its first representative Adam; what a dreadful thing sin must be, which, six thousand years after its perpetration, presents us with such appalling results as this from one single act? And what must *our* condition be, who have added innumerable actual transgression to the sins of our nature, unless we believe and repent? But oh! how sweet the doctrine! My

dear babe is dying, indeed, by virtue of its legal relation to the first Adam; but thanks to my heavenly Father, he shall live for ever by virtue of his legal relation to the Lord my Redeemer."

Yes, Mr. Moderator, if infants do not die in Adam, they are not made alive in Christ. If they are not condemned and exposed to God's wrath by the sin of the former, they cannot be pardoned, justified and blessed for ever by the righteousness of the latter? Look at the facts of the case. Can infants be saved if they are not lost? Can they be redeemed, if they were not slaves, sold under sin? Can they be pardoned if they have not been condemned? Pardon is the remission of sin—the passing by a sinner condemned—the withholding punishment from him to whom it was justly due. Pardon is bought with Jesus' blood. Can the infant be washed in the blood of the Lamb, if it has not been polluted? Clearly, then, the salvation of infants is out of the question, on any other hypothesis than that of their being guilty on account of Adam's sin imputed. If, therefore, this doctrine be not true, then it will follow, that infants cannot be pardoned; they cannot be washed from their sins in the blood of the Lamb, (for they have no sin)—they cannot be regenerated by the Spirit of God, for they were never dead in sin—they cannot, by consequence, "sing a new song, saying, Thou art worthy to take the book, and to open the seals thereof: for thou wast slain and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood." Rev. v. 9. Oh no! these lovely strangers, who just visit earth to peep in upon its follies, taste a little of its joys, and drink deeply of its sorrows in no sense justly due to them, turn away and pass into another heaven from their parents. Not redeemed from the curse of the law, they can not thank redeeming love. No golden harp in its praise can they for themselves hold—no lofty note, no loud anthem shall swell from infant tongue and from parental lip. Can this be? Who that has closed in death the eyes of lovely infancy, can bear to behold such dissevered bonds? Who, that has sealed the prattling tongue in the long, long silence of the grave, can endure the thought that that tongue shall never unite with his own in singing the song of Moses and the Lamb? Ah no! Moderator. The heart clings to the truth when the erring head would part from it. Yes, our little ones too will obey the "voice which comes out of the throne, saying, Praise our God, all ye his servants, and ye that fear him, both *small* and great." They, too, shall be "arrayed in fine linen, clean and white," and with us shall sit down at "the marriage supper of the Lamb."

Besides, on what other ground can the baptism of infants be accounted for? This argument is alluded to in the admirable History of Pelagianism, Bib. Rep. ii. 100. "So also the council of Milvium, or rather of Carthage, denounced such as denied that infants should be baptized for the remission of original sin. Can. 17. "For in no other sense can that be understood which was spoken by the apostle—that by one man sin entered into the

world, and death by sin; and so death hath passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned [so it is translated]—than in that adopted by the universal church, every where diffused. For by reason of this rule of faith, even infants, who were never capable of committing any sin themselves, are nevertheless baptized according to truth for the remission of sins: so that the pollution contracted by them in their birth might be cleansed by their regeneration."

But that which was thought to give peculiar force to this argument was, that Celestius himself, in a book which he edited at Rome, was constrained to confess, "that infants are baptized for the remission of sins, according to the rule of the universal church, and according to the doctrine of the gospel." It seems, then, that from this argument the Pelagians were never able to extricate themselves." P. 107, Vincentius Lyra asks, "Who, before Celestius, that monstrous disciple of Pelagius, ever denied that the whole human race was held guilty of Adam's sin?" Need I, Mr. Moderator, ask who *after* him denied it? P. 110. "Hilary expresses their [the Pelagians'] opinion thus, 'That an infant dying unbaptized cannot justly perish, since it is born without sin.' And Augustine describes it in these words: 'Nor do little children need the grace of the Saviour, by which, through baptism, they may be delivered from perdition, because they have contracted no guilt from their connexion with Adam." The doctrine of the Pelagians on this point was, that infants were not guilty—that is, neither polluted nor liable to punishment on account of Adam's sin; and yet they held—absurdly enough, just as those in our day who deny the same doctrine—that they ought to be baptized.

Against this doctrine Richard Baxter directed his mighty pen. Works, vol. xiii. 91, &c. "You cannot," says he, "exempt infants themselves from *sin* and misery without exempting them from Christ the Redeemer, and the remedy." He then pours forth more than half a page of texts, and proceeds: "If infants have no *sin* and misery, then they are none of the body, the church, which Christ loved and gave himself for, that he might cleanse it." You will observe here specifically he fastens down *sin* as well as misery upon infants, and then he mentions the *guilt* and the punishment of sin in the case of infants. "But what need we further proof when we have the common experience of all the world? Would any man that is born of a woman, without exception, so early manifest sin in the life, if there were no corrupt disposition at the heart?" In this brother Barnes and others agree with him; not in the next sentence: "And would all mankind, without exception, taste of the *punishment of sin*, if they had no participation of sin, if they had no participation of the guilt? "Death is the wages of sin; and by sin death entered into the world, and it passeth upon all men, for that all have sinned." Rom. v. 12. Infants have sickness, and torments, and death, which are the fruits of sin. And were they not presented to

Christ as a Saviour, when he took them in his arms and blessed them, and said, "of such is the kingdom of heaven?" Certainly none that never were *guilty*, nor miserable, are capable of a place in the kingdom of the Mediator. For to what end should he mediate for them? or how should he redeem them that need not a redemption? or how should he reconcile them to God, that never were at enmity with him? or how can he wash them that were never unclean? when the whole have no need of the physician." Matt. ix. 12. He "came to seek and save that which was lost." Luke xix. 10. and to save "the people from their sins." Matt i. 21. They are none of his saved people therefore, that had no sin. He came to "redeem them that were under the law." Gal. iv. 5. But it is most certain that infants were under the law, as well as the adult: and they were a part of "his people Israel, whom he visited and redeemed." Luke i. 68. If even they be admitted into glory, they must praise him that redeemed them by his blood." Rev. v. 9. P. 94. "Infants then, are sinners, or none of those that he came to save. Christ hath made no man righteous by his obedience, but such as Adam *made sinners* by his disobedience."—"There is no regeneration, or renovation but from sin." P. 95. "If they think that any infants are saved, it is either by covenant, or without; there is some promise for it, or there is none.—96. He concludes, "By the fulness of this evidence, it is easy to see, that infants and all mankind are *sinners*, and therefore have need of a Redeemer." Richard Baxter then hath fully taught, 1. That infants are polluted and need cleansing —2. Are dead spiritually, and need regeneration. 3. Are guilty, liable to, and do experience punishment. 4. Punishment is the endurance of "sickness and torments and death," due not for their own but Adam's sin. Against this argument I predict no man will lift up his voice. And here I might close the discussion of this VII charge, in the confidence that the proof is full and clear, that Mr. Barnes denies men to be guilty on account of Adam's sin. However, as it would be uncourteous not to notice his argument, I must remark,

1. I apprehend the difference lies in the *things* not in the *terms*, and therefore it is not an idle logomachy. I have endeavoured, in stating the things deemed errors, to express them in terms plain and simple; and here, to avoid ambiguity in the term *guilt*, I have defined it "liability to punishment," and I hope the preceding remarks have made the meaning clear and the truth evident. When it is said, mankind are liable to punishment on account of Adam's sin, I cannot imagine how any man should suppose that the certainty of their sinning, *when* they should become moral agents, was meant—or that they came into the world with a hereditary depravity, or propensity of liability to sin; or that they will suffer and experience pain and death merely "in consequence of that connexion." The dumb brutes experience the same evils as a consequence of Adam's sin. Nor yet is the meaning, that

they are suitable for the moral Governor of the universe to inflict in order to express his abhorrence for sin." But the meaning is plain, that pain and death, temporal, spiritual, and eternal, are justly and legally awarded to every soul of man by the righteous God—that thus they are sinners condemned, and therefore liable to have this sentence executed upon them; and all this on account of Adam's sin imputed, that is, charged in law and right upon them. On the contrary, Mr. Barnes maintains that the evils incident to infant humanity (and thus to all the race, for they all are one time infants) are not penal at all; do not result from moral or legal connexion with Adam; but are similar only to the evils incident to a drunkard's children from his conduct—to a suicide's, to a traitor's, to Adam's. All his reasoning here seems to me to rest on the hypothesis that the legal relations are the same. Now this hypothesis I take to be gratuitous and false, and also dangerous. It is gratuitous and false, (a) because the death of Achan's children could not follow as a legal result of his crime simply. He was not their legal representative in that act of sin; his relation as parent did not constitute him such, and his act alone could not in justice and right bring upon them this fearful punishment. This would be to set the children's teeth on edge, *because* the father had eaten sour grapes. "Why do you charge this as a principle of the divine administration, that the children are punished for the sins of their parents?" Mr. Barnes says that to deny this principle is the object of the eighteenth chapter of Ezekiel. Here we agree, for I deny that the sin of Achan was the *sole* or *true* ground of his children's death. And I deny it simply on the principle, that evils upon a moral being can follow, in a perfect government, only the transgression of law: and this transgression must be committed either by the individual or by one rightfully authorised to act for him. But Achan was not so appointed, (the drunkard, the suicide, the traitor, were not so appointed, except measurably as the representatives of property,) and therefore his sin could not be the sole, true and legal procuring cause of their death: at the very most it was the occasion only. (b) Because *if* Achan's sin was the *sole cause* of their death, they being yet infants, their execution was itself an infinitely greater offence against the laws of right, than Achan's sin. He was not their representative in this matter, and their lives could not *justly* be the forfeit of his act. On the contrary, (c) they had been born under sentence of condemnation—they were guilty of death by the transgression of Adam, who did represent them by *right* of God's appointment, and the judgment being by one to condemnation, they were *before* the act of their father, under sentence of death—children of wrath, and this was the only, true, real moral or legal cause of their death. The offence of Achan was but the occasion, and "all Israel stoned them with stones," and became their executioners. So exactly with the drunkard, and traitor, &c. Their children suffer. There is an immediate

instrumental cause, viz. their destitution of food, raiment, &c. There is a mediate cause or agent instrumental, viz. the drunken parent. There is an original essential procuring moral cause, viz. their first father's first sin.

The hypothesis on which Mr. Barnes' reasoning rests, viz. that the relations between Achan, the drunkard, &c. are the same as between Adam and his posterity, is dangerous. (a) It strikes at the foundation of all moral government; for it makes God (and human governors,) inflict pain and wo and death, without a ground in right and law for such infliction. The infant of Achan dies for his father's sin, without any *just condemnation*—the law does not look upon the child as guilty, as liable to punishment, and yet it dies! Is not this unjust? So, says Mr. Barnes, Adam's infant posterity suffer on just the same principle. They are not guilty—not liable to punishment—not under sentence of law—not condemned to penal suffering—and yet they suffer death? Is not this unjust? Is not this the definition of tyranny? (b) It leads to a subversion of the gospel; for if no other relation exist between Adam and his posterity than between Achan and his, then neither does any other relation exist between Christ and his people. (c) This principle makes the physical or mere animal connexion the only basis and ground of moral or legal treatment; or in other words, the moral world is adapted to the material, and not the material to the moral. Matter is superior to mind.

But we are told this treatment of infants, &c. is designed to display the abhorrence of the moral governor against sin. Now, I ask how? If they are not guilty because of Achan's offence—if they are not under sentence of law declaring them justly liable to punishment, as is affirmed, how can their suffering death exhibit the abhorrence of government to sin? Can the sufferings of innocence—for if they are not *guilty*, and Mr. Barnes says they are not, they *must be innocent*—can the sufferings of innocence display hatred against sin!

2. We must add something about mere terms—the logomachy: and a poor business it is. Mr. Barnes contends that *guilt* always implies *personal criminality*, meaning, that the person *himself* committed the crime: and that punishment means suffering penalty *for personal acts*. And (1) he quotes Webster, but only so far as suits his object. Let me quote him to suit mine. "A crime denotes an offence or violation of public law." Now, it is in reference only to public law that we speak. "Criminal—that violates public law, divine or human." "Criminality—a violation of law." "Guilt—criminality in a civil or political view; exposure to forfeiture or other penalty." "Punishment—any pain or suffering inflicted on a person for a crime or offence, by the authority to which the offender is subject, either by the constitution of God or civil society." The truth is, that Webster, in the definitions of crime and guilt, distinguishes between the moral and the civil or political application. Mr. Barnes has improperly

turned his eye upon the former; for it is manifest, that our concern is with legal relations, and not with moral character. Now, "criminality is a violation of law," and "guilt is criminality in a civil or political view, *exposure to forfeiture* or *other penalty.*" "Guilt, therefore, implies both criminality," "violation of law," "and liableness to punishment," to "any pain or suffering inflicted on a person for a crime, or violation of public law." He does not say, that the criminality, or violation of law, by which a man is guilty or exposed to forfeiture or other penalty, and so endures punishment, or any pain or suffering inflicted—he does not say, the violation of law *must* be his own *personal* act, in order to his being exposed to the forfeiture. The definitions applicable to the present case, are precisely such as I could desire. Adam violated public law, divine; this exposed him and his posterity to forfeiture of life; they became guilty; pain or suffering is inflicted on them; they are punished.

(2.) The second appeal is to the law books; and here I confess my learning runs short; the books are not within my reach just now. Brother Barnes says "a jury or court never think of separating the idea of *personal offence, or crime*, from their idea of *punishment.*" Whether this remark be true or not, he has utterly failed to *prove* it true. I think it is about half true; in certain departments of their proceedings, they do not make the distinction, and in others they do. The latter first. In all cases where the "forfeiture," or thing itself awarded as that to which the person is liable, or by which he is bound, lies properly and really within the power of human law, the award may fall upon a person, and he endure the forfeiture, who did not perform the act. Thus in the whole business of suretyships and co-partnerships, the courts frequently find a verdict against a man, and hold him bound in law by the forfeiture, although he did not *personally* perform the act. The silent partner of a firm is held responsible (*reus*, guilty,) in law for the act of another. But where the "forfeiture" relates to life, where death or pains leading to death are the matter of the "forfeiture," the court make no distinction, because no man has power over his own life, or over another's; no man *can rightly* expose himself by his *own act*, or by *another's*, to forfeiture of limb or life. And *therefore*, no jury or court *can rightly* admit such forfeiture, and hold a man guilty, i. e. liable to penal evil for another's act. But what man has no right to do, because he has not power over life, God has done in appointing his own Son to die for the sin of others. Whether, therefore, the term *punishment* is used in human courts to mean the suffering of evil on account of the sin of another, is a matter of indifference in this question. Still, however, brother Barnes has adduced no evidence to disprove it. For (a) Blackstone defines punishment to be, "the right of the temporal legislator to inflict discretionary penalties for *crimes* and *misdemeanors.*" Does he say for *crimes* only of the persons punished? Or may such relations exist between two

persons, that one may suffer pains and forfeitures for another's misdemeanor? Besides, Blackstone's definition is limited to "the temporal legislator," and we are speaking of the rights of the eternal legislator; and, besides, the extreme inaccuracy of his definition proves the truth of Coleridge's remark, that he lived and wrote in a dark and imperfect state of legal knowledge. If accurately quoted, Blackstone says, "punishment is the right of the temporal legislator," &c., which is manifestly not true. "Punishment is not the right of a legislator," nor is it the exercise of such a right. It is the forfeiture inflicted—the pain endured under sanction of law—and the ground of it is violation of law. Coke's maxim of law is true or false, just according to its application. If he meant that *such relations cannot exist* as shall bring penal evil upon one man for another's sin, (as I suppose he did not,) it is not true. But brother Barnes' chief dependence is upon Grotius—and for it I am sincerely sorry—because it lays me under the *necessity* of making statements, which will be called the argumentum ad invidiam. And (a) Grotius, though learned, was very unsound as a theologian. Owen on Satisfaction, Works, vol. IX. p. 74, 293, has proved that Grotius is at least a semi-Socinian, although he wrote against Socinus. In his work "*De Satisfactione Christi*," on atonement, Grotius had taught, as Owen shows, the correct doctrine of Christ's suffering the legal consequences of our sin—the punishment; but afterwards, (having read Crellius,) he rejects his former interpretations, and in his *annotations* falls in with Socinus and Crellius in nearly all their interpretations of the proof texts of the doctrine of atonement. "The substance of his annotations on those places," says Owen, "being taken out of Socinus, Crellius, and some others of that party."—p. 301. Accordingly, every one knows the fact, that Grotius is claimed and gloried over by the modern Unitarians, as their most illustrious champion. You will be able to appreciate the authority of Grotius on a point where the essence of atonement is concerned, when you consider that he falls in with the infidel Jews in their exposition of the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, in application to Jeremiah the prophet and the afflictions that befel him. For example, v. 6, "All we, like sheep, have gone astray," &c. Grotius interprets, "We have all erred from the days of Manasseh, some following some idols, others others; and God permitted that he [Jeremiah,] by our grievous crimes, should suffer most unworthy things." On v. 7, "And as a lamb," ("wherewith," says Grotius, "Jeremiah compares himself.") Chap. xi. 18. In v. 8, the phrase "for the transgression of my people was he smitten," he explains thus, "for the wickedness of my people I have stricken him, [Jeremiah,] in the Hebrew it is, 'stroke it on him,' that is, befel him, through the great error and fault of the people, as is before said."

Now to this very transaction, Owen applies the term punishment, as do almost all the world of Christians. My object in addu-

cing these passages is, to show the reason Grotius had for maintaining that the term punishment, *pœna*, is applicable only to suffering for *personal sin*. For if that be true, then Christ did not and could not possibly suffer *punishment* at all—could never endure penal evil, never having *personally offended*. Thus conveniently is dismissed the whole doctrines of the Christian atonement. Grotius then is about as good authority on a question deeply affecting the vitals of the Gospel, as Horace and Cicero, and Aristides and Demosthenes, whom he calls to his aid. After all, however, or rather before all this, Grotius in his treatise against Socinus, most explicitly teaches the contrary. See Bib. Rep. II. 441. "Sed ut omnis hic error dematur, notandum est, esse quidem essentiale pœnæ, ut infligatur ob peccatum, sed non item essentiale ei esse, ut infligatur ipsi qui peccavit." That is, "But that here, every mistake may be removed, it must be observed, that it is essential indeed to punishment, that it be inflicted on account of sin, but that it is not in like manner essential to it, that it be inflicted on the very person who has sinned." Here is precisely our idea of punishment on the same page. "Puniri alios ob aliorum delicta non audet negare Socinus." That is, "Socinus dare not deny that some are *punished* on account of the sins of others." And p. 467, "It is not simply unjust or contrary to the nature of *punishment* that one be punished for the sins of another." Thus Grotius expressly dares Socinus to deny the application of the term punishment to suffering endured on account of other men's sins. The precise thing which Mr. Barnes brought Grotius himself in to deny.

3. Mr. Barnes' third appeal is to the Bible, to show "that *punishment* is to be regarded as the evil inflicted by a just moral governor *for personal offence*. You will bear in mind that the only question here is about *personal offence*. Is the word *punishment* here applied where there is not *personal offence*—where the person has not by his *own act* merited it. Can we say an *unjust punishment?* that a man was *punished unjustly?* Such a phrase plainly is an application of the word *punish* to a person not deserving it by his own act. Let us open the Bible; Mr. Barnes says there is no such application of the term. Now the very second place where the word *punish* is used is such, Prov. xvii. 26, "to punish the just is not good." Jer. xliv. 13, "I have punished Jerusalem by the sword, by the famine, and by the pestilence."—Now it is undeniable many *infants* fell under these ministers of punishment, who had not personally sinned. So in Jer. xxvii. 8, and xxix. 32, "I will punish Shemaiah the Nehelemite, and his seed," l. 18, "I will punish the king of Babylon and his land, as I have punished the king of Assyria." Now every one knows that in the execution of this threatening, infants innumerable were involved in the calamity here called punishment. Shemaiah's seed, who had no personal action in his sin, are included in the punishment. I shall not multiply cases; indeed this is the

more general sense of the term. Gen. xix. 15, "Lest thou be consumed in the iniquity [*gnon*, punishment] of the city." Did the infants of Sodom endure this punishment? and had they *personally* sinned? Jer. xxi. 19, "God layeth up his iniquity [*Heb.* his punishment] for his children." Punishment then, often falls on those who have not sinned personally.

So in the New Testament, "he is guilty of death." Was Jesus personally deserving? But Mr. Barnes says they thought so who used the term. But the fact was, he did die, and that by appointment of God. Was he, *enochos*, guilty, liable to suffer? did the Father's justice require him to suffer? If so, then he was in God's sight *enochos*, guilty, liable to penal evil; if not, he paid no debt of our sin, and his suffering was as unrighteous, viewed as the decree of God, as when viewed as the decree of men! Did his people deserve to be punished—were they *enochoi*, guilty, justly liable to punishment?—was *punishment* the precise thing required of them by the law?—and did Jesus meet the claim of law for them? Then *punishment* is the proper name of what he endured.

In other places the term implies *obligation* of some kind. But in not one instance is there any expressed limitation of the phrase to liabilities resulting from personal acts, although in nearly all cases it is thus in fact. But this fact is only a negative proof that the word never is used in any other sense. The case Heb. ii. 15, is at least not unequivocally so limited. I think neither the fear of death nor *subjection* to the bondage of Satan is limited to personal sins, but belongs to the sin of our nature. Acts iv. 21, "Finding nothing how they might punish them because of the people." To punish signifies here, simply to inflict suffering; that was their wish, but not finding a plausible pretext, they desisted, fearing a popular commotion.

4. Mr. Barnes' last appeal is to old Calvinistic writers. Here (*a*) "The theory of *one-ness* or *personal identity* with Adam" is again brought forward. We have seen it exist only in the imagination of those opposed to old Calvinism. (*b*) Mr. Barnes quotes Turretin from the Bib. Rep. II. 440, he says, for the very opposite purpose to that for which they quoted him. "Reatus theologice dicitur obligatio ad pœnam ex peccato." Guilt, among theologians, is defined, to be obligation to punishment *on account of sin.*" But how does this prove that it is on account of sin *committed by the person* who is held to punishment?

(*c*) Mr. Barnes quotes Owen, Justi. XI. 246, (280) "Guilt in Scripture is the respect of sin unto *the sanction of the law* WHEREBY the sinner becomes obnoxious unto punishment." Again, "The guilt of it [sin] is nothing but ITS respect unto punishment from the sanction of the law. Again, (on Justification, 280) he says, "There can be no *obligation* to punishment, where there is no *desert* of punishment." Again, "The guilt of sin is its desert of punishment, and where is not *this*, there can be no punishment PROPERLY SO CALLED." Now, Mr. Moderator, no man since the

days of Paul, would so appal me by his opposition, as John Owen. Can it be possible that I have so misunderstood him? Can it be, that John Owen refuses to call that *punishment* which is inflicted for the sin of another! Let us look candidly and read fairly. *Immediately* after the words first quoted here, it reads, "And to be guilty is to be ὑπόδικος τῷ Θεῷ, liable unto punishment for sin, from God, as the supreme Lawgiver and Judge of all. And so guilt or "reatus" is well defined to be "obligatio ad pœnam, propter culpam, aut admissam in se, aut imputatam, juste aut injuste." This may be thus translated, "an obligation to punishment, on account of sin, either admitted against himself, or *imputed*, justly or unjustly." Now the very object for which Mr. Barnes quoted Owen, was to prove that *guilt implies necessarily personal ill desert.* Had he quoted the seven consecutive lines, he would have proved indubitably that personal ill desert is not necessary to guilt; but that sin imputed brought *guilt.* Was this fair dealing? Again, "There can be no *obligation* to punishment, where there is no desert of punishment." Now this would seem to intimate that Owen would not call a man guilty, but for his one personal desert, the very reverse of what Owen teaches. Now to be candid let Owen speak the whole sentence; "Dignitas pœnæ [desert of punishment] and obligatio ad pœnam, [obligation to punishment] is but the same thing in diverse words. For both do but express the relation of sin unto the sanction of the law, or if they may be considered to differ, yet are they inseparable; for there can be no obligatio ad pœnam where there is not dignitas pœnæ."

By comparing the last quotation Mr. Barnes makes above, marked well with small capitals, with the sentence fully and fairly taken, you will see there is ground of complaint. "Sin hath other considerations [besides its guilt] namely, its formal nature, as it is a transgression of the law; and the stain of filth that it brings upon the soul; but the guilt of it, is nothing but its respect unto punishment from the sanction of the law. And so indeed, "*reatus* culpæ," is "reatus poenæ," [the guilt of sin, is, "the guilt of punishment;] the guilt of sin, is its desert of punishment. And where there is not this "reatus culpæ" [guilt of sin,] there can be no "poena," no punishment properly so called. For "poena" is "vindicta noxæ," "the revenge due to sin." Owen thus distinguishes between the stain of its filth and the guilt, or liability to its punishment. And on the next page he says, "that our sins were so transferred on Christ, as that thereby he became asham, hupodikos to Theo, reus, responsible unto God, and obnoxious unto punishment in the justice of God for them." *Punishment* then, according to Owen, the Redeemer endured. What! for "personal criminality?" No. "Perfectly innocent in himself; but he took our guilt on him, or our obnoxiousness to punishment for sin." Why did brother Barnes attempt to press Owen into such a service? But I forbear. I am glad his quotations were

not direct. I am glad he is indebted to the Christian Spectator for such garbled, and inaccurate, and unfair quotations. I am glad no Presbyterian is reus huic culpæ. (*c*) Ridgley is quoted for the same purpose. "Guilt is an obligation, or liableness to suffer punishment FOR SIN COMMITTED." True; but committed by whom? By the person who is guilty? Can none be guilty but for "personal criminality?" Ridgley, in the very next sentence answers it. "Now since this guilt was not contracted by us, but imputed to us." And p. 120, Vol. II. he says, "And let it be farther observed, that we do not say that there is no punishment due to original sin, as imputed to us; for that would be to suppose that there is no guilt attending it, which is contrary to what we have already proved."

I must add a remark on the 5th and 6th concluding observations. He seems to wish to submit the terms and the things too to common sense and common use, as the standard. But neither can be admitted as umpire, when God's truth and the terms by which it is expressed are at stake. Here Mr. Barnes remarks, "How can a just government be sustained, in the ends of moral agents, if it holds those guilty who are innocent, and punishes those who have no ill-desert? This objection to the language is insuperable." So it is: But whose language is it? No Calvinist ever held it. We do not say that children are innocent. The reverse is our doctrine. They have deeply-seated corruption in the heart, and this is a result of their sin in their original representative, Adam: and this doctrine of the Bible, "We can and do preach."

Again: Mr. Barnes objects to our doctrine, that it makes God unjust. If the Bible did teach that Adam's posterity are guilty and punishable for his sin, then it would teach such an unrighteous doctrine, as to destroy itself. "There is no place, says he, where it is affirmed, that men are *punished* for the sins of another; and were there, it would be such a departure from the common use of language, and from the obvious principles of common justice, as to neutralize no small part of all the proof that could be brought for the truth of a divine revelation." "It not only explains nothing, removes no perplexity, but it compels us to ask the question, How can this be just? How can it be right to charge the sins of the guilty on those who had no participation in them?" Now this is the very objection urged by Dr. Taylor. "If this be just—if the *Scriptures* teach such a doctrine, then the Scriptures are of *no use*—understanding is *no* understanding—and what a God must he be, that can thus *curse* innocent creatures! Is this thy God, O *Christian!* Edwards, Vol. II. 561. If my brother will associate himself with such men as Dr. Taylor of Norwich, I will be honest enough, and kind enough to tell him he is in dangerous company. If a Presbyterian minister inadvertently use the very same identical arguments against the doctrine of our standards, which are used by the great champion of Arminianism, justice to the truth of God, and charity to the souls of men, equally demand

the exposition of the fact: and no charge of exciting odium shall deter me from obeying the calls of charity to my brethren, and justice to the truth. Who does not know that this is, and always has been the stereotyped argument of Arminianism against Calvinism? Who does not hear it reverberating through the land continually? Who can point out a single Arminian pulpit in the Union, where it is not the theme of perpetual vapouring? If infants are liable to punishment on account of Adam's sin, then God is unjust.

Now it might be sufficient refutation of this objection to identify it with a Dr. Taylor, either of Norwich or New Haven. But lest it should be thought rather a cavalier-like treatment, it may be proper to add the interrogation of Paul, "Is God unrighteous who taketh vengeance?" For manifestly, the fact, that infants suffer,—the fact that Christ suffered, in the government of God, and by his express appointment, is undeniable: and this Arminian objection lies not against any peculiar doctrine of Calvinists, but against the broad, obvious, and appalling FACT.

CHARGE VIII.

Mr. Barnes denies, "That Christ suffered the proper penalty of the law, as the vicarious substitute of his people, and thus took away legally their sins, and purchased pardon."

Proof 1. All the passages quoted under charge vi. and vii. are referred to here. If the sin of the *first* Adam is not imputed to his seed, and they are not liable to punishment on account of it; then it inevitably follows, that the sin of his seed is not imputed to the second Adam, and he punished on account of it.

Proof 2. p. 89, 90.—"In the plan of salvation, therefore, he has shown a regard to the law, by appointing his Son to be *a substitute* in the place of sinners; not to endure its precise penalty, for his sufferings were not eternal, nor were they attended with remorse of conscience, or by despair, which are the proper *penalty* of the law; but he endured so much as to accomplish the same ends as if those who shall be saved by him, had been doomed to eternal death. That is, he showed that the law could not be violated without introducing suffering; and that it could not be broken with impunity. He showed that he had so great a regard for it, that he would not pardon *one sinner* without an atonement. And *thus* he secured the proper honour to his character as a lover of his law, a hater of sin, and a just God. He has shown that if sinners do not avail themselves of the offer of pardon, by Jesus Christ, *they* must experience in their own souls for ever, the pains which this substitute for sinners endured, in behalf of men, on the cross." Thus, no principle of justice has been abandoned; no claim of his law has been let down: no disposition has been evinced to do *injustice* to the universe, by suffering the guilty to escape. He is, in all this great transaction, a just moral governor, as *just* to his law, to himself, to his Son, to the universe, when he *par-*

dons, as he is when he sends the incorrigible sinner down to hell. A full compensation, an equivalent has been provided by the sufferings of the Saviour, in the sinner's stead, and the sinner may be pardoned."

On proof 1st, it may be proper to remark,—1. It has been shown that Mr. Barnes denies the existence of a covenant between God and Adam, as a representative head of his posterity. (Charge v.) Mr. Barnes denies, by consequence, that the first sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity; (Charge ii.) and that they are guilty, i. e. liable to punishment on account of the sin of Adam. Proof sufficient has been adduced on these several points: and also the accused himself admits their truth, but denies their relevancy. He sets up a defence against these several points of doctrine.

2. It has also been evinced, by good and sufficient proof, that a parallel is drawn in Scripture, and in our standards, between Adam and Christ, (who is therefore called "the second man,") in such language and manner, as clearly shows, that, as the former was constituted a covenant head and representative of his children, so the latter is appointed, by the same divine authority, a covenant head and representative of his children. The representative character of "the second man," is as indubitably a doctrine of the Bible and of our standards, as the representative character of the first Adam. The denial of the one, is a rejection of the other, and vice versa. He, therefore, who denies the imputation of Adam's sin, to those whom he represented, must deny, and does deny, the correspondent imputation of Christ's righteousness, to those whom he represented; and also the correspondent imputation of their sins to their surety. 3. Now, it is in evidence—and no man can read the defence of Mr. Barnes, without perceiving his admission of it—that he denies the transfer of legal relations; so that Adam's sin passes over upon his children to their condemnation, and just liability to endure punishment on its account. And so the sins of Christ's people do not pass over upon him, by a legal imputation, so that he, in the eye of the law, is held guilty, or liable to punishment on their account.

But I am perfectly aware it will be said—it has been said—this is an inference of mine, for which Mr. Barnes is not accountable. But it is not so. He does distinctly affirm, that no such legal transfer is or can in right be made. Now, if no such imputation is or can be made in any case, then none is made in this case; and the sins of God's people are not charged in law to Christ as their surety, so that he is accounted liable to the penal consequences: and if he was not justly liable to punishment, of course God did not appoint him to endure penal evil. This is in no other sense a matter of inference from the doctrines he teaches, than if a man should aver, that another had violated every precept of the decalogue, and it should hence be said, that he charged his neighbour with the sin of Sabbath breaking.

Proof 2nd. Here we have the explicit statement, God appointed

his Son "not to endure its precise penalty." This is the thing charged. I have not supposed that Mr. Barnes denies that Christ suffered pain and sorrow for men. They who utterly reject and scout the whole doctrine of atonement, admit that Christ suffered for the sins of men. But they put their own explanation upon the terms. Mr. Barnes admits that Jesus endured great and sore evils on account of our sins; but he does not admit that these were *penal*—they partook not of the nature of punishment—they were not the result of a legal imputation to him of the sins of his people. But to make the *truth* of this charge quadruply sure, it must be observed, that three reasons are alleged, why Christ could not, and did not suffer the precise penalty of the law. The possibility of mistaking his meaning is thus placed entirely out of question. 1. The first is, that the sufferings of Jesus "were not eternal." 2. He did not experience "remorse of conscience." 3. His sufferings were not attended by despair. Thus it is infallibly manifest that Mr. Barnes teaches, as charged, that Christ did not suffer penalty. Whatever he endured was not *penalty*, however dreadful the sufferings may have been. I shall therefore not dwell on proofs, and especially, as the accused admits in his pleadings, explicitly and fully, the thing charged, as we shall see in remarking thereon. Let us first, however, learn the doctrine of our standards and of the Scriptures in this important matter.

Confession Chap. VIII. § 4.—"This office the Lord Jesus did most willingly undertake, which, that he might discharge, he was made under the law, and did perfectly fulfil it; endured most grievous torments immediately in his soul, and most painful sufferings in his body; was crucified and died." § 5. "The Lord Jesus by his perfect obedience and sacrifice of himself, which he through the eternal Spirit once offered up unto God, hath fully satisfied the justice of his Father, and purchased not only reconciliation, but an everlasting inheritance in the kingdom of heaven, for all those whom the Father hath given unto him." Lar. Cat. 49.—"Having also conflicted with the terrors of death and the powers of darkness, felt and borne the weight of God's wrath; he laid down his life an offering for sin, enduring the painful, shameful, and cursed death of the cross." Shor. Cat. 25.—"Christ executeth the office of a priest, in his once offering up of himself a sacrifice to satisfy divine justice, and reconcile us to God, and making continual intercession for us."

On these remark, I. The *object* of the sufferings of Jesus, which by them he accomplished, was to satisfy divine justice—"he hath fully satisfied the justice of his Father." It is, therefore, of commanding importance to know what the Father's justice demanded; or in other words, what God's law required of his own people who had transgressed it. Will brother Barnes tell us what justice demanded of Christ's people, in order to its full satisfaction? Can any man be at a loss to say what the violated law requires? Do not all men know that it demands the infliction of its penal sanc-

tion? Can *justice* be *satisfied—fully satisfied*—with any thing short of this? Why, by the very terms, to stop short of the full demand of law, is *injustice:* and can justice be fully satisfied with injustice?—with a partial meeting of its claims? Clearly, then, the very essential nature of justice demands a *penal* infliction—an infliction of the penalty—the whole penalty—and nothing but the penalty of the laws; and any and every diminution from this, is a sacrifice of justice. But now Christ satisfied fully the justice of his Father; therefore, the claim of law upon its violators, Jesus met. It demanded punishment of them, he endured it. Their sin, in its legal effects, its *punishment*, he bore in his own body on the tree. "The Lord laid on him the iniquity of us all." In what sense could this be, unless as to its punishment—"he bore our sins in his own body on the tree." How? surely not literally—not the pollution! Nay, but the *penal effects.* He died "the just for the unjust"—in their legal room, enduring the penal consequences of their sin.

2. What was it that the law threatened as the punishment of sin? What is the penalty of the covenant of works? Death, says the Confession of our Faith—man was forbidden to eat "upon pain of death." So the Bible, "in the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die." The same truth is taught in the entire system of bloody sacrifices from the days of paradise onward. All proclaimed the wages of sin to be death: all taught that Christ our passover must be sacrificed for us.

3. As to the nature of this penalty or death, it is obvious we can have no precise and adequate ideas. We may say, he "endured most grievous torments immediately in his soul"—he "was made a curse for us"—"it pleased the Lord to bruise him"—he "made his soul an offering for sin"—"he conflicted with the terrors of death and the powers of darkness, felt and bore the weight of God's wrath." He was forsaken of God; but after all we know not what it was, his human body and soul suffered. To raise an inquest after the amount of pain and anguish, would obviously be worse than folly and vanity. God has furnished us with no rule in his word or in our nature, by which to measure pain. It cannot be measured by duration. It cannot be estimated by degrees of intensity. It cannot be told by numbers or quantity. What the frown of heaven may be, we cannot tell. What the human spirit, sustained by the almighty power of the eternal Spirit in our blessed Redeemer, could endure, and did suffer in that awful hour, no creature will ever know. When we view the scenes of Gethsemane, and the sorrows of Calvary.—When we hear the declaration, "my soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death."—When we see the "great drops of blood falling down to the ground."—When we hear the prayer of agonized humanity: "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me."—When the final withdrawings of a Father's love, as to its sensible exercises, leaves the soul to drink the bit-

terness of wrath divine, and wring from the last agonies of expiring humanity—the tomb-startling shriek, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" our feelings tell us justice must now be satisfied to the full: the bitterness of that death, which constitutes the punishment of our sin is over; the law's whole demand against our divine Surety on our account, is met and fully paid. And when we know, that it *pleased* the Lord to bruise him thus, we see evidence full and clear, that he could not thus suffer, unless he were *justly liable* to suffer—our sins were charged in law against him, and *therefore* it *pleased* the Lord. We ought to observe here, that the Hebrew for the word *pleased*, expresses *satisfaction* very commonly—*complacency:* As Psalm xxii. 8. "He *delighted* in him." Ps. xli. 11. "Thou *favourest* me." Is. xlii. 21. "The Lord is *well pleased* for his righteousness sake." "So the Lord was *pleased* to bruise him." Now there is no reconciling of this with the goodness of God, but by the glorious and blessed doctrine that a claim of justice lay against him; which claim could in no conceivable manner exist, but through the sins of his people, whom he represented, being imputed to him, and he thus becoming liable to punishment on their account.

4. The inevitable consequence of his enduring for his own sheep, for whom he laid down his life, the penal consequences of their sins, is their deliverance from them. This results from the very nature of God's justice. The law's entire claim against the sheep of Christ's flock, their adorable Surety has liquidated. This secures two results; his own deliverence from the mortal bondage of the grave, for "it was not possible he should be holden of death;" and their pardon bought with blood. Jesus hath a right to the release of his people from all the penal consequences of their sins. Death hath no more right of dominion over them; for He has satisfied the law whose claim gave death all his power, and the grave all its terror. Pardon, therefore,—the remission of sins—the omission to punish his dearly-bought flock, is to Jesus a matter of pure justice. When he advocates their cause before the divine throne, he puts in a claim of right. He asks no sacrifice of justice; but prays the Father to do justice to him, in dispensing pardon to them. Hence the *love* of God the Father is displayed in the gift of such a Surety: the *grace* of our Lord Jesus in dispensing pardon. For *to them* from him it is all of grace; whilst to Him from the Father, it is all of debt; and hence "God is faithful and *just* to forgive us our sins."

Such, Mr. Moderator, is the doctrine of the confession and of the Bible. Such is the plan of redemption by the vicarious substitution of the Son of God in the law-place and room of his people, and I can truly say, my soul is grieved to be forced to believe that my brother does not believe it.

5. One other observation I desire to make. It is of a general nature, viz. That every remedial scheme goes, as the very name indicates, to establish the principle of the original institute. Now

the covenant of works is the original institute in the present case, and the great principle of it was, to give life to man, on the ground of a perfect and full compliance with law. Perfect obedience was to secure life. This failed in the hands of the first Adam, and, in infinite mercy, God provided a mediator to remedy the evils of the fall, by establishing the law as the rule of obedience still. Jesus did so—he fulfilled the law in its precept, (as we shall see hereafter,) and he exhausted the penalty: hence he claims the promised reward, even life everlasting, for all his people; on the *basis of the original grant*, in the first covenant.

Let us now attend to Mr. Barnes' defence, and

1. He alleges that three things are mentioned as included in the penalty of the law, viz. eternity of duration to suffering, remorse of conscience and despair, which Christ could not, and did not endure. As to the whole of this, it is plainly a metaphysical distinction unknown to the Scriptures. They say nothing definitely about remorse of conscience and despair, as descriptive of the penalty of law. The former term is not found at all, and the latter only once, and that not on this subject. But particularly: (*a*) Eternity of suffering is essential to the penalty. This has reference to amount, it is infinite, and its endurance infinitely honours the law. But now the infinitely glorious, and holy, and exalted Son of God could pay this infinite debt—could endure this infinitude of divine wrath in finite duration. This is the plain, and obvious, and common, and satisfactory answer to the universalist and infidel objection against the doctrine of atonement. (*b*) Remorse of conscience, as before intimated, is not a scriptural phrase, and to settle its precise meaning, would, I presume, be as difficult as to end the present controversy. Brother Barnes means by it, that feeling which arises from personal criminality; meaning by personal criminality, I presume, moral turpitude, and then properly enough denies that Christ could experience it. But as the Bible and our Confession do not render it necessary to go into this metaphysic, I suppose wisdom dictates adherence to its simple language. (*c*) Despair is a term not so difficult to understand. It is once used in Scripture—"cast down, but not in despair"—where it seems to mean a high feeling of despondency: an apprehension of failure in the work before us. But in reference to both these, I am satisfied, that all minute, metaphysical inquiries into the nature of these feelings which agitated the agonized soul of the Saviour are entirely improper; and can lead to no profitable results. On the contrary, the statement already given is clear, Scriptural, and ought to be satisfactory. The proper penalty of the law is death—"thou shalt surely die." Jesus did die under the curse of the broken law.

2. My only reply to the first four remarks under this head, is that they all go to deny the penal nature of Christ's sufferings. Webster's definition of punishment in reference to personal and private offence, is again brought in, whilst his definition in refer-

ence to public law, is left out of view. Under the second, he says that the language of the Confession, that Jesus "felt and bore the weight of God's wrath," must be understood figuratively.

I can only say, I am truly sorry at every attempt to pare down and diminish our apprehension of the sufferings of Christ. I must think they were beyond any conception we can have, and the power of any language we can use. To say, "it was impossible—that he should endure that proper penalty," is in my apprehension, a perilous assertion.

His fifth remark begins thus: "If Christ *had* endured the strict penalty of the law, then the law would have no claims on us now. If the debt was fully and literally paid, and *all* the penalty removed, they for whom it was paid have a *right* to a discharge, and are *already* innocent before God. The view, therefore, which affirms that that penalty is truly paid, leads at once to all the evils of Antinomianism." Here observe, (a) Mr. Barnes rejects in the most express terms, the penal nature of Christ's death. (b) He denies the doctrine of *satisfaction* altogether. He maintains that Jesus did not render full return to the violated law—that *all* the penalty is not removed. And, (c) to put the matter beyond all doubt, he gives his reasons why he thinks it dangerous to teach the doctrine of full satisfaction being rendered to divine justice by the Saviour's death. The first, and which is the foundation of all the rest, is that, if there had been full satisfaction rendered, then, "all the penalty being removed, they for whom it was paid have a *right* to a discharge." Again he says, "When a law or penalty is fully paid, the law has no further claims on men; and if the full penalty had been met by the substitute as really and truly as if the criminal had himself borne it, then he has a *claim* to a discharge, and his release becomes not in any sense a matter of grace or favour, but a matter of right." The same is taught under his sixth remark. "If this doctrine be true; if it be affirmed that Christ endured the literal, complete, and proper penalty of the law, then it follows that no gain has resulted to the universe from his intervention. All that has been done, has been to *transfer* the penalty, involving the same kind and degree of suffering from the guilty to the innocent. Just as much suffering has been endured on this supposition as though the elect had endured it in their own persons in the eternal fires of hell." Hence it is clear to a demonstration, that Mr. Barnes maintains a defective satisfaction—that Christ's sufferings were not punishment at all—and that they were not in degree and amount equal to the whole demand of the law's penalty. This is yet more evident by a remark a little below, where he agrees, "that a vast amount of suffering in the universe has been prevented"—that Christ's sufferings being so much inferior in amount to those deserved by his people, have diminished by that excess, the total of pain endured in the universe, and this is the chief glory of the atonement; but the doctrine that he suffered the full demand of law, "dims its moral

lustre and glory." Here, unquestionably, is the idea of a relinquishment, in part, of the strict claims of law against the people of God; the penalty is not fully paid; the lustre and glory of the atonement consists in God's accepting something less than strict justice required. Like a condescending and indulgent creditor to an unfortunate endorser or surety, he compounds, and for a partial payment releases both surety and principal.

Now, let us set in contrast with this, the words of our Confession. "The Lord Jesus hath fully satisfied the justice of his Father." "The JUSTICE," you will observe, not the benevolence —but the JUSTICE of his Father is *fully* satisfied. Can a more peremptory contradiction be framed in language, than is here exhibited between brother Barnes and the Confession of Faith?

As the issue is fairly joined on this point, let us see what others have held. And as Turretin is generally viewed as expressing the sense of all orthodox Christians, let us hear him. "De satisfactionis Christi veritate." Pars. I. § 9. "It is one thing for Christ to have died *usefully* for us, i. e. *for our good and advantage;* another, *for us by substitution*, i. e. *in our room and place;* one thing, that he has been delivered up on account [propter peccata,] *of our sins incidentally*, that also he might draw us off from them; another, *causally and meritoriously*, that by taking the guilt of them [eorum reatum,] upon himself, he might also make expiation by paying in his own body all the punishments due to them"—[pœnas omnes illis debitas in corpore suo tuendo expieret.] Thus Turretin teaches a full and proper satisfaction by Christ's suffering the whole penalty—*all the punishment* due to the sins of his people, and this as a result of his having taken *their guilt* upon himself. He immediately adds, "It is one thing to speak of *such kind of satisfaction*, by which Christ shall have satisfied all those things which were imposed upon him by the will of God for procuring our salvation; another, to speak of *penal satisfaction*—[de satisfactione pœnali,] and properly so called, by which he shall have satisfied not only the will of God, but also the divine justice, our punishments being assumed unto himself, [assumptis in se nostris pœnis."] Here, again, Turretin maintains that the satisfaction of Christ is *penal*, the punishment due to us falling upon him; and he says, "the question is not concerning the first, which the adversaries do not deny; but only concerning the second, which they petulantly reject." His opponents admitted some kind of satisfaction, but denied it was *penal*—that its endurance was *punishment*—that Christ bore our *guilt*, and satisfied the divine justice. Whether this be not the precise point of brother Barnes' opposition, I leave his readers to judge, adding only, that the opponents whom Turretin cites are Crellius and Smalzius, distinguished Socinians. Again, Part II. 19, he says, "Neither can punishment [pœna,] be separated from satisfaction, seeing Christ hath so borne it [punishment,] most fully, [plenissime,] that he has endured it *entirely*, and exhausted it

altogether;" and this he says Jesus suffered, not as from the hand of the Father, but "from him as a judge out of justice, on account of which he is said to be made a curse and sin"—"that we may know that a *commutation of debt* had been made between us and Christ." The italics are Turretin's own, and show most clearly that he believed the Saviour bore our sin legally, as a matter of justice, by *commutationem debiti*, and that he endured the punishment [pœna,] most fully, entirely, and totally—*plenissime*, *omnino*, *penitus*. Can Mr. Barnes, or any other man, express the idea more fully and entirely and totally, that Jesus, being *reus*, liable on account of our sin, did endure the whole punishment due to us?

Let us hear from him once more. Part VIII. 8, "The objectors endeavour to prove that on God's part satisfaction is impossible, because God every where in Scripture is represented as gratuitously and mercifully forgiving all our sins. Now, if he remits gratuitously, say they, in what manner could he either demand satisfaction or remit? what is more contrary to remission than true and full satisfaction. If you answer, that indeed remission and satisfaction are repugnant, but in as much as satisfaction proceeds from him who either has procured, or ought to procure remission, they can be perfectly consistent, seeing it is remitted to one, but another satisfies for him; they retort, that the answer is vain—1st, because a debt cannot be said to be remitted for which that is given which fully satisfies; for what necessity of remission, where there is no longer any debt; but there is no longer any debt where already it has been fully satisfied; for, 2d, that a debt may be remitted, it is not sufficient for the debtor to be set free, although he himself shall have paid nothing, but it is necessary that the obligation itself be entirely extinguished, by the liberality alone of the creditor, so that neither the debtor himself, nor the person substituted in his place, may pay any thing to the creditor. 3d. If a person transfer a debt to himself, the debtor can very properly be said to be commuted, but the debt cannot be said to be remitted, seeing, at last, the creditor has received to a farthing what was due. 4th. If Christ has paid in our place, in him, and with him, we can be esteemed to have paid; but if we are esteemed to have paid, then God cannot be said to remit out of grace, but of justice, because it would be unjust in God not to absolve us, the payment being already made." Here is something very plausible by way of objection, and I think it essentially and substantially and identically the same with the objections of Mr. Barnes. Now, Mr. Moderator, it is painful to tell the truth, and but for the truth's sake, and for my brother's sake, and for the church's sake, and for Christ's sake, I will add the last words of this paragraph from Turretin: "Sic argutator Socinus." "Thus argues Socinus." Ought not a Christian minister to be alarmed when he discovers such coincidence of sentiment?

Two evil consequences are supposed by Mr. Barnes to follow

the doctrine of full, legal satisfaction. 1. "*Eternal justification.*" But if we follow the Confession and the Bible, we must inevitably escape this rock on which many have split and gone down. Conf. chap. XI. § 4. "God did, from all eternity, decree to justify all the elect; and Christ did, in the fulness of time, die for their sins, and rise again for their justification; nevertheless, they are not justified, until the Holy Ghost doth, in due time, actually apply Christ to them." "He that believeth not shall be damned." No man is ever justified but by faith. If he believe not—if he repent not—if he do not live in practical holiness—he is not a justified man. But, secondly, and almost the same thing, the doctrine of full, legal satisfaction, is charged with leading to Antinomianism. And it is not to be questioned that this, and the doctrine of election, and the doctrine of perseverance in grace, if set by themselves, and detached from their kindred doctrines of faith, repentance, regeneration, &c. become Antinomian. The doctrine of free grace in salvation is Antinomian, *if* thus detached. And what principle of divine truth, if abused, will not lead to ruin? Will not the blood of Jesus, if trampled under foot, double the damnation of the impenitent sinner? What then? Shall we refuse to preach salvation bought by blood? Now, I ask, what peculiar tendency is there in the glorious doctrine of full, free, and perfect satisfaction to the justice of God, by the punishment of my sin in my blessed Surety—what tendency is there here to Antinomianism? How can this lead me to love sin? When I hear the sighs of Gethsemane, and the groans of Calvary, and the thought rushes in upon my soul—He suffers the punishment due to my transgression—is there here any peculiar motive to love sin and practice unholiness? When I mark the falling tear; the big rolling drops of mingled sweat and blood; the pierced hands and bleeding side and panting bosom and agonized soul, and say to myself, He drinks the wrath of God; the curse of the broken law pours in upon his holy soul; it is the punishment of my sin—is there here a motive to continued rebellion? Ah! my brother, if heaven can present to earth a motive almighty to holy action, here it is, in the glorious doctrine that Christ bore the penalty of law due to our sins. Take back, then, your charge of Antinomianism. "Do we then make void the law through faith? God forbid. Yea, we establish the law." Oh no! I am as ready as any man to go on a crusade against all the polluted hosts of Antinomianism, who inhabit the holy land; but then my brother must not tear away the very cross itself. I can follow only that banner; and if I didn't believe that Christ had endured the penalty—that Jesus had suffered the full punishment of my sin, then, instead of following his cross, I should be seeking one of my own, on which to endure for myself what remains of the law's just demand—my soul should be "exceeding sorrowful even unto death."

One other remark here. Brother Barnes charges with Antinomianism, the doctrine that Christ suffered penally and to the full the

punishment of his people's sins. This same charge was brought against Paul's doctrine of grace; does not this seem to say that our doctrine and his are identical? Would the same argument be urged against both, if both were not the same?

As to the 7th item, it is necessary only to repeat, he therein distinctly admits the satisfaction or sufferings of Christ to be, not the proper penalty required by the law, but only a substitute in the place of it. This is the thing charged.

On the three remaining subdivisions, in which Mr. Barnes has thought proper to cut up the proposition of this eighth charge, I have only two remarks. 1. He denies, as has been proved, I suppose, the representative character of the second as of the first Adam; that Christ was constituted the covenant head of his people; and acted for them in a legal respect, bearing their liabilities to obedience and suffering. This is what I suppose to be meant by a vicarious substitute, and therefore consider the whole doctrine of legal substitution as rejected in the notes. His affirming here that he maintains the doctrine of Christ's vicarious substitution and action for his people, only proves that he attaches to the terms a meaning which is not common and which I am unable fully to comprehend. 2. The other remark is, that I can see no just ground for the reiterated complaints of injury and injustice. I have stated *one* distinct plain proposition. Mr. Barnes divides it into four. He draws the *inference* that I charge him with four errors here instead of one, and believing that the four are not found in his book, complains of injustice. If it has not been proved that he rejects the doctrine of our sin being imputed to Christ and his suffering the *penalty* of it, then the charge is not proved; but if that is established, then the whole charge is sustained and no injustice is done. For in that case, even the three inferred propositions are sustained, and the author's using some phraseology apparently inconsistent with them is no evidence to the contrary. It requires extreme caution in one who reads old orthodox works occasionally to avoid in his own writings the use of words and even phrases expressive of sound doctrine when he does not intend it.

CHARGE IX.

Mr. Barnes denies "That the righteousness, *i. e.* the active obedience of Christ to the law, is imputed to his people for their justification; so that they are righteous in the eye of the law, and therefore justified."

Proof 1. p. 28. (3) The phrase *righteousness of God*, is equivalent to *God's plan of justifying men; his scheme of declaring them just in the sight of the law; or of acquitting them from punishment and admitting them to favour.* In this sense it stands opposed to *man's* plan of justification, *i. e.* by his own works. God's plan is by faith." "The word to *justify*, δικαιοω, means properly *to be just, to be innocent, to be righteous.* It then means to

declare, or treat as righteous, as when a man is charged with an offence, and is acquitted. If the crime alleged is not *proved* against him, he is declared by the law *to be innocent.* It then means to *treat as if innocent*, to *regard as innocent;* that is, to pardon, to forgive, and consequently to treat as if the offence had not occurred. It does not mean that the man *did not* commit the offence, or that the law might not have held him *answerable* for it; but that the offence is forgiven; and it is consistent to receive the offender into favour, and treat him *as if* he had not committed it."

"In regard to this plan it may be observed, (1) That it is not to declare that men *are* innocent and pure. That would not be true. The truth is just the reverse; and God does not esteem men to be different from what they are. (2) It is not to *take part* with the sinner, and to mitigate his offences. It admits them to their full extent, and makes *him* feel them also. (3) It is not that we become partakers of the essential righteousness of God. That is impossible. (4) It is not that *his* righteousness becomes *ours.* This is not true; and there is no intelligible sense in which that can be understood. But it is God's plan for *pardoning* sin, and for *treating* us as if we had not committed it; that is, adopting us as his children, and admitting us to heaven, on the ground of what the Lord Jesus has done in our stead. This is God's plan. Men seek to save themselves by their own works. God's plan is to save them by the merits of Jesus Christ."

Proof 2. p. 84, 85. "*Even the righteousness of God.* The apostle, having stated that the design of the Gospel was to reveal a new plan of becoming just in the sight of God, proceeds here more fully to explain it. The explanation which he offers, makes it plain that the phrase so often used by him, "*righteousness of God*," does not refer to an attribute of God, but to his plan of making men righteous. Here he says, that it is by faith in Jesus Christ; but surely an *attribute* of God is not produced by faith in Jesus Christ. It means God's mode of regarding men as righteous through their belief in Jesus Christ. "God has promised that they who believe in Christ, shall be pardoned and saved. This is *his* plan in distinction from the plan of those who seek to be justified by works."

"*Being justified.*—Being treated as if righteous, that is, being regarded and treated as if they had kept the law. The apostle has shown that they *could not* be so regarded and treated by any merit of their own, or by personal obedience to the law. He now affirms that if they were so treated, it must be by mere favour, and as a matter, not of right, but of gift. This is the essence of the Gospel.

Proof 3. p. 94, 95, as quoted under Charge IV (7) and p. 96. "God judges things as they are; and sinners who are justified, he judges *not* as if they were pure, or as if they had a claim; but he regards them as *united by faith to the Lord Jesus, and in this*

relation he judges that they should be treated as his friends, though they have been, are, and always will be personally undeserving. But if the doctrine of the Scriptures was, that the entire righteousness of Christ was set over to them, was really and truly theirs, and was *transferred* to them in any sense, with what propriety could the apostle say, that God justified the ungodly? If they have all the righteousness of Christ as their own, as really and truly theirs, *as if* they had wrought it out themselves, they are *not* "*ungodly.*" They are eminently pure and holy, and have a claim, not of grace, but of debt, to the very highest rewards of heaven," p. 97. *Unto whom God imputeth righteousness.*—Whom God treats as righteous, or as entitled to his favour in a way different from his conformity to the law. This is found in Psalm xxxii. And the whole scope and design of the Psalm is to show the blessedness of the man who is *forgiven*, and whose sins are not charged on him, but who is freed from the punishment due to his sins. Being thus pardoned, he is treated as a righteous man."

Proof 4. p. 127. *By the obedience of one.*—Of Christ. This stands opposed to the *disobedience* of Adam, and evidently includes the entire work of the Redeemer which has a bearing on the salvation of men. Phil. ii. 8. "He ---- became *obedient* unto death."

P. 212. "*God's righteousness.* Not of the personal holiness of God, but *of God's plan of justifying men*, or of declaring them righteous by faith in his Son. Here God's plan stands opposed to their efforts to make themselves righteous by their own works."

1. The silence of this book of notes on the subject of Christ's righteousness being imputed to his people for their justification, gives ground to a strong presumption, that the doctrine is rejected by its author. To this I know it will be objected, that it is hard to condemn a man for what he does not say. But then it ought to be remembered that a faithful witness will tell the *whole* truth. If a man tell not all the truth in the matter—if he keep back a part, even though what he does say is true, he is a false witness. If a commentator in expounding those Scriptures which set forth any leading doctrine of Christianity, leave that doctrine out of view altogether, he is justly esteemed a foe to the doctrine. Now Mr. Barnes was bound in expounding this epistle, to make the doctrine of the imputed righteousness of Christ, and particularly his active obedience, the prominent feature of his book. The epistle to the Romans is a treatise, and the only one in the Bible, *formally*, on the doctrine of justification, and the marvel of marvels is, that this volume of exposition does not once present it distinctly and clearly to the reader. "The righteousness of Christ [his active and passive obedience] imputed to us and received by faith alone," is not once brought distinctly into view from beginning to end. If it is, I am much mistaken; for after a careful perusal of the whole, and an oft repeated inspection of those parts where

this doctrine ought to be the radiant and the rallying point, I confess myself unable to find it. The word justification is sometimes used, but a meaning is attached to it, as we shall see, not sanctioned by Scripture usage nor the standards of our church.

2. Proof 1, is a part of the Note on i. 17. "For therein is the righteousness of God revealed," &c. and "the righteousness of God" is made to be "equivalent to God's plan of justifying men." He had before mentioned two interpretations of the phrase: viz. that it means the attribute of God's *justice;* and his *goodness* or *benevolence;* both which he rejects, and then adopts this, which surely bears no kind of resemblance to the terms to which it is declared to be equivalent. Yet these three, he avers, are the only possible interpretations. How it is, that the plain, simple, common sense and Bible meaning of the term *righteousness* should never have presented itself to the brother's mind is to me matter of astonishment. Do you ask what that is? I answer, in the fourth meaning given to the Greek, *dikaiosune*, by Hedericus, viz. "Conformitas cum lege." *Conformity with law.* Compliance with the rule of right—obedience. And as holy obedience includes the *moral affection of the heart*, the assent of the understanding and consequent action of the whole person; so the Greek word and its correspondent hebrew, *tsedek*, includes such affection: and hence they sometimes express benevolence, kindly feeling. The law is a straight line; walking in the line marked out for us is rectitude, straightness, righteousness. Deut. vi. 25—"it shall be our righteousness, if we observe to do all these commandments"—xxiv. 13, "it shall be righteousness unto thee before the Lord thy God."—xxxiii. 19, "shall they offer the sacrifices of righteousness." Let any man just take his Bible and concordance and sit down patiently to the investigation, and he will be surprised at the almost universal applicability of this definition. Such, too, is the general understanding of the term. Dr. Ridgley, III. 74, says, "the righteousness we are now speaking of, must be something wrought out for us, by one who stood in our room and stead, and was able to pay that debt of obedience." And in the note Dr. Wilson adds, "Righteousness is taken ordinarily to signify a conformity to laws, or rules of right conduct. The moral law, which is both distinguishable by the moral sense, and expressly revealed, requires perfect and perpetual rectitude in disposition, purpose, and action. Dr. Gill, on the place, says, it is "that righteousness which he [Christ] wrought out by obeying the precepts, and bearing the penalty of the law." A multiplication of authorities is useless: there can be no dispute about the matter. Righteousness is "conformity to law." And when spoken of God, in reference to his own acts, it means his procedure according to his own will, the supreme rule of right. When spoken of his acts and doings for the benefit of men the same general idea is set forth. So Paul speaks of "the righteousness of God *being* unto all and upon all them that believe"—that is, the righteousness which Christ said

it became him to fulfil—his obedience to, his compliance with, law, which constitutes the title to life. This it is, that is revealed in the gospel from faith to faith: according to the promise, Isa. lvi. 1,—"for my salvation is near to come, and my righteousness to be revealed." xlvi. 13. "I bring near my righteousness; it shall not be far off, and my salvation shall not tarry." In the preceding verse, he commands, "Hearken unto me, ye stout-hearted, that are far from righteousness"—"ye that follow after righteousness and have not attained to it." Rom. ix. 30, 31, 32. Now what does this following mean, but their vain attempts to *comply with the law's demands*. Still righteousness, compliance with law, was far off: But, "My righteousness is near, my salvation is gone forth." Isa. li. 5. In a thousand texts it is clearly stated that righteousness is the title to life: righteousness the actual and active obedience to law, and salvation are united as antecedent and consequent.

That righteousness is active compliance with law is further evident from Paul's whole train of reasoning here. Let us analyse it, for here lies the soul and life of the gospel. First, he says, i. 16, the gospel is the power of God unto salvation. But what is it in the gospel that gives it such almighty energy to save? Second step in the process: v. 17. It reveals righteousness; and salvation—eternal blessedness is the just reward of righteousness. But whose righteousness is it? Man's? No; for man could not perfectly keep or comply with the law, and perfect obedience only can be admitted by the law and rewarded with life. No; it is God's righteousness; the very same which he has so often promised to his people—"my righteousness shall be for ever"—"their righteousness is of me, saith the Lord." "I bring near my righteousness." But, if it be the Lord's, what avails it to us? 3. It becomes ours by faith. It is proffered to us upon the pledged faithfulness of God "from faith," and becomes ours by our humble, sincere, and true reliance upon this pledged faithfulness "to faith." But where do you find this doctrine? 4. In the prophecy of Habakkuk, ii. 4. "The just by faith shall live." He who believes in the promise of God, wherein life or salvation is offered on the ground of the Saviour's righteousness, and who thus sets to his seal that God is true, and thus becomes, in deed and truth, united to Jesus, being renewed and enabled thereto by the Holy Ghost in his regenerating influences—this man is justified by his faith as the *instrumental procuring cause*, and by Christ's righteousness as the *meritorious cause*.

On this quotation from the prophet, which is Paul's text, Mr. Barnes and I differ *toto cœlo*. He maintains that the point of the text is to affirm the manner in which men *live*: I insist that it affirms the manner in which men are *justified*. He says, "it does not refer originally to the doctrine of justification by faith"—then Paul's text and sermon (like many another unfortunate preacher's) have little, if any connexion with each other; for

really I think he preaches on that doctrine. No, says Mr. Barnes, "but its meaning is this: 'The just man, or the righteous man, shall live by his confidence in God.'"

This mistake as to the text of Paul, is the prime cause of that want of perspicuity and system which pervades the whole book. Now let us look into the matter, and let us keep one precise point in view. Mr. Barnes insists, that the text relates to the manner of living: I, that it relates to the manner of justification. And I observe that the prophet is speaking of the Gospel day. Having spoken of the Chaldee persecutor, his mind is carried forward from his watch tower, "to see what he will say unto me." "And the Lord answered me, and said, Write the vision, and make it plain upon tables, that he may run that readeth it. [And yet it has been misunderstood!] For the vision is yet for an appointed time; but at the end it shall speak, and not lie: though it tarry, wait for it; because it will surely come, it will not tarry." And what is the vision? What is the glorious doctrine, by the reception and belief of which, verse 14, "the earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the glory of the LORD, as the waters cover the sea?" Verse 4. "Behold, his soul which is lifted up is not upright in him"—the proud, "who follows after the law of righteousness," "is not upright," righteous, just, justified—accepted of God: "but"—what? Why, exactly the opposite of this: and what is that? Is it a question about the *manner of living*, or about *being upright* or *just?* Assuredly the prophet says nothing concerning *how* the proud might live; but he speaks of his want of righteousness, "his heart is not *upright;*" and the opposite is uprightness—"but the just by his faith shall live." This is the natural, simple, and plain translation of the words, and is required to make up the contrast with the previous part of the verse. The words may be accommodated, as Owen says, and thus express the idea of the subsequent life of faith. Because the *justified by faith*, do also walk by faith. Yet the position of the terms, strictly require them to express the manner of their becoming just, i. e. by faith in the person promised in the vision, viz. Christ. A Germano-English friend has this moment furnished to me a passage or two from Luther's comment on this text; which shows that he understood the prophet as referring to justification through faith in the promised Messiah. Luther's complete works, Halle, 1741, Vol. VI. p. 3157-58.—"At last, Habakkuk finishes this sentence of the table, [verse 2] with the words, 'But the just shall live by his faith;' i. e. if one will live and be just, he must believe the promises of God; vice versa, the unjust dies in his unbelief. If you will live and be saved, you must believe this writing on the table, that Christ will come in his kingdom." Verse 20.—"Here you see that the prophets have preached the faith of Christ, as well as we under the New Testament; and that Habakkuk is even so bold as to condemn all works, and ascribes life only to faith. He says plainly, the unbeliever shall not succeed; let him pray and work until death, still all his

works are condemned, that they are of no use to him, and shall not help him; and the believer shall live, without works, by his faith." But a better authority than Luther, we have in the Apostle himself, for immediately after stating his text, he proceeds to establish it, by negativing the only other way of justification, and that which the prophet had negatived in the preceding clause of the verse, viz. *by works.* From this to the 19th verse, chap. iii. he shows, by an induction of particulars, that works cannot secure life, by making man just before God; and concludes, verse 20, "Therefore by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight." His conclusion is manifestly concerning justification; and this is Paul's fifth step. He has now demonstrated that man's righteousness—his works—his active obedience to law—not his endurance of penalty—but his active obedience—cannot secure a sentence of justification before God. Thus is set aside, as utterly inadequate, the works, the active obedience of men. Clearly, then, he believed that the righteousness which justifies, is compliance with law; but man's is inadequate, and therefore another's must come in its place. Whose shall come in the place of man's obedience, or works, or righteousness? Certainly the righteousness of God, which, in verse 17, he says is revealed in the Gospel, and which had been laid aside until he should demonstrate the insufficiency of man's. Therefore he here takes it up. "But now the righteousness of God without the law is manifest," &c. This is his sixth step: and the entire process of his reasoning, shuts us up to the necessity of understanding "the righteousness of God, which is by faith of Jesus Christ," in the same sense as we understand the righteousness of men that has been rejected; viz. compliance—the compliance, or active obedience of Christ. The seventh step is the medium through which it comes, viz. the "redemption that is in Christ Jesus." The satisfaction to the penal claims of law, is indispensable to the availableness of his righteousness, properly so called: and hence, it is the same faith resting upon the atonement, that, in the strict sense, procures pardon; which, resting on the righteousness of Jesus, procures justification.

The same truth is established by the contrast in x. 3, 4, between the righteousness of God and the righteousness of man. "For they, being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, have not submitted themselves to the righteousness of God. For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every believer." Here God's righteousness and Christ's righteousness are the same: and from the contrast, it is evident the term must be understood in the same sense, viz. *conformity with law.* But Christ is the end—fulfilment, by his perfect obedience,—of all law—to every believer. Unquestionably, the righteousness which they went about to establish, was their own works of obedience; therefore Christ's righteousness is his conformity with law; and this is that which is revealed from faith

to faith. Hence, Jesus Christ is said to be made of God unto us, wisdom and righteousness. And in Jer. xxiii. 6, he is called "the Lord our righteousness." And Isaiah xlv. 24—"In the Lord have I *righteousness* and strength:" and lxi. 10.—"He hath clothed me with the garments of salvation, he hath covered me with the robe of righteousness." Rev. xix. 8.—"To the Church was granted, that she should be arrayed in fine linen, clean and white; for the fine linen is the righteousness of the saints." But I waste words. Let me only here touch the objection drawn from two Scriptures. Rom. v. 9. "Much more being justified by his blood:" hence it has been supposed that atonement, or redemption, is the same as justification. Or in other words, that it is Christ's death, and not his life of holy obedience, that justifies us. But I reply, that, *en to haimati*, by his blood, does not necessarily mean the efficacious cause. Yea, it rather marks the instrumental cause; for there is an ellipsis of *through faith*, as it is in iii. 25, *through faith in his blood, dia tes pisteos en to autou haimati;* and marks the medium and instrument. And I admit that the atonement or satisfaction by death, (which, properly speaking, secures pardon,) is indispensably necessary to the justification of a sinner; inasmuch as without it, the righteousness, or active obedience, which is the proper title to life, cannot be available to him.

The other passage is Phil. ii. 8.—"he humbled himself and became obedient unto death." Here brother Barnes has been carried away by the English translation. He thinks this an evidence (p. 127) that Christ's obedience is suffering death—that death is that to which he paid subjection. But the sense is, he became, or rather simply *he was submissive* (hupekoos mechri thanaton) *until death*—submissive, that is, to the law of God in all things, *until* active obedience was finished: and this the word properly signifies, and so is it generally translated in the New Testament.

Now, Mr. Barnes denies that God's people are righteous in the eye of the law, the active obedience of Christ being imputed to them. "It is not that *his* righteousness becomes *ours*." This is not true; and there is no intelligible sense in which that can be understood." This is so explicit as to preclude comment. How different this from Luther's language to his friend Spenlein; speaking of Christ he says, "Ipse suscepit te et peccata tua fecit sua, et suam justitiam fecit tuam; maledictus qui hæc non credit." Epist. An. 1516, tom. 1. Justifi. 28. That is, "He himself has taken you and made your sins his own, and has made his own righteousness yours; cursed be the man who does not believe it." And Augustine to the same effect—"he made our sins to be his, that he might make his righteousness to be ours." P. 27.

Under proof 2, he affirms that men are "regarded and treated as if they had kept the law," but he carefully avoids the admission of Christ's righteousness passing over in law to their account and constituting the ground of their justification. They are not righteous at all, in any sense; but only treated as if righteous.

The idea of their having in their living Surety a right and title to a sentence of justification he rejects. Their acceptance "must be mere favour, and as a matter, not of right, but of gift." The believer in Jesus has no right to heaven—did I not say truly—this brother's doctrine, if true, would render it impossible for the believer "to read his title clear to mansions in the skies?"

Proof 3. Here again the idea of a title to heaven flowing from union with Jesus is rejected. "Not as if they had a claim"—"if the doctrine of Scripture was, that the entire righteousness of Christ was set over to them, was really and truly theirs, and was *transferred* to them in any sense, with what propriety could the apostle say, that God justified the ungodly?" We cannot misunderstand this. Christ's righteousness is not transferred in any sense to his believing people—it is not set over to them in law—it is not theirs. His meaning is unequivocally certain by the reason which supports it, viz. the old, standing, Socinian objection—I say it with grief and mortification—that if the believer hath in Christ a title, right, or claim to the highest rewards of heaven, then there is no grace in the gospel. Purchased grace! what an absurdity!

Proof 4. Turn back to the quotation from p. 127. There is the whole comment on the phrase "By the obedience of one." On which a real Calvinistic Presbyterian would have given his heart full flow and let his pen run rampant. But there you have it, text and comment, in five brief lines. Now I ask why this brevity? Why is *that* by which many are made righteous, dismissed thus cavalierly? Why is this, which he admits stands opposed to the disobedience of Adam, hurried out of sight? If it stands opposed, is it not the opposite of Adam's disobedience? And what is the opposite of disobedience? is it not obedience? and what is disobedience but want of conformity with law? Must not then the obedience which is the opposite of this be conformity with law?—active compliance! Oh! how could my brother shut his eyes against this most glorious point of gospel truth?—a point on which all the bright beams of the Sun of Righteousness converge to a focus, that might make the eye of an archangel blench, and shrivel like a parched scroll, the entire legions of lost spirits who can never say through grace, "The Lord is my righteousness."

But so it is. Admitting the truth that the obedience of the *one* is Christ's, and that it includes his entire work, he tries to turn it off, by quoting Phil. ii. 3. "He—became *obedient* unto death"—italicising *obedient* to make the reader think that all Christ's work consisted in suffering. Ah! this Parthian arrow is not medicated with Presbyterian oil.

On the last quotation, p. 212, I have only to remark, that being a comment on chap. x. iii.—"they being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness"—it is very strange, that a commentator should say (and expect his reader to believe him,) that, "Here God's plan stands opposed to

their efforts"—"God's plan"—what a phrase! the word plan is not in the Bible, and I doubt whether a single man who ever read this book of Notes, knows what the phrase *God's plan* means. Does not the apostle contrast God's or Christ's righteousness and their righteousness? Why should the meaning be hid in an unscriptural phraseology? And how could he say "I have uniformly represented the doctrine as near as possible in the language of the Scriptures?"

But it is time we should look into our standards. Conf. XI. §1. "Those whom God effectually calleth, he also freely justifieth; not by infusing righteousness into them, but by pardoning their sins, and by accounting and accepting their persons as righteous; not for any thing wrought in them, or done by them, but for Christ's sake alone: not by imputing faith itself, the act of believing, or any other evangelical obedience to them, as their righteousness: but by imputing the obedience and satisfaction of Christ unto them." §2. "Faith, thus receiving and resting on Christ and his righteousness," &c. §3. "Christ, by his obedience and death, did fully discharge the debt of all those that are thus justified, and did make a proper, real, and full satisfaction, to his Father's justice in their behalf. Yet, inasmuch as he was given by the Father for them, and his obedience and satisfaction accepted in their stead," &c. Lar. Cat. 70. "Justification is an act of God's free grace, in which he pardoneth all their sin, accepteth and accounteth their persons righteous in his sight; not for any thing wrought in them, or done by them, but only for the perfect obedience and full satisfaction of Christ, by God imputed to them, and received by faith alone." See also 71 and 72, and Short. Cat. 33.

You will see, 1—That the satisfaction rendered by Christ's death, is uniformly distinguished from the obedience, or active righteousness—"the obedience and satisfaction of Christ"—"his obedience and death"—"his obedience and satisfaction"—"perfect obedience, and full satisfaction"—"by his obedience and death." And this is according to the nature of the case; for the preceptive and penal claims of law are entirely distinct. Now, in perfect accordance with this distinction, observe, 2—The *obedience*, as well as the *satisfaction*, the life, or active righteousness, as well as the death, in its efficacy to make satisfaction, are imputed to his people; "the perfect obedience and full satisfaction, by God imputed to them"—"imputing his righteousness to them." 3. The result of God's imputing Christ's satisfaction, his death, to them is, that they are free from the penal claim of law; it has its satisfaction; and thus Jesus hath a *right* to their release—pardon he has freely to bestow: "he pardoneth all their sin"—"by pardoning their sin." 4. The result of imputing Christ's obedience, his righteousness, to them is, they are, not simply "treated as if righteous," as brother Barnes says, but accounted righteous; the righteousness of Christ is theirs—they have received it, and it is set down to their account—he "accepteth and accounteth their persons righ-

teous in his sight." Contraries never can agree; this and the "Notes" can never be reconciled.

On the "Defence" here I have little to say. The first three observations are assertions that he has not denied, that the benefits of Christ's works are imputed; that his active obedience is imputed; that his people are righteous in the sight of the law. Now I leave you to judge whether I have not most incontestably proved the opposite of the last two. As to the first, he does say, the benefits are imputed; i. e. what he calls the benefits; but he assuredly excludes the glorious benefit of a title, a *right*, to heavenly joys, as given to us in the imputation of the Saviour's righteousness to us. And as to the third, he never admits that believers are righteous, by Christ's righteousness becoming theirs; it is not set over to them—it is not transferred to them in any case.

His fourth observation, and summing up of the whole, is a repetition, and contains intrinsic and express evidence of the truth and justice of the whole charge. Paul, according to what is here said, is not righteous—Jesus Christ's righteousness is not reckoned to Paul—it is not his in any sense—he is treated *as if* righteous—Christ died in Paul's place, but he did not suffer the *punishment* due to Paul—the *penal claim* has never been liquidated; and although in terms he says, "justice has been satisfied," yet his whole system denies it. Nothing can be more explicitly asserted, than his doctrine, that the sufferings of Christ were not penal—were not punishment. Now it *was* penal suffering that the law required of Paul, and this requisition has never been met, according to Mr. Barnes. Justice, therefore, is not satisfied. In fact, it is very nearly in terms a contradiction, to say that justice has any claim of suffering, and yet that the suffering claimed is not penal. How could the sufferings of Jesus satisfy the claims of justice against Paul, if, as Mr. Barnes abundantly maintains, his sins were not legally imputed to Christ, and the punishment of them inflicted upon him? If it was not legally right—if there was not a proper, *legal claim* of suffering against Jesus—if he was not in *justice* and *in law* bound, and liable to suffer, was it *right* for God to put that cup into his hand? Or would not that be the definition of oppression, injustice, and cruelty?

Proceed we to the Xth Charge, viz: Mr. Barnes also teaches, in opposition to the standards, that "justification is simply pardon."

Proof 1. pp. 28, 29. (already quoted, p. 17,) "The phrase *righteousness of God* is equivalent to *God's plan of justifying men; his scheme of declaring them just in the sight of the law or of acquitting them from punishment, and admitting them to favour.*"

2. "In regard to this plan, it may be observed (4) It is not that *his* righteousness becomes *ours*. This is not true; and there is no intelligible sense in which that can be understood. But it is God's plan for *pardoning* sin, and for *treating us* as if we had not committed it."

3. p. 110. "*Being now justified.* Pardoned; accepted as his friends.

4. p. 124. *Unto justification.* The work of Christ is designed to have reference to many offences, so as to produce pardon or justification in regard to them all." The comment on chap. v. 19.—"For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous," is thus summed up, p. 127, 128: "The sense of the verse is this: 'As in consequence of the sin of one, the many became sinners, without explaining the mode in which it is done; so the many became righteous in the mode and on the terms which are explained? *Righteous.* Justified. Free from condemnation.'"

5. p. 182. "*It is God that justifieth.* That is, who has pardoned them, and admitted them to his favour; and pronounced them *just* in his sight."

6. p. 217. "The moment a sinner believes, therefore, he is justified; his sins are pardoned; and he is introduced into the favour of God."

Pardon is a release from obligation to suffer punishment. No man can be pardoned until after he is guilty. He must be in a state of condemnation to whom pardon is extended. And in this state all human beings are by nature "bound over to the wrath of God." Pardon is the release of this obligation. A pardoned man cannot be again brought under obligation to wrath for the same offence. That is mere *respite;* but pardon is an act of the sovereignty, wherein a pledge of law and truth is given, that the offender shall never be punished for that sin.

Now that Mr. Barnes makes the whole of justification consist in pardon, forgiveness, remission of sins, is just as true as the assertion I made in the ninth charge. For if he rejects, as I suppose is proved, the active obedience of Christ, of course there is nothing left but pardon. But let us attend to the other proofs in order.

1. He makes acquitting them from punishment, and admitting them to favour," equivalent to justification. He makes the word to justify to mean "to *treat as if innocent*, to *regard as innocent*, to pardon, to forgive." This is the charge in terms.

2. Here he denies *that the righteousness becomes ours*, but that it is God's plan for pardoning sin. This is again plain and positive.

3. *Being now justified.* "Pardoned; accepted as his friends." In express terms, pardon and justification are made to be synonymous.

4. Again, "pardon or justification" are synonymes. "*Righteous.* Justified. Free from condemnation." Equally explicit.

5. *It is God that justifieth.* That is, "who has pardoned them." There is here a fugitive expression, which seems to admit something more than pardon—"pronounced them *just* in his sight." If this were not irreconcileable with the previous representations, it might be admitted as evidence that the active obedience is included in his idea of justification. But among contradictory witnesses, equally respectable, we must be determined by the majority.

6. Here again justification and pardon are terms of equal import.

The testimonies quoted and cited under the preceding charge are the same on which I rely here to evince the difference in our standards between justification and pardon. Nor is it necessary to add any further remarks illustrative of their meaning. No man can read them without perceiving that pardon has reference to the penalty of law—it is its remission; and that justification regards the precept and amounts to a declaration on the part of the judge that the person is legally possessed of the righteousness of the law, and is therefore, on the score of justice and right, entitled to the rewards of holy action—of obedience.

The scriptural sense of this term cannot be determined, but by reference to Scripture: for justification is a modern Latin word, coined to express a particular thought. We must, therefore, look to the original terms of Scripture, if we will have the truth. Dr. Owen, on Justification, p. 110, observes, that "in no place or on any occasion is it [the Hebrew tsadah] used in that *congregation* wherein it denotes an *action towards another*, in any other sense, but to absolve, acquit, esteem, declare, pronounce righteous, or to *impute righteousness*, which is the *forensic sense* of the word we plead for; that is its constant use and signification, nor doth it ever signify to make inherently righteous; much less to pardon or forgive; so vain is the pretence of some, that justification consists only in the pardon of sin, which is not signified by the word in any one place of Scripture." To sustain the truth of his remark, he adduces a great many instances, and explains the only one doubtful case. He then takes up the Greek word, *dikaioo*, and says, "Neither is this word used in any good author whatever, to signify the making of a *man righteous* by any applications to produce internal righteousness in him: but either to absolve and acquit, to judge, esteem, or pronounce righteous; or on the contrary to *condemn*." He quotes Suidas, who says, "*It hath two significations, to punish and to account righteous.*"

The "DEFENCE" suggests three remarks. 1st. The writer seems here, and in many other places to confound innocence and righteousness. "God determines to treat him hereafter as a righteous man, or as if he had not sinned." Now, innocence is freedom from guilt—the state and condition of a moral being, who has not transgressed. It is rather a negative than a positive quality or condition. Adam, the moment of his creation was innocent. Righteousness implies positive quality, activity in compliance with law; and if the law prescribed a course of action and proposed a reward, the compliance must cover the whole course—the obedience must be entire and positive, in order to its being entitled to the reward. Adam had rectitude of nature, and was innocent, but he was not righteous—he had not that positive obedience to which life was promised. Justification is the judge's declaration that a man has this, and is justly entitled to the stipulated reward. This all truly-regenerated persons—real believers, have in Christ Jesus their surety and friend, and God the Father declares the fact—he justifies them. The second remark

is, that justification is an act. It is done at once, and henceforth, and for ever, the justified man remains so. The act of justification may be spoken of again and again; and the sinner will be in the great day pronounced just. But the *act* of justification is an eternal act, it is once and *for ever*. Not so pardon to men. This is repeated and repeated; not indeed in reference to the same sin. But as men in this state are perpetually failing and offending, they as perpetually are suing for and receiving forgiveness.

My third remark is, that in the very defence, he gives evidence of the truth of the charge. The very concluding sentence proves it. "In the very passages adduced by the prosecutor on this charge, I have taught that God admits the sinner to favour, and treats him as if he had not sinned, or were righteous." Here is a reiteration of the very error charged, viz. that not sinning and righteousness are the same thing. Why did he not affirm that God accounts the believer righteous, because of "the righteousness of Christ imputed to him, and received by faith alone?" Simply because it is opposed to his views: he does not believe that his righteousness becomes ours, in any sense.

And now, Mr. Moderator, we are through the protracted argument of this important case. It has been long and laborious: and for the patient attention which has characterised your proceedings, since the discussion, I heartily thank you: and from it, I augur favourably as to the results. Yet as the magnitude of its importance rises upon us, you will bear with me a little longer in a few observations, chiefly upon the *difficulties* in the way of your arriving at a decision equally accordant with truth and charity: the *results* likely to follow; and the solemn *responsibilities* that lie upon you.

The *difficulties* admit of classification. 1st. Those which exist intrinsically in the nature of the case. 2dly. Those which are extrinsic. And 3d. Such as are thrown in your way by the abilities and skilful arrangements and arguments of the appellant.

I. *Intrinsic.* There are two. 1st. The contradictions, at least apparently so, in the book itself. You are, I trust, convinced that such do exist; probably you are aware that attempts were made in the Synod of Philadelphia, to perplex the subject by them. It was alleged that if error was taught, the opposing truth was also taught. But now if this were a sufficient defence, would an errorist ever be condemned? Would not a wily disputant always take care to throw in some terms significant of the true doctrine, for the very purpose of providing a shelter? It must certainly be known to all conversant with the history of these very errors, that this has ever been the course of their advocates. They have distinguished themselves by their ability in the use of terms equivocal and therefore capable of an orthodox, as well as a heterodox meaning. In rallying a routed army, and securing their retreat, there is often more generalship displayed than in gaining a victory. The retreat of the ten thousand Greeks, entwined round the brow of Xenophon laurels more

enduring than Cæsar gathered on the plains of Pharsalia. The true explanation of these inconsistencies has been already pointed out, viz. that a man trained in the ecclesiastical literature of the Presbyterian church cannot write at all without using some orthodox terms: a new nomenclature must be introduced for the new doctrine, before the appearance of orthodoxy can entirely forsake the writings of its advocates.

The second intrinsic difficulty is in the subject under discussion. Some of their points run near the regions of metaphysics; and men versed in ecclesiastical controversies know, that errorists love to lurk in the mists that hang on the mountain's brow, whence they may descend, Centaur like, make incursions and inroads upon the peaceful inhabitants of the plain, and vanish away into their metaphysical nebulæ. The possibility of being involved in such difficulties, has already been alleged as a reason why our plain, common sense eldership shall not judge in such cases. But this court will, I hope, bear in mind, that the essence of the whole controversy lies in a few leading and plain truths, with which the minds of all Presbyterians are in a good degree familiar. Let us only be guarded against the possibility of being led into the fogs, and we have nothing to fear.

II. The *extrinsic* difficulties are much more embarrassing, because they lie in *the spirit of the age.* (1.) It is a spirit of *free inquiry;* and this very characteristic, which constitutes the glory of the age, is also in imminent danger of becoming its disgrace and ruin. We think, or seem to think, we cannot give evidence of independent thought, unless we treat with scorn the thoughts and opinions of our fathers. All past ages were bound in mental manacles; the present is the only age which has burst away from the forms and symbols of cloistered and hooded orthodoxy, and taken a bold and decided stand on the side of mental independence. What! bind our souls in chains forged in the dark ages at Westminster! Cramp down the elastic spirit of the nineteenth century within the framework of the Cromwellian age!! Yes, Mr. Moderator, this spirit of self-sufficiency, under the specious garb of freedom of opinion, is becoming alarmingly violent; it is assuming a tittle of the features it displayed thirty years ago in France. The most fell of all persecuting spirits is the bigotry of liberalism. And you will find no small difficulty in resisting the violence of popular clamours, if you pursue an even forward course. The whole mass of irreligion is violent against ecclesiastical discipline. The whole meretricious free-thinkers of the day are on the side of error; and so it always has been. But, (2) you see this in the tendency to the anarchy of popular government by mobs. Over our entire country there prevails a powerful epidemic, attended often with a spasmodic excitability—a kind of moral cholera, that seems to disregard the persons of men, and seize the temperate as well as the intemperate. The state and the church are agitated by it. What is a mob, but an appeal to the fountains of power in the people, *immediately,* and irrespec-

tively of the legitimate organs of action? And do we not see the same things attempted in our church? and in reference to this very case too? What is the publication of a *Defence* before a word of argument is published on the other side, but an appeal to the *people*—to *popular feeling?* What mean these public congregational meetings, to condemn the legitimate actions of the legitimate organs of your church? Is not this the mob spirit? Now, Mr. Moderator, you must dare this menace, if you mean to be faithful to Zion and her King. (3) But there is a third difficulty before you. Money is powerfully corrupting in its influence; and the present aspect of our church and of the world presents strong temptations to monied men to use the power they have by it, in governing the church. Her charitable institutions, her glory and defence, yet open this door to temptation. If you are stern to the cause of truth, and thereby offend rich and liberal free-thinking Christians, or reputable men of the world, will not your Boards of Education and Missions suffer? Will not such as are opposed to strict orthodoxy, and to the trammels of creeds and confessions, and to what they are pleased to call ecclesiastical tyranny, set their faces against you, and combine together and put down your Boards and Theological Schools by starvation, or by erecting voluntary associations in the form of Education Societies, Missionary Societies, and even Theological Seminaries? And may you not see the entire business of training and sending forth your ministry, taken out of your hands, by the mere force of money? This difficulty also will call upon you to brace up your moral nerves for the solemn vote you are soon about to give.

III. Among the difficulties thrown around you by the skill of the *appellant*, may be named, (1.) The allegation that the charges are in some instances inferential, and that no man is responsible for the inferences drawn by others from his doctrine. Under the eighth charge, brother Barnes uses this argument, and sustains himself by authority of the Assembly's minutes, vol. V. page 220. And I should not say a word on the doctrine he sets forth here in the name of the Assembly, (because I rest nothing upon mere inference, in the charges or proof,) had he not made a good deal of it. He thinks that if charges may be brought by inference, no man is safe; character is dependent upon false logic; and he calls upon the courts to crush such tyranny. But now, to be calm; every man is accountable for all legitimate inferences that may be drawn from his language. If, indeed, when he sees the inference to be fairly drawn, and denies and rejects the principles and its results, he is of course not chargeable. But, if he hold to the principle or language, from which mischievous consequences follow, he must bear those consequences. If a man utter words that give ground to unavoidable inferences, injurious to the character of his neighbour, he may be prosecuted for slander; and if so, it is for the jury, not for him to say, whether the inferences are unavoidable, and the injury must follow. They will never allow him to interpret his own language. If it is capable of an inter-

pretation, according to the ordinary meaning and use of terms, which is not injurious, they are bound to put on it the most favourable construction. "Charity thinketh no evil." But if, on the contrary, all the circumstances being considered, they think the words will bear no other construction; or that the inferences, injurious to his neighbour, will inevitably be drawn by every person hearing or reading the language, they will find for the plaintiff. So, if an author's words are capable of an orthodox meaning, we are bound in charity to put upon them that meaning; but if we *cannot* do it, we cannot be bound; the only plain sense of the terms must govern us. This is the sense of the Assembly. They never intended that a man's simple *assertion*, that when he affirmed there are not three persons in the Godhead, he only meant there were not three Gods, shall be received as an evidence that he did not teach Socinian doctrine. Adopt such a rule. Let every man have the right of explaining his own terms, and who will ever be convicted of any error that will bring down censure upon him? Would Arius or Pelagius ever thus have been condemned? Did not they claim the right of explaining? And were they allowed it? The principle which Mr. Barnes contends for, would indeed put an end to all prosecutions for error; but it would put out for ever the light of the church's testimony against false doctrine.

2. It doubtless will be expected that I should take some notice farther of the charges made by the author, in the language of his Notes. And certainly, if a man take away the offence, we ought to be satisfied. But you will bear in mind, that whilst he has made some real improvements in phraseology, he has also said that he has not changed one sentiment. He has simply varnished the pill that, in the taking, its bitterness may not be so offensive. You will therefore, certainly, not be influenced in your decision by this consideration. And more especially, because, even if real changes were made, so as to remove every erroneous sentiment from the book, still no present statements of his can justly constitute any basis for your decision on a question of *appeal*. *Here* nothing but the doctrines of the book, *as it was originally taken up*, can come into view. On *this basis alone* the judgment of this Assembly must be formed. If you shall find the errors taught indeed, which are laid in charge, you will say so, by sustaining the decision of the Synod. *Then, after that*, you may hear confessions and weigh the value of amendments. If Mr. Barnes will *then* come forward and confess the truth, and renounce the errors which you will have condemned, my soul will be glad, and my heart will rejoice. But the question of *right*—when you respond to the interrogations, do the proofs adduced by the prosecutor establish his positions—on the question of right and justice, concessions have no plea; forgiveness must *follow* amendment, and be *subsequent to condemnation*. So soon as *justice* has finished *her* work, *then*, and not *before*, let her retire from the throne, and *then*, and *not till then*, let mercy occupy it. And if there shall be any business for her to do, in the name of the great King let

her do it. But let her not attempt to *usurp* the place of justice, *before* she has finished her work, lest in her bowels of compassion for *one*, she inflict wounds deep and deadly upon the whole church.

3. A third serious obstacle in the way of a correct decision is, the allegation of the appellant, that these sentiments were always held and tolerated in the Presbyterian Church. Now, however plausible his defence here, and it is so in a high degree, yet you will observe it contains a severe thrust at the character of the Presbyterian Church. It insinuates that she glories in an orthodox creed, but like another body that might be named, winks at a heterodox clergy; that she is friendly to the broad and liberal Christianity, which lets go all the truth in detail, whilst she glories over it in the aggregate. Now, if this insinuation be correct; if such latitude of opinion (under the plausible pretext of free inquiry,) be allowed, and has been always allowed, that a man may reject the covenants and deny imputation; that he may hold all the errors proved here, and yet be a good Presbyterian—if such is the deceptive system we are under, then the sooner we shall be torn into shreds the better. Let no union of knaves in the bond of such hypocrisy, be called a Presbyterian church. Such never can be a bulwark of truth. But I insist on it that this is a slander. The Presbyterian church has always believed her own doctrines. She has honestly professed them, and zealously maintained them, and is not now prepared to abandon them, and put her light under a bushel.

4. But fourthly, brother Barnes seems to think that between us there is no substantial difference—the substantial facts of the case he holds, just as I do. It is only a dispute about words; at most a difficulty in philosophy: And this he has repeated so often, and reiterated with such frequency as satisfies me he really has worked himself into the occasional belief of it. That he wishes you to believe it, I have no doubt. He feels his cause resting for success in this precise attempt. If he can induce this venerable body to think, that these charges relate to minor and comparatively trifling matters, his point is gained. Gallio will dismiss the parties, that he may attend to the weightier concerns of his government: such as to determine the exact amount of relative criminailty between A and B, in an assault; or whether C or D displayed the least or most villany in a trade about lands or houses.

You must, I am persuaded, have observed that this is Mr. Barnes' main object in his entire defence. We agree, says he, in the substantial facts of the case—there is no difference but in terms and modes of explanation. But now, Mr. Moderator, if this be so; if brother Barnes and those who think with him do substantially agree with the other side; and if we hold the phraseology and the modes of explanation, which are set forth in the standards, why will our brethren introduce new terms and modes of explanation, to the utter destruetion of peace and harmony? If we are the weak brethren, who are made to stumble at terms, and are grieved, and injured, and wounded by new phraseology,

which means substantially the same, where is charity? Will she *insist* on the new nomenclature, or the new philosophical explanations, when she sees such distractions and heart-burnings are the necessary consequence? Suppose for a moment, there *is* no substantial difference: then where are our brethren, who have created this logomachy—this war of words? (For I take it, that no man is so mad and bewildered with new light, as to deny that the innovations are from that side of the house.) Are not they who deny any substantial difference, and yet persevere in adherence to the new terms, guilty of sin in violating the law of love, by wounding the conscience of their weaker brethren? How can they persist in this course which so distracts the peace of Zion? If they honestly think it is a mere war of words, let our *assailants*—the man who *begun* this war, the man who *introduced* the new and objectionable phrascology—let them take it away. They can do it, according to their own declarations, without any sacrifice of principle. They mean the same thing that we do. Then let them speak the same words. If *sibboleth* means the same that *shibboleth* does, why will our brethren rend the church by pronouncing the aspirate! Is the hissing sound to them a matter of such deep importance, that it must be uttered even at such fearful expense? Ah, Mr. Moderator, if the children of Judah speak half in the language of Ashdod, it is because they have formed unholy alliances with those who are not friendly to the peace of Jerusalem. There is a substantial difference in the sentiment, or our brethren would not be so unreasonable and so *uncharitable* as to turn the otherwise peaceful domain of our Zion into an arena of perpetual strife. Oh, no, they *feel* that their *innovations* are worth contending for, for they as honest-hearted men, would not contend for them, at *such* fearful cost. Had not brother Barnes been allied in sentiment with the New England Ashdod, he would not speak their language. Had he not found out their riddle, he would not plough with their heifer. Yes, sir, the difference is substantial, it is vital, it is fundamental. Every one of these charges has been proved true. The principal ones, Mr. Barnes expressly admits to be true. He does teach, that mankind are not sinners prior to voluntary action—they are indeed so placed that they will sin so soon as they act voluntarily,—but they are not chargeable with sin until they do so act—2. That Adam was ignorant of law and moral relations. 3. That men do not lie, *by nature*, under an insuperable inability to do the will of God, but only they are unwilling, and they *can* turn as soon as they please. 4. That faith, saving faith, is an act of the mind only, and not a holy habit or abiding principle of action, and the act of Abraham's mind itself, not the Messiah's righteousness, but the act of mind was reckoned to him for righteousness. 5. Having represented Adam so ignorant, he denies, of course, that God had made a covenant with him. The whole doctrine of the covenant of works he *admits* that he does not believe. Adam was not the covenant head and repre-

sentative of his people. They did not "sin in him and fall with him." No other relation existed between him and them, than between a drunkard and his children. Consequently, 6. He denies imputation; the transfer of legal relations cannot take place in any case, but by the voluntary action of man. Consequently, 7. No guilt attaches; there is no liability to punishment on account of Adam's sin, until after men *voluntarily* transgress; their own act constitutes the only legal connexion with Adam. Then, and not before, they are guilty. Consequently, as the Bible runs a parallel between the first Adam and the second *Adam*, 8. Mr. Barnes denies that Jesus suffered the punishment of his people's sin. He admits (so do Socinus and Crellius,) who could deny it? he admits, indeed, that Christ suffered; that he died for men, and that they are delivered by his satisfaction; but then he peremptorily denies that his sufferings were *penal*—he did not endure the proper *penalty* of the law—he was not *punished* for our sins. Consequently, denying the representative character of Adam and Christ, 9, He must deny, and he does deny, the imputation of Christ's righteousness to his people, just as he denied the imputation of Adam's sin. They are treated as if righteous; but they are not so. His righteousness is not theirs in law; it never can become so; no such transfer can take place. And tenth and lastly, he teaches that justification is simply pardon—pardon bought indeed; but bought without paying the only adequate price, viz. the penalty due to his people's sins, and so not bought at all. Such is the system of doctrine taught in these Notes. Now, Mr. Moderator, I do honestly, and in the fear of God, and in love to brother Barnes, declare my belief, that this leads by a straight forward, direct, and short road to downright, desolating, damning Socinianism. If this system is true, then I'll be a Unitarian. I'll embrace the deistical system of the perfectability of human nature, as the easiest mode of escape from all these perplexing theological controversies. This system presents such of its advocates as are gracious men, to my mind like a boat and crew suspended by a cable, a mile and three-eighths in length, from the lower extremity of Grand Island. There they hang on the bellying surface of the mighty river, just over Niagara's roaring cataract and the yawning gulph below—there they hang and row with all their might *down* stream, and are only prevented from the fearful ruin by the strength of the cable. This cable, Mr. Moderator, is the grace of God, but for which this mistaken crew would speedily make the fearful plunge into the horrible gulf of Socinianism. Now cut this cable, and where's the crew? Put into this boat men who are not anchored to the throne of God by the very cords of truth which this system denies, and the moment you let them go, where are they? Oh, let us do our duty in endeavours to dissuade our brethren from such mad experiments. If this system pervade our church, where will our children be? True, if they are bound by the

cords of a Saviour's love, they will be saved in despite of their efforts to row themselves over the cataract: But then, why teach them so to labour? Will such a system of error be a likely means of fastening them with such cords? Hence I set out, and therefore do I invoke this Assembly to interpose the salutary discipline of God's house, for the arrest of this system. Let it here meet such a sentence as will deter all to whom your influence extends from such terrible experiments. I repeat it, I have no unkind feeling to gratify. I do most cordially reciprocate all the benevolent expressions brother Barnes has uttered in the close of his defence. He has greatly won upon the best feelings of my soul, in the progress of this trial. And the moment he shall cease to dig under the foundations of our Zion, and labour to shake the pillars that support the lofty dome, that moment my arms are open to his embrace, and my hand and heart are his, in any warfare he may plan against the enemies of her King.

Now in this thing, Mr. Moderator, my hopes are realised. The Son of God has thrown a solemnity around this discussion of no ordinary character. He has therein taught us that when the church, in her legitimate courts, comes up to the line of duty, and dares to discuss and decide in favour of the truth, she may expect the God of truth to direct her councils. In the Presbytery and in the Synod, (except when efforts were great and violent, and persevering, to prevent the doctrinal discussion) there was perfect harmony and peace. The past history, therefore, of this case calls upon you, in the language of encouragement to meet fairly and decide according to truth on the fate of this system. What may be the

II. Results is the next general classification of my concluding remarks. 1. Upon the original parties in the case. And this particular I mention chiefly, to entreat you to leave it out of view entirely in the formation of your opinions on the merits of questions respectively. What is the present prosecutor?—or what is the present appellant? Is it not the truth of God, after which you are to seek, and in favour of which, you are to decide? And shall fear, favour, or affection, for either party, have any thing to do with the formation of your judgment? "God forbid: Yea, let God be true, but every man a liar." "What is the chaff to the wheat, saith the Lord?" (2) Upon yourselves. This too I mention for the same reason. The members of this house have no right to ask how their votes may possibly affect their individual interests, in reference to character, to worldly *business*, to social relations, to personal friendships. Nothing of all this, I am persuaded can influence an honest Presbyterian in such an important case: only so far as *he* may be involved in the general interests of Zion should any man allow his interests to influence his course of action now. If this Assembly decide as the court appealed from decided, they know what they have to expect; and nothing but a high

sense of duty can sustain under it. (3) To the church, the results must be important: and no man can foresee them. She is only in a small degree under your care. Her King is in the midst of her, and she is safe. Yet, *if* this Assembly *shall* DECIDE *nothing*—absolutely *nothing*: then a perpetuity of distraction and controversy must follow—turmoil and strife; and floods of error will succeed to floods of error; discipline is broken down and rule is gone: the world will sneer at our want of nerve, and all sorts and descriptions of errorists will shout peans of victory. For you will observe, that *indecision is victory* to them. Error is arraigned at your bar; if it be not *condemned*, it will of right claim the verdict, and the whole world will grant the award. But if, on the contrary, this Assembly shall DECIDE these great questions: if they shall sustain the decision of the Synod; then the distractions and controversies which have sprung up with these innovations will cease in a great degree; the Spirit of God having thus lifted up the standard of your constitution against them, the floods of error will fall back broken, though foaming, from the rock, and die away in the murmurs of a peaceful sea: discipline will be restored, and subscriptions to your standards will not be accounted an idle form: the world will stand afar off, awe-struck at the majesty of truth, and confess that God is in Zion. If this Assembly shall not *decide*, if some *middle course* be taken—some *compromise*—some *bartering* for pride and consistency of character: and these distractions in consequence, continue, then it appears plain to me, that many of the best sons of the church, wearied with war, will go off in detail, and find in other denominations, less agreeable to their judgment in general, that peace which INDECISION of counsel in their own, refuses to give. On the contrary, if you will *decide* in favour of Truth, and your own standards, a few and but a few will go "out from us, because they are not of us." Their own strong predilections for another system of ecclesiastical government, and another system of doctrine will lead them to a more upright course: they will formally become, what in reality they are: and we shall have peace within our borders.

From this would result union in counsel and energy in action. The Presbyterian church would then arise in her strength, and "come up to the help of the Lord, to the help of the Lord against the mighty." She would indeed "look forth as the morning; fair as the moon, clear as the sun, and terrible as an army with banners." (4) To the welfare of our common country; to the cause of general benevolence; and to the world's salvation, the results must be most felicitous. The God of providence and grace has prepared this church and this country for some great and glorious ends: and in the signs of the times, we read the approach of great events. In their production our church, I honestly believe, must stand proudly—no, *humbly* pre-eminent. She has powers for great good, and she is pre-

paring for it. Let me entreat you, to use the language of the Pittsburgh Memorial—let me entreat you to turn your eye upon the aspect of the world. Lo! what an inviting field for benevolent enterprise. And is there a body of believers in the whole church militant, invested with so many of the qualifications to enter it, and gather the rich harvest of glory to our divine Redeemer, as the Presbyterian church? The position of our country points us out—the position of our church points us out—the position of the world points us out—the voice of unborn and unsanctified millions calls us to the conflict. The Lord of Hosts himself has gone down into the plains before us, and chides our long delay. Now we ask, brethren, what causes this delay? Why, when "the armies of the living God begin to consolidate," and himself gives the watchward, "*Truth* and *Victory*"—oh, why this delay? Ah! there is division in the camp! "There be some that trouble us." *Innovation* distracts our counsels, alienates our affections, turns the sword of brother in upon brother, and the Master's work remains undone. Do you ask, "how shall the evil be remedied?" we reply, "Let this Assembly come up to the work of reform. Let them establish the ancient landmarks of truth. Let them unfurl the banner of the constitution." Yes, Mr. Moderator, let your standards mark the centre of your camp—its affections and its energies, let them all rally round that banner, and you are an invincible host. What a legion of trained bands you could soon pour forth upon the territories of darkness and death, *if it* were not for your internal distractions? For the peace of our Zion, then, and the world's welfare, I entreat you to condemn this system of distracting doctrines, and thus to restore peace and union to a torn, and lacerated, and bleeding church. Thus shall the energies expended in domestic commotions, be directed upon the foes of Zion, and the increment of our power be inversely as the diminution of our numbers.

III. Solemn indeed are the *responsibilities* that now rest upon this Assembly. This is to you an hour of no ordinary interest Never, perhaps, has a body of ministers and elders met on thi. continent, to whose acts and doings, so much importance has been attached, and to whom so large a number of the friends and the enemies of truth and order, are looking up with intense anxiety. Never, perhaps has so much ardent supplication ascended to the throne of divine mercy on behalf of any General Assembly. Let a knowledge of this fact encourage you to faithfulness in the solemn duties of your station. And let us all bear in mind that there is "a great white throne," before which we must each one, for his own personal and official conduct, give an account to Him, whose eyes are as a flaming fire, and who will rectify all our mistakes, and pronounce a judgment according to truth, that shall stand for ever. To you, is now committed the final issue of this case on earth, and to Him in heaven.

THE END.

APPENDIX.

NEW-SCHOOLISM IN THE SEVENTEENTH, COMPARED WITH NEW-SCHOOLISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

The following harmony of affiliated errors, is drawn up chiefly from Dr. Thomas Scott's translation of the official history of the Synod of Dort, held in 1618—19; in which the Remonstrants or followers of James Arminius were condemned. It is here appended, in the hope that it may assist in convincing the reader, that there is nothing new under the sun—that new light is old darkness—and that war and error, and truth and peace, are nearly allied.

I. *State of the Belgic churches, prior to the introduction of the new theology.*

"In the Reformed churches of federated Belgium, how great an agreement had, in the preceding age, flourished, on all the heads of orthodox doctrine, among the pastors and doctors of the Belgic churches; and moreover, how great order and decorum * * * had always been preserved in the government of the same, is too well known to the Christian world, for it to be needful to set it forth in many words. This peace and harmony of the Belgic churches, lovely (in itself) and most pleasing to God and all pious men, certain persons had attempted to disturb, with unbridled violence, but not with great success; (persons) who having de-

State of the American Presbyterian churches, prior to the introduction of the new theology.

In the Presbyterian churches in this Federated Union, there prevailed a goodly measure of harmony, prior to the introduction of the improved theology. For a time, in our western borders indeed, some disturbances occurred from the rash and hasty admission of men into her ministry, during that first scarcity of ministers. Efforts were made, and with partial success, to thrust in illiterate men, and men ill grounded in the great doctrines of the Confession. But these were suppressed by the timely interposition of the proper church courts. A few heterodox men were cut off, and a considerable number of minis-

serted popery, but being not yet fully purified from its leaven, had passed over into our churches, and had been admitted into the ministry in the same, during that first scarcity of ministers." p. 8.

These disturbances having been suppressed, "afterward James Arminius, pastor of the most celebrated church at Amsterdam, attempted the same thing, with great boldness and enterprise." p. 8.

ters who had been thus hastily admitted, were excluded, and formed a new body. But the general condition of the church was that of peace and union in the truth. Early in the nineteenth century, matters took a turn tending towards disorder; but the leaven was kept under, and outward peace and good order prevailed.

II. *Disturbances—their causes—novel doctrines.*

"James Arminius, a man, indeed, of a more vigorous genius, (*excitatioris*) but whom nothing pleased except that which commended itself by some show of novelty, so that he seemed to disdain those things received into the Reformed churches, even on that very account, that they had been *received.* * * * Afterwards he began openly to propose and disseminate various heterodox opinions nearly related to the errors of the ancient Pelagians, especially in an explanation of the Epistle to the Romans: but by the vigilance of the venerable Presbytery of that church, his attempts were speedily opposed, lest he should be able to cause those disturbances in the church, which he seemed to project." p. 9.

"Some pastors who were intimately acquainted with him, gloried that they possessed an entirely new theology. His scholars, having returned home from the university, or having been removed to other universities, petulantly (proterve) insulted the Reformed churches,

That the peace of the Presbyterian church is now disturbed, will not be disputed. Our ecclesiastical atmosphere is greatly agitated. It may be a profitable question, From what causes? May we not safely infer the cause from its effects? If a controversy now exists, and throws the whole community into commotion, and, upon close examination, we find the *subject matter* of the controversy identical with principles which are known to have produced controversy of a similar character in a distant age, can any reasonable man hesitate to believe in the existence of the same causes? Assuredly, *novelties* in doctrine and measures are the present causes of present controversies. "Innovation distracts our councils." If Mr. Barnes was content to receive the doctrines of our Confession of Faith in their plain, and obvious, and commonly understood sense, the cause of controversy, so far as he is involved would not exist. If he was content to labour within the

by disputing, contradicting and reviling their doctrine." p. 11.

On p. 20, Dr. Scott has this note. "Nothing can be more evident than this fact, that the followers of Arminius aimed to subvert, or exceedingly to modify, the doctrine of the authorised writings of the Belgic churches; and that the others wanted no alteration to be made in that doctrine."

"Finally, very many new things in the government of the churches occur every where in this formular (*formula.*) So that from the same, it might appear, that nothing other was proposed by those men, than that they might make all things new, not only in doctrine, but in the external government of the church by rites." p. 50.

* * * They presented a second remonstrance to the Illustrious the States, in which, with incredible impudence, they endeavour to remove from themselves the crime of innovation, and to fasten the same on those pastors, who most constantly remained in the received doctrines of the churches." p. 63.

"But moreover, because some persons having gone out from among us, * * * * * they have grievously, and altogether dangerously, disturbed the Belgic churches, before most flourishing, and most united in faith and love, and in these heads of doctrine, have recalled ancient and pernicious errors, and framed new ones: and publicly and privately, both by word and by writings, have scattered them among the common people, and have vehemently contended for them: have made "frame-work" of the Constitution he would find a harmonious co-operation of all true Presbyterians.

The reader will perceive that novelty and haughty resistance to received opinions, by the introduction of ancient Pelagianism led to distraction. Nothing can be more evident than this fact, that the brethren of the new school do aim to subvert, or exceedingly to modify the doctrine of the authorised writings of the Presbyterian church, and that the others want no alteration to be made in that doctrine.

Another point of resemblance is violent attempts now made to misrepresent the orthodox views, *e. g.* it is strenuously insisted on, that we teach the absurd doctrine of personal identity with Adam. This absurdity has been fathered on Edwards, with the obvious design, thereby to neutralize his influence in other points. The same is averred in reference to living orthodoxy. We all deny it; but still the opposition say, we do believe it. We challenge the proof, and there is none. Still the calumny is reiterated.

The reader will also remark that, as the Remonstrants finally discovered, that the orthodox were the innovators: so now it is ascertained that the Confession of Faith is semi-Pelagian. (see Beecher's trial.)

Still another point. The new doctrines find their way to light in a commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. (See Stuart's Commentary and Barnes' Notes.)

Let us now attend to the par-

neither measure nor end of inveighing against the doctrine hitherto received in the churches, by enormous calumnies and reproaches." p. 127.

ticulars of doctrinal innovation. We shall not find, indeed, a perfect agreement in the detail; but it will appear that in the main points, the ancient and the modern new schools are identical.

Doctrines of the Synod of Dort.
Original sin.

"As all men have sinned in Adam, and have become exposed to the curse and eternal death, God would have done no injustice to any one, if he had determined to leave the whole human race under sin and the curse, and to condemn them on account of sin."—p. 87. No Presbyterian can be at any loss to see here the precise doctrine of his own church.

Errorists condemned by them.

The Synod condemned all who teach that 'All men are taken into a state of reconciliation and the grace of the covenant; so that no one, on account of original sin, is liable to damnation or to be damned; but that all are exempt from the condemnation of sin.'—p. 103.

Who teach that 'It cannot properly be said, that original sin suffices of itself for the condemnation of the whole human race, or the desert of temporal and eternal punishments.'—p. 111. To see how much like this is the modern doctrine, see p. 104, of the argument.

2. *The will.—The ability doctrine.*

"Therefore, all men are conceived in sin, and born children of wrath, indisposed (*inepti*,) to all saving good, propense to evil, dead in sin, and the slaves of sin; and without the grace of the regenerating Holy Spirit, they neither are willing nor able to turn to God, to correct their depraved nature, or to dispose themselves to the correction of it."—p. 105.

"In which manner, (or for which reason,) unless the admirable Author of all good should work in us, there could be no hope to man of rising from the all, by that *free will*, by which,

Condemned are they "who usurp the distinctions of impetration and application, that they may instil this opinion into the unwary and inexperienced; that God, as far as pertained to him, had willed to confer equally upon all men, the benefits which are acquired by the death of Christ: and that some rather than others (præ aliis,) should be partakers of the remission of sins and eternal life, this discrimination depended on their free will, applying to themselves the grace indifferently offered."—p. 103.

"Who teach that 'Man unre-

when standing, he fell to ruin." p. 110.

"And that others, who are called by the ministry of the gospel, do come and are converted, this is not to be ascribed to man, as if distinguishing himself by free will (libero arbitrio) from others, furnished with equal or sufficient grace, (which the proud heresy of Pelagius states,) but to God, who, as he chose his own people in Christ from eternity, so he also effectually calls them in time; gives them repentance and faith."—p. 107.

The reader will here perceive the doctrine of our church as it has been held from the first, and is taught in our Confession. Man has neither the *ability* nor the *will* to convert himself.

generate is neither properly nor totally dead in sins, or destitute of all power for what is spiritually good; but that he can hunger and thirst after righteousness of life, and offer the sacrifice of a broken and contrite spirit, which is accepted by God.' "—p. 112.

"Who teach that 'Grace and free will are partial causes concurring at the same time to the beginning of conversion; nor doth grace, in the order of causalty, precede the efficacy of the will; that is, God doth not effectually help the will of man to conversion, before the will of man moves and determines itself.' "—p. 115.

The reader must see here the old doctrines of Pelagius, revived by the Arminians, and *now* strenuously thrust upon us as new theology. Man has the *ability;* the *will* only is wanting.

3. *Faith a grace.*

"That some, *in time*, have faith given to them by God, and others have it not given, proceeds from his *eternal* decree. For, 'known unto God are all his works, from the beginning of the world.' Acts xv. 18. Eph. i. 11. According to which decree, he graciously softens the hearts of the elect, however hard, and he bends them to believe; but the non-elect he bends, in just judgment, to their own perversity and hardness.' " p. 88.

"Thus, therefore, faith is the gift of God; not in that it is offered to the will of man by God, but that the thing itself is conferred on him, inspired,

Faith an act of the mind.

"For the proof of this thing, he [Gomarus,] produced his own very words, written out from the hand writing of the same Arminius, in which he asserts that in the justification of man before God, the righteousness of Christ is not imputed for righteousness; but that faith itself, or the act of believing (το credere,) by the gracious acceptation, (acceptationem, acquittal,) was that our righteousness, by which we are justified before God." p. 23.

In view of this doctrine the Synod condemn those "Who teach that, 'in the true conversion of man, there cannot be new qualities, habits, or gifts,

infused into him. Not even that God only confers the power of believing, but from thence expects the consent, or the act of believing; but that he who worketh both to will and to do, worketh in man both to will to believe, and to believe itself, (et velle credere et ipsum credere,) and thus he worketh all things in all."—p. 109.

"In order to give them alone justifying faith, and thereby to lead them to eternal life—that he should confer on them the gift of faith."—p. 100.

infused by God into his will; and so faith, by which we are first converted, and from which we are called the faithful, is not a quality or gift infused by God; but only an act of man.' "—p. 113.

For proof that this error is part of our new theology, the reader may consult the preceding Argument, p. 54, &c. where he will see evidence of remarkable coincidence. Mr. Barnes does indeed deny that faith is a work, whilst he affirms it to be "his own act.' Dr. Wilson, however, proves it upon him beyond cavil. See p. 59.

4. *Faith not a condition of election.*

"This same election is not made from any foreseen faith, obedience of faith, holiness, or any other good quality and disposition, as a *prerequisite cause*, or condition in the man who should be elected; but *unto* faith and *unto* the obedience of faith, holiness," &c.—p. 89.

The doctrine condemned in the opposite column is sometimes avowed publicly in this nineteenth century.

Faith a condition of election.

The Synod condemn those "Who teach that 'election of individuals to salvation, incomplete and not peremptory, is made from foreseen faith, repentance, and sanctity and piety begun; and, therefore, faith, the obedience of holiness, piety, and perseverance, are not the fruits and effects of immutable election to glory, but the conditions and causes required beforehand.' "—pp. 95, 96.

Doctrine of perfect satisfaction maintained.

——"Which punishment we cannot escape, unless the justice of God be satisfied."

"2. But as we cannot satisfy it, and deliver ourselves from the wrath of God, God of infinite mercy gave to us his only begotten Son as a Surety, who, that he might make satisfaction for us, was made sin and a curse

Doctrine of perfect satisfaction denied.

The Synod condemn those "who teach" that God the Father destined his own Son unto the death of the cross, without a certain and a definite counsel of saving any one by name (*nominatione*,) so that its own necessity, utility, and meritoriousness, (*dignitas*) might be established unimpaired (*sarta tecta*) to the

on the cross for us, or in our stead."

"3. This death of the Son of God is a single and most perfect sacrifice for sins; of infinite value and price, abundantly sufficient to expiate the sins of the whole world."

"4. —— Finally, because his death was conjoined with the feeling of the wrath and curse of God, which we by our sins had deserved." P. 99.

Reader, are not the above the very doctrines of the Presbyterian Confession on the points handled? Here mark,

1. We deserved *punishment.*

2. Christ suffered *punishment.*

3. Justice required *perfect satisfaction.*

4. Christ, by suffering, *perfectly satisfied* justice.

PUNISHMENT, therefore, to the *whole extent* of the law's demand against his people, Christ did endure. The doctrine of *full satisfaction* is here clearly taught. That this is explicitly denied by Mr. Barnes, (and others,) see "Argument," p.112.

In the opposite column, have you not the present *new doctrine* of an indefinite atonement—an atonement that secures the salvation of no one? An atonement that "atones God!"

Will the reader also give attention due to Dr. Scott's note? How admirably it suits "our age and land!"

How great the astonishment and strong the disgust of some at these statements, the public press and the ecclesiastical assemblies of our church may testify.

benefit obtained (*impetrationi*) by the death of Christ, and be perfect in its measures, (*numeris*) and complete and entire, even if the obtained redemption had not, in fact, been applied to any individual." P. 101.

"3. Who teach that 'Christ, by his satisfaction did not with certainty (*certo*) merit that very salvation and faith, by which this satisfaction of Christ may be effectually applied unto salvation; but only that he acquired of the Father, power, and a plenary will, of acting anew with men, and of prescribing whatever new conditions he willed, the performance of which might depend on the free will of man; and therefore it might so happen either that none or that all might fulfil them." Now these think far too meanly of the death of Christ; they in no wise acknowledge the principal fruit or benefit, obtained by it, and recall from hell the Pelagian heresy." P. 102.

On this Dr. Scott has the following note, viz.

"That so large a body of learned theologians, collected from various churches, should unanimously, and without hesitation, and in so strong language, declare the error here rejected to be the revival of the Pelagian heresy, may indeed astonish and disgust numbers in our age and land, who oppose something, at least, exceedingly like this, against the doctrines called evangelical; but it should lead them to reflect on the subject, and to pray over it. Are they not, in opposing Calvinism, reviving and propagating the heresy of Pelagius?"

IV. *The* Policy, *including in some measure the* Morality *of the New Theology.*

In the Seventeenth Century.

1. *Concealment of views and glosses upon them.*

Arminius was educated at Geneva; but, renouncing the doctrines of the school in which he had been educated, he at first "paved the way for himself to this thing [his novelties] by publicly and privately extenuating and vehemently attacking, the reputation and authority of the most illustrious doctors of the reformation, Calvin, Zanchius, Beza"—p. 9. And Mosheim says, "Arminius taught his sentiments publicly." But afterwards when about to be introduced into the professorship of Theology at Leyden, and "the Presbytery of Amsterdam refused to consent to his dismission," he endeavoured to cloak and cover over his real sentiments. His dismission was finally obtained, "yet upon this condition, that a conference being first held with Dr. Francis Gomarus, concerning the principal heads of doctrine, he should remove from himself all suspicion of heterodoxy by an explicit declaration of his opinion."

In this conference "he unreservedly condemned the principal dogmas of the Pelagians concerning natural grace; the powers of free-will, original sin, the perfection of man in this life, predestination, and the others"—"at the same time he promised, that he would teach nothing which differed from the received doctrines of the churches." 10.

In the Nineteenth Century.

1. *Concealment of views, and glosses upon them.*

Mr. Barnes was educated at our Geneva. How far he has adhered to the doctrines of Princeton the reader must judge for himself. It is remarkable also that his opinions, most at variance with the standards and the seminary, appeared in their most obnoxious form "in an explanation of the epistle to the Romans." Some others have, in like manner, turned their backs upon their teachers, and refused their instructions.

In the last General Assembly it was incidentally remarked by the present prosecutor, that young men sometimes had gone to Princeton after studying elsewhere, with the precise design to inoculate with new divinity. This produced some excitement, was denied, and proof demanded. The proof was promptly given on the floor, and the evil probably does not now exist. Such conduct needs only to be held up to public view, to secure a just sentence upon it.

In the conferences held with Mr. Barnes, about the time he was received into the Presbytery of Philadelphia, by members and by a committee of Presbytery (though he refused to hear them as a committee,) he declared, and still declares, that he holds to the doctrines of the church, and is not conscious of teaching any thing materially at variance with them: the

"May 6, 7, 1602. In the beginning of this [his professorship] he endeavoured by every means to avert from himself any suspicion of heterodoxy; so that he defended by his support and patronage in public disputations [October 28,] the doctrine of the reformed churches, concerning the satisfaction of Christ, justifying faith, justification by faith, the perseverance of those who truly believe, the certitude of salvation, the imperfection of man in this life, and the other heads of doctrine, which he afterwards contradicted, and which at this day are opposed by his disciples. (This he did) contrary to his own opinion, as John Arnoldi Corvinus [one of his followers] in a certain Dutch writing ingenuously confesses." p. 10, 11.

"But when he had been now engaged in this employment as professor, a year or two, it was detected, that he publicly and privately attacked most of the dogmas received in the reformed churches, called them into doubt and rendered them suspected to his scholars." 11. "Most of the young men coming from the University of Leyden, and the instruction of Arminius, being called to the ministry of the churches, in the examination indeed concealed their opinion by ambiguous methods of speaking." p. 21. "They added that declaration of their own opinion concerning the same articles, which they under the ambiguous covering of words concealed, that so it might appear to the more unskilful not much distant from the truth." p. 36.

reader of his Notes and of the preceding argument must judge in this case. He will also observe that for some years after the first difficulty, nothing appeared to excite alarm and call forth contentions in the churches. Comparatively there was a suppression of the obnoxious sentiments.—It now appears, it was a fire only kept under, not extinguished. We are now told the sentiments have never been changed. They are held now by him as they always were.

Now the point here, to which the reader's mind is directed is simply this, and the comparison is not meant for Mr. Barnes only but for those in general who hold with him, the inconsistency of these views, and their maintenance with a profession of adherence to the Confession of Faith and Catechisms of our Church.

If there was no concealment now under ambiguous terms, would the Church be then distracted? Is not the fact of resistance to the right of examination proof undeniable, that men are afraid to be examined? Do the orthodox shrink from a full and unreserved exposure of their views?

2. *No difference in fundamentals—public peace and private war—delay.*

At the annual meetings of the Synods, reports were usually presented, in which grievances, if any existed, were arraigned by the Presbyteries. In 1605,the new theology was presented. "Arminius bore this very grievously, (*ægerrime*) and strove with all his power that this grievance should be recalled; which, when he could not obtain, by the assistance of the Curators [Trustees] of the University, he procured a testimonial from his colleagues, in which it is declared, "That indeed more things were disputed among the students, than it was agreeable to them; but that among the professors of sacred theology themselves, as far as it appeared to them, there was no dissention in fundamentals."

When a committee of the Presbytery waited on Arminius, "in order either that satisfaction might be given by him in a friendly conference, or the whole affair might be carried before a lawful Synod. To these (persons) he answered, "That he himself had never given just cause for these rumours; neither did it appear prudent in him to institute any conference with the same persons, as deputies, who should make the report concerning the matter, unto the Synod; but if they would lay aside this character, (*personam*,) he would not decline to confer with them, as private pastors, concerning ths doctrine; on this condition, tht if, perhaps, they should too

Here you see three points of resemblance between the ancient and modern policy connected with the same doctrines.

1. Every method is practised to prevent a doctrinal discussion and decision in the proper ecclesiastical bodies. Any kind of discussion was tolerable, but that which might lead to an ecclesiastical decision on the doctrinal points. Nor can the reader of the history be at any loss for the reason of this course. They were the *growing* party, and delay was an increase of their strength. Hence, though the fire of new-light broke out in 1602, all the efforts of the orthodox failed of bringing out an ecclesiastical decision until 1619. Thus for nearly seventeen years did they baffle and procure delay.

2. The reader will see another point of policy; viz. they regretted the prevalent disputation: it "was not agreeable to them." So now. The very men who have revived these errors, cry out for peace—"let us alone—what have we to do with thee." The art of creating mischief, and imputing it to others, seems inseparable from those errors. A notable instance I here record, as I have not seen it elsewhere recorded. For some ten years, the brethren of the Philadelphia Presbytery, had met for prayer in Dr. Green's study, on Monday morning. After the new theology became rife, its advocates drew off, and formed an opposi-

little agree among themselves, they would report nothing of this to the Synod. As the deputies judged this to be unjust, and as the solicitude could not be taken away from the churches by a conference of this kind, they departed from him without accomplishing their purpose." p. 12.

"When they had met together, the Remonstrants refused to institute the conference with the other six pastors, as with the deputies of the churches of Holland and West Friezland, such as they showed themselves to be by letters of commission, (*fidei*,) but they should seem to be adversaries of the churches ;—unless these would lay aside that character." p. 39.

tion prayer-meeting; they broke this form of brotherly communion, and yet, the matter was so managed, by some body or no body, that the impression prevailed generally, that the old school brethren had *refused* to pray with the new. So completely did this device succeed, that my brother-in-law, Dr. Dickey, who laboured much to heal the breach, came to me with the deep impression upon his mind that the old school brethren had drawn off and refused to pray with the others, and he was exceedingly hurt by it, and upon being correctly informed, was exceedingly surprised.

3. One other point. The matters in controversy are non-essentials—"there was no dissention in fundamentals." This is now the cry—it is only a dispute about terms—or philosophical distinctions—not worthy of serious notice.

Well, if our brethren really believe so, they can easily prove the sincerity of their belief, by *abstaining from the use of their terms and distinctions.* Does not the perpetuity of their contending, prove that *they* at *least* think the matters worth contending for?

3. *Braving a trial, and then shrinking from it.*

"He, (Arminius) nevertheless persisted in his purpose; so that he at length exclaimed, that he wondered, seeing various rumours of his errors had gone about through the churches; and the conflagration excited by him, was said to rise above the very roofs of the churches; that he yet found no

Mr. Barnes in the Presbytery of Philadelphia, invited, time after time, a regular trial. The same has been clamorously called for by others on the same side: a notable case of which bravo occurred in the General Assembly of 1834. But now, when their own request is granted—when charges are pre-

one, who dared to lodge an accusation against him. Gomarns, in order to meet this boasting, undertook to prove that he had taught such an opinion concerning the first article of our faith, namely, concerning the justification of man before God, as was opposed to the word of God, and to the Confession of the Belgic churches." p. 23.

Yet he was unwilling to meet it, for "When Arminius understood this, [that a Synod was about to be called] he procured, through Utenbogardus,—that the annual Synods themselves—should be deferred." p. 24.

The orthodox petitioned again for the calling of a Synod [the civil government then held the power to call] (June 23, 1608.) To this petition, the Illustrious States declared, that they had determined, in the next October, to call together a provincial Synod for this purpose. [viz. to decide these doctrinal disputes.] When this had been made known to the churches, all the pastors attached to Arminius were again admonished, that each of them would lay open to his classis, [Presbytery,] his considerations, that the same might be lawfully carried to the approaching Synod. But they, as before, so now also each of them, declined this with one consent, with their accustomed evasions." p. 24, 25.

sented, behold what patience-exhausting efforts have been made to evade a trial. For the evidence of such efforts you are referred to the Introduction, pp. vi—ix. of this little volume: and also to the history of the case, under appeal, before the Synod of Philadelphia—see Minutes, p. 10–19. You are also referred to the Barnes case, as it presented itself before the General Assembly of 1831. What extraordinary efforts were then made to evade a decision? True, some of the orthodox joined in the compromise, which every man now sees was a compromise, by the temporary sacrifice of truth; but then, it was because they could not procure a fair and full decision on the doctrinal points. The men who chiefly ruled in that Assembly were on the other side, and their weight led to that disastrous compromise. Let any candid man ask himself, wherefore this shrinking from a doctrinal decision? Can ingenuity, consistently with truth, return any other answer than this? viz. The new side feel conscious of departure from the standards of the Presbyterian church, and cannot abide a compromise, that may result in a legal decision?

4. *Refusing subscription to the Confession.*

"The Synod also commanded all the pastors, for the sake of testifying their consent in doctrine, that they should subscribe the Confession and Catechism

Parallel to this is the case of the non-subscribing Presbyterians in the Synod of the Western Reserve, and elsewhere. The General Assembly has

of those churches, which, in many classes [presbyteries] had been neglected, and by others refused."

"The pastors also who had embraced the opinion of Arminius, every where in the classes refused to obey the mandate of the Synod, concerning the subscription of the Confession and Catechism."—p. 14.

taken order, and required all her ministers to express their reception of the Confession and Catechisms, by answering the questions prescribed. With this rule and order they have never been able to secure compliance. It is believed that ministers have sat in the Assembly itself who had not adopted the Confession.

5. *Claim for toleration.*

"The remonstrants judged, that no more certain method of concord could be entered on, than a mutual toleration, by which each party might be permitted freely to teach and contend for his own opinion concerning these articles."—p. 46. "Such a toleration," adds Dr. Scott, in a note, "amounted to an entire abolition of the Belgic Confession and Catechism, without any previous interference of those Synods, classes, and Presbyteries, which were essential to their form of church government."

No man conversant with church affairs, can be at any loss to trace the resemblance here. In this land is a Constitution forming a visible bond of union —its principles are republican —but many citizens desire other principles, and proceed to create a civil government on monarchical or aristocratical principles. They appoint their officers, they disseminate their doctrines, &c. Our government interferes, and they claim free toleration—is it not a free country! "Such a toleration amounts to an entire abolition." Is not this what some desire?

6. *Misrepresentations of the Orthodox views.*

"In this [their Remonstrance] they placed before them [the civil rulers,] the doctrine of the Reformed churches, concerning the divine predestination, and the perseverence of the saints, unfaithfully (mala fide,) and not without open and atrocious slanders, that by this means they might render it odious to the illustrious orders."—p. 36.

Similar to this you may find facts at present existing. See the attempt, still persevered in, of representing the old school as teaching the doctrine of a personal identity with Adam—teaching the odious doctrine of fatalism, leading to all the abominations of Antinomianism—the doctrine of physical depravity—opposition to revivals of

Dr. Scott adds the note, "It seems a sort of *right by prescription* to Anti-Calvinists, to misrepresent and bear false witness against the Calvinistic doctrines, and those who hold them; I would that no Calvinist had ever imitated them in this respect."

religion—opposition to the temperance reformation, &c.

7. *Laxness in religious belief and associations, and in morals.*

"Hence the pastors attached to Arminius began even publicly to defame the received doctrine. Among these, a certain person (called) Adolphus Venator, was not the last; who, besides that he was of too little approved a life, (*vitæ minus probatæ*,) openly and by no means in a dissembling manner, scattered abroad Pelagian and Socinian errors with incredible impudence, publicly and privately; for which cause he was suspended from the office of teaching, by the legitimate judgment of the churches of North Holland, and a few other pastors whom he had drawn over into his opinion."—p. 29. "Yet this man did Arminius take as one of his coadjutors in the convention of the states, to debate before them the points of doctrine."—page 30. "And when the orthodox wished to have him excluded, 'Arminius vehemently struggled against it,' and succeeded."—p. 31.

After the death of Arminius, (October 19, 1609,) the whole power and influence of his followers were exerted to procure the appointment as his successor of "Conradus Vorstius, a professor of Steinfurt, a man for many years justly suspected by

Here you will observe, 1. A disregard of the censures of the church, when a party purpose was to be answered. 2. A determination to sustain the man, even though immorality was added to error in procuring his suspension. 3. Very serious and alarming errors did not disqualify from a professorship of theology, in the opinion of the Remonstrants. Vorstius was unquestionably a Socinian; and he had before sufficiently let out his poisonous doctrines; yet they pressed his appointment by all possible means. Is there not here indubitable evidence of elective affinity between the errors set forth above, and the soul-destroying doctrines of Socinus?

Now it is not intended here to intimate a disposition on the part of our new school brethren to favour either immorality or Socinianism. I have proved coincidence of doctrines in some specific points, and here hold up the beacon of warning. Laxness of principle must lead to laxness of practice; and, therefore, all error hath an immoral tendency.

It is perfectly obvious, moreover, that the denial of original sin and imputed righteousness,

the Reformed churches of Socinianism."—p. 36–46. "To prevent this, the orthodox laboured with all diligence, and king James I. of England, wrote and used all his influence against it."—p. 44.

of itself leads to confidence in the flesh, and so to immorality. And that subscription to a creed which is not sincre and true, is a dereliction from correct principle, and may lead to farther deviations. Let us avoid all evil and all appearance of evil.

Let these cases of coincidence in doctrine and policy be duly considered, and then let the reader ask himself, do they not prove identity of system? Is not the new theology of the nineteenth identically the same with the new theology of the seventeenth century? It will, I know, be said, that the writer exhibits another example of the *policy* he condemns. He is endeavouring to excite odium against the brethren on the other side. He denies and disclaims it. He does, indeed, ardently desire to excite odium against the *false doctrines;* but simply with a view to their condemnation, as they were condemned by the Synod of Dort, and to the deliverance of his brethren both from the errors and from the policy to which they lead. If such shall be the result, as he fondly hopes, then we shall soon be able to say, "Walk about Zion, and go round about her; tell the towers thereof. Mark ye well her bulwarks, consider her palaces, that ye may tell it to the generation following. For this God is our God for ever and ever; he will be our guide even unto death."

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